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Abstract 
Political support for the inclusion of social policy advocacy groups in the development of 
public policy is underpinned by a broad belief in the right of citizens to participate in or at 
least contribute to government decision making. Governments and state agencies consult 
widely on social issues when they see accountability and transparency as politically 
attractive, a form of both useful advice and risk management. While scholars have theorised 
on the benefits of non-state participation, empirical research on the role of policy advocacy 
groups in the development of Australian public policy is limited. This thesis examines the 
role of Queensland Shelter Inc., a state based social housing policy peak, in the 
development of Queensland social housing policy (1987-2012). While consultation 
processes are open and inclusive of a wide range of stakeholders, participation remains 
restricted to a select few. Why are some interest groups able to directly participate in the 
development of public policy while others are only consulted or even ignored?  
The influence of Queensland Shelter over housing policy has fluctuated over its twenty-five 
year history. Three factors were examined in relation to this oscillation: the organisational 
capacity of Queensland Shelter, the willingness of the housing ministry to engage and the 
broader political context. While the main focus of the study is to assess and analyse shifts 
in the relationship between Queensland Shelter and the state housing ministry, attention is 
also given to the connections between Queensland Shelter and other stakeholders, 
including the bureaucracy, other policy advocacy groups and the Australian federal 
government. These connections were found to be important factors in the ability to develop 
close working relationships with decision makers. 
Shelter’s changing role and its capacity to participate in the development of social housing 
policy are examined through documents and semi-structured interviews with former 
politicians, senior public servants, Shelter staff and board members, and other key players 
within the Queensland social housing sector. Throughout the period covered in this 
research, the Queensland housing ministry remained in a position of authority, at times 
enabling Queensland Shelter to participate and at other times shutting them out. While the 
capacity of Queensland Shelter to provide policy advice has expanded over the past twenty-
five years, the willingness of the state housing ministry to engage with this organisation 
continues to wax and wane, a product of both the minister at the time and the overall 
approach of the political party in power.  
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Introduction 
Governments encourage the participation of some not-for-profit interest groups, offering 
direct financial support and a willingness to listen to policy advice. The impact of this, 
however, on the ability of an organisation to participate in policy development varies greatly. 
Formal recognition by government is only part of the story – informal discussions around 
ideas and issues are as important to the development of public policy as official processes. 
Interest groups with close relationships with governments are able to work around the 
‘edges’1 of decision making. These edges represent ongoing discussions and relationships 
between an interest group and government stakeholders: understanding these is just as 
important as knowledge of the formal aspects of policy reform. Informal discussions occur 
throughout policy development, from defining the problem through to implementation.  
This thesis examines the role of Queensland Shelter Inc.2 in the development of social 
housing policy3 in Queensland over a twenty-five year period (1987-2012). Over this period, 
Shelter evolved from a grassroots community organisation to an almost fully government 
funded social housing advocacy peak. In this same time period, successive Queensland 
governments have played a major role in developing the community housing sector, not 
least because they wanted to retreat from the Housing Commission model where the 
government built the accommodation and then acted as landlord. This thesis explores the 
relationship between the state Department of Housing in Queensland4 and Queensland 
Shelter.  
                                            
1 Former chair of Queensland Shelter and long-standing community advocate Eleri Morgan-Thomas referred 
to ‘tinkering around the edges’ when describing incremental policy adjustment during her interview. The edges 
of policy making could also be used to describe informal discussions surrounding a policy issue (Morgan-
Thomas 2013 interview by the author).  
2 Within thesis herein referred to as Shelter. 
3 Social housing policy is defined as policy which concerns the provision and supply of “…accommodation 
managed on a non-profit basis and provided or subsidised by government in order to meet social aims. It is 
provided primarily for low-income earners …” (Shelter 2002). 
4 The name of the actual department responsible for social housing changes often, representing various 
couplings with other state functions. See appendix B.  
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Queensland Shelter is a not-for-profit policy peak advocating to improve access to safe and 
secure housing for all Queenslanders, while recognising that “Our funding mandate and 
social justice framework puts particular focus on the interests of low and moderate income 
housing consumers in Queensland” (Carson 2011: 8). Shelter is managed by a volunteer 
committee, which is elected at each Annual General Meeting. The Committee, or Board has 
it has been known in recent years is responsible for the strategic direction and the executive 
which oversees Shelter’s financial responsibilities. Membership consists of individual 
members and organisations.  
Theoretical framework  
An adaptation of Wyn Grant’s pressure group typology (published in Pressure Groups, 
Politics and Democracy in Britain, 1989) is used as an analytical framework for analysing 
the variances which have occurred within the relationship between the government of the 
day and Shelter. Over the thirty or so years since Grant’s typology was first published, the 
pressure group literature has become dominated by examination of pressure groups5 as 
members of policy networks.  
The Marsh and Rhodes (1992) typology of networks is widely employed by public policy 
scholars to distinguish between types of policy networks. The typology arranges these 
networks on a spectrum ranging from issue network at one end to policy community at the 
other. An issue network has fluctuating participation, a high level of conflict and may include 
members who lack power and resources (Marsh & Rhodes 1992). In contrast a policy 
community is characterised as having limited membership, frequent interaction between all 
members and cohesion in values and ideology across membership (Marsh & Rhodes 1992). 
In a policy community each of the members have resources that are valuable to other 
members of the network. In other words, each participant of the policy community will bring 
something to the table that other members of the community need or at least find useful. 
This has led some scholars to argue that policy communities emerge without the agency of 
government, with inclusion due to the resources held by each organisation rather than state 
permission: 
                                            
5 Within this thesis I use pressure groups and interest groups interchangeably but provide an historical 
perspective on the vernacular in chapter one.  
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Government cannot be characterised as the central all-commanding actor who 
unilaterally - irrespective of the resources which groups possess - decides who gain 
access … Such a perspective denies the validity of what we believe … to be the 
currency for exchange-based behaviour within closed policy making arenas … 
(Maloney 1994: 23).  
Within the social housing sector there are many examples of issue networks and policy 
communities – but the network typology does not account for the role that the state plays 
within the welfare sector in enabling some organisations to develop greater capacity (and 
resources) in order to participate in policy communities. This is not to suggest that 
community organisations are without agency. Community groups work hard to develop skills 
and strategies in order to gain funding and recognition from governments. Recognition may 
come in the form of funding which will enable sustainable growth – capacity to provide 
advice, represent members and participate in policy.  
This research does not seek to challenge the importance of studying policy networks. 
Instead I argue that the relationship between the state and interest groups within the 
Queensland social housing sector should be studied to determine whether an interest group 
will be able to access a policy sub-system, such as a policy community. Governments retain 
the authority to regulate the invitation list for policy networks. In the community sector, many 
organisations are reliant on government for funds, thus they are in competition for the 
attention of government. Attention comes in various forms and includes direct funding and/or 
having the ‘ear’ of decision makers to being open to listening to advice. This is not to suggest 
a negative view of the role of the state – governments are compelled to play favourites within 
a representative system of democracy.  
The role of state arbitration is referred to by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) as the 
“ugliness of democracy”. Choosing between competing interests creates winners and losers. 
Decision makers are routinely faced with very difficult choices – deciding, for example 
whether to increase funds for a program for housing for those with a disability or providing 
additional crisis accommodation for those escaping a family violence situation. Some 
governments are experimenting with participatory democracy in which there is opportunity 
for citizen deliberation and consensus. Examples of these, however, remain rare and are 
usually issue specific rather than broad bush attempts at reforming the way in which public 
decisions are made. Consensus is difficult and time consuming – governments instead aim 
for acceptance. One way of gaining the public’s acceptance is to consult with community 
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groups during a ‘consultation’ and/or during the implementation phase. In recent decades 
peak advocacy groups have emerged within the social sector to work more closely with 
governments on policy development. Studying the role of advocacy groups is particularly 
relevant to the issue of democracy because “Professionalized (sic) non-profits often have a 
disproportionate ability to speak on the behalf of others, shaping public understandings of 
social problems and advocating for preferred solutions” (Dempsey 2011: 149). Peaks have 
the capacity to strengthen democracy by enabling the participation of citizens provided they 
are representative of a broad membership. Governments are accountable for the decisions 
they make regarding the funding of peak advocacy groups. As Hancock observed: 
“… perhaps more significant from the democratic point of view was the fact that 
politicians could decide which groups were to be recognised as peak bodies, how 
much funding they would receive, whether this funding would be withdrawn, and 
whether this power would be in fact be used by politicians to stifle outside voices …” 
(Hancock 2006: 53). 
In this thesis I spend time distinguishing between interest groups which are enabled to 
participate and those that are not: the rhetoric of community consultation should not be 
confused with an open door for all. Since the election of the Goss government in 1989 
successive state governments in Queensland have taken more interest in the views of 
welfare groups than prior conservative governments. The level of this inclusion varies, 
depending on the issue, capacity of the interest group and government of the day. Change 
to the relationship between governments and peak groups are mostly incremental, with 
punctuations following political elections and/or bursts of radical policy change such as 
funding reviews. In this thesis I use these punctuations as pauses within the narrative: the 
case study chapters are organised into political eras. Without exception, when there was a 
change in the governing party there was also a change to the level in which Shelter was 
able to participate. The thesis uses evidence of formal permission (for example government 
funding, inclusion in regular meetings, policy network membership) as a starting point for 
examining the relationship between Shelter and successive state housing ministries. In 
addition to policy documentation, the use of oral history has enabled a much greater 
understanding of the role of Shelter in the development of social housing policy, providing 
insights into informal policy discussion which underpin formal decision making.  
My interest in studying the specific relationships between interest groups and the 
governments that fund them evolved during an earlier study I had conducted for a Masters 
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Research project. Before embarking on this PhD study, I completed a short research project 
as part of a postgraduate program in governance and public policy at the University of 
Queensland. Early in the course Stephen Bell, who was in the process of writing a book, 
Reinventing Governance: the Centrality of the State posed a challenge to the student cohort: 
could any of us provide an example of non-governmental governance? In his book, he 
argued with his co-author Andrew Hindmoor, that while neo-liberal governments had 
increasingly developed “strategic relationships with a range of non-state actors" this had 
enhanced their capacity to govern rather than weakened it (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 2). I 
became aware of a radical decision by a policy network of sheep farmers and industry 
representatives to phase out a long held Australian farming practice and for my final 
research project I examined this decision as a possible rare example of a public policy 
decision made by non-state actors. 
In 2004 the Australian Sheep and Industry Taskforce announced that sheep mulesing in 
Australia would be phased out by 2010. There did not appear to be any government 
involvement, rather the Australian wool and sheep sector had formed a taskforce to respond 
to the threat of international retailers boycotting Australian Wool. The taskforce was led by 
Australian Wool Innovation (AWI), who are responsible for research and development into 
the wool industry. AWI is a not-for-profit organisation, formed by the Australian government 
and funded through a statutory funding agreement, governed by a board of directors. In 
order to demonstrate a case of decision making by a non-state actor I needed to establish 
the autonomy of AWI from the state. This proved more difficult to establish than anticipated.  
While the government was not technically involved in the decision to phase out sheep 
mulesing, it remained in a position of authority. AWI promoted its self-determination, stating 
on its website that it was a fully independent “public company limited by shares and owned 
by Australian woolgrowers” (AWI 2011). But an examination of the legislation (Wool Services 
Privatisation Act 2000) reveals that the federal government retains a great deal of authority 
over this organisation. The Australian Government regulates the activities of AWI through 
the statutory funding agreement: “Accountability mechanisms are in place so that the 
Commonwealth can be satisfied that the company is using the money appropriately for the 
benefit of wool growers” (Australian Government 2004: ix). Analysis of the documentation 
regarding the governance of AWI, revealed that the decision to phase out sheep mulesing 
was not an example of non-state governance because had the government wished to 
intervene in the decision they retained the power to do so. Thus I concluded that the decision 
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to phase out sheep mulesing had not occurred without the agency of the Australian 
government. While initially disappointed that I had not uncovered a rare example of non-
state decision making, the project inspired inquiry into the role of interest groups in public 
decision making and the methods of research that could be used to examine the impact and 
participation of interest groups. I became interested in the separation between a fully funded 
interest group and the government that funded it – how does a group remain autonomous 
from government when funded by state money? Without autonomy an interest group is at 
risk of being captured, no longer able to represent the interests of its membership.  
Participation, Power and Influence 
One of the reasons there is limited study of interest groups is because the influence of 
groups is inherently difficult to measure. Throughout this thesis I equate active participation 
with the opportunity to influence. During each of the core chapters I describe the interaction 
between Shelter and the government of the day in relation to its relationship with 
government, attempting to assess what influence Shelter asserted. My own understanding 
of power and influence has been guided by the community power literature. Lukes’ (2005) 
seminal work on power, provides a critique of previous work within this field, arguing that 
there are three “faces” of power. The power of the ruling elite as evidenced by decisions 
made, the power to set the political agenda and the power to set preferences. A short 
discussion of the three faces of power is included in this introduction because it provides the 
context for the importance of studying formal and informal interaction between Shelter and 
the government of the day. My evidence for agenda and preference setting draws heavily 
on interviews conducted for this thesis.  
Early studies into public policy decision making were based on the assumption that power 
was held by the ruling elite. A renowned example is Floyd Hunter’s 1953 research, in which 
he attempted to ‘locate’ power within an American city, which was referred to within the study 
as ‘Regional City’. Hunter studied the decisions made with the assumption that these 
decisions were made by the leaders. “It was taken as axiomatic that community life is 
organized (sic) and that persons occupying “offices” and public positions of trust would be 
involved in some manner in the power relations of the community” (Hunter 1953: 263). Once 
he had identified the community leaders, Hunter used structured interviews to examine who 
had the power to make decisions (Hunter 1953: 7).  
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The concept of elite decision makers was challenged by pluralists. Dahl (1961) approached 
his community power study with the assumption that western democratic governments had 
moved from “oligarchy to pluralism”. Rather than assume, as Hunter had done, that leaders 
were a “‘ruling elite”’ he argued that they may well be “captives of their constituents” (Dahl 
1961: 89). Dahl even went so far as to argue that “It is theoretically possible, of course that 
‘real decision-makers’ differed from the official decision-makers ...” (1961: 11). He studied 
the city of New Haven in Connecticut for several years to determine who had the authority 
to make decisions. Like Hunter, Dahl studied the decisions made, choosing three areas of 
public policy: public education, urban redevelopment and aspects of the electoral process. 
In both Hunter’s and Dahl’s research, power was a study of who wins and who loses (Lukes 
1974: 18). The first dimension (or adopting Lukes’ vernacular, face of power) involves the 
study of the decisions, and the overt conflict that occurred in the lead up to that decision. 
An important critique of community power studies was undertaken by Bachrach & Baratz 
(1963) who contended that power was not only located in the decisions made but also in 
non-decisions. Dahl (1961) had also raised the issue of non-decisions in his publication, 
Who Governs? “If a party politician sees no payoff, his (sic) interest is likely to be small; if 
he foresees an adverse effect, he will avoid the issue if he can” (Dahl 1961: 93). Bachrach 
& Baratz, however, made much more of the issue of avoidance and argued that preventing 
certain issues from being discussed was as important as the study of decisions made. 
Powerful entities could in fact keep certain ideas or issues off the political agenda. Bachrach 
& Baratz (1963) argued that this was the second dimension of power and that the scrutiny 
of non-decisions was just as important to the study of power as that of decisions. Hogwood 
(1992: 5) likens the choice to study decisions in the absence of other contexts to “the story 
of the drunk man searching for his keys under a lamppost – not because they are likely to 
be there, but because there is more light” (cited in Cairney 2012: 61-62). Examining non-
decision making is more difficult, but interests that did not make it onto the political agenda 
can be observable through the study of “policy preference or grievances” (Lukes 1974). 
For Bachrach and Baratz (1963) conflict remained a necessary component of power as 
without conflict there was no need to exert power. Bachrach and Baratz’s definition of power 
includes an implicit understanding of both the first and second dimension of power: “‘A 
achieves B’s compliance using overt or tacit threats’” (Cairney 2012: 49). While some 
authors use the words power and influence interchangeably, (Baldwin 1980, Kerbo & 
McKinstry 1995 cited in Zimmerling 2005: 97, Barry & Watson 1996 cited in Krause and 
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Kearney 2006), influence is described as where “One person has influence over another 
within a given scope to the extent that the first, without resorting to either a tacit or an overt 
threat of severe deprivations, caused the second to change his (sic) course of action” 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 637 emphasis in original). In practical terms influence is defined 
as “the ability to change, direct, or affect the behaviour of others without ordering or 
threatening them” (Harvard Business School 2006: 62).  
The power to influence the policy agenda can be as important as the power to make 
decisions. Matthew Crenson (1971) was one of the first scholars to study non-decisions 
empirically, in his study of air pollution in two cities in the United States. The premise of his 
study was to query why air pollution was ignored in some places and dealt with in others. 
He applied his interpretation of the ideas of Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and 
Schattschneider (1960) to his study. Schattschneider had already noted that political 
debaters express “bias in favour of the exploitations of some kinds of conflicts and the 
suppression of others because organization is the mobilization (sic) of bias” 
(Schattschneider 1960 cited in Crenson 1971: 23 italics in original). Crenson’s 1971 study 
encountered the methodological challenge of studying what had not occurred. He addressed 
this issue by comparing two cities: why did some cities tackle air pollution while others 
managed to avoid any discussion? Using Dahl’s (1979) definition, he argued that power 
means that “A can get B to do things that B would not otherwise do. The critical step in the 
analysis of power is therefore to find out what B would ordinarily do” (Crenson 1971: 33). In 
his comparative study he was able to theorise on what B would ordinarily do by observing a 
similar town with similar air pollution problems. Rather than employing a comparative study 
between organisations, I have examined the preferences of Shelter and analysed whether 
these were given consideration by the state government. I have spoken with former Shelter 
staff and other government and non-government actors to determine whether Shelter were 
able to persuade the state government to include certain items on the policy agenda. The 
second dimension requires the study of preferences: what, for example, did Shelter choose 
to put forward? What preferences or policy positions were excluded by decision makers? 
How did Shelter shape the policy agenda? With the knowledge that the Minister for Housing 
is not the sole decider, a peak advocacy group would benefit from a broader target than just 
the Department of Housing but this requires resources that a smaller outfit may not have 
available. Peak policy groups may also empower the minister with evidence and knowledge 
so that he or she can act as a “policy entrepreneur” (Kingdon 1984: 129) within Cabinet or 
to other decision makers such as the Queensland Treasury.  
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In 1975 Steven Lukes (1974) published a critique of the first and second dimensions of 
power, Power: A Radical View.6 His main critique of Bachrach & Baratz (1963) was that 
conflict need not be observed in order for power to be present. Lukes (2005) argued that 
power could be expressed without conflict by controlling the preferences of other parties:  
… A may exercise power over B by getting him (sic) to do what he does not want to 
do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his 
very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others 
to have the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by 
controlling their thoughts and desires? (Lukes 2005: 27 emphasis in original). 
Lukes identified that the power to control preferences was the third ‘face’ of power and 
related this to the role of dominant ideas and broader ideologies within public policy making 
(Cairney 2012: 220). The ability of Shelter to persuade the government, as well as other 
members of the housing sector, to implement certain ideas is emphasised within this study. 
Ideas as well as an understanding of the practical and political implications of prospective 
policy interventions are important to peak organisations as they often rely on this knowledge 
to influence decision makers.  
The Study of Peak Advocacy Groups  
The establishment of peak advocacy groups has occurred in other parts of the world with 
terms such as “intermediaries, resource/umbrella groups, trade associations, coalitions, 
federations and advocacy organisations …” (Melville 1999a: 2) used to describe such 
groups.  
By 2007 Australia had the highest percentage of social services provided by the not-for-
profit sector, higher than: 
… almost any other country, with the sector turning over $100 billion a year – more 
than the revenue of BHP Billiton (at $66 billion) or Telstra, News Corp and the 
Commonwealth Bank combined (together, about $80 billion) (Dalton 2013). 
In 2010 the Australian Government Productivity Commission published findings on the 
contributions made by the sector and recommendations on further government intervention 
which would “enhance its effectiveness and achieve even better outcomes for the 
                                            
6 Republished in 2005 with additional chapters. 
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community” (Australian Government 2010: iii). The Productivity Commission noted that while 
historically the sector was involved primarily in the delivery of social goods and services, the 
sector had also become increasingly involved in “raising awareness of social and 
environmental issues” which the commission attributed to “increasing involvement in the 
delivery of government funded services” (Australian Government 2010: 2). Peak bodies 
were established to provide a unified voice to governments, negating some of the complexity 
involved with dealing with a wide range of disparate interests within a sector.  
Research into Australian peak bodies has focussed on the relationship between the peak 
and the government (see May 1996, Sawer and Jupp 1996, Sawer 2002 and Melville 1999 
cited in Cheverton 2005). The majority of these studies, however, are point-in- time studies, 
employing large survey data in order to critique the relationship between peaks and the 
governments that fund them. Few Australian studies have provided an historical analysis of 
the development of interest groups and their relationship to government, focussing on how 
and why they try and influence, and assessing when they are and are not successful.  
In addition, Philip Mendes’ publication Inside the Welfare Lobby (2006) examines the work 
of the Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS) between 1955 and 2006. Mendes’ 
study examines the organisation in light of its strategies, dynamic relationship with the major 
Australian political parties, internal ideological conflict and influence over the period. This is 
a much broader study of an interest group than research undertaken in this thesis, which 
has concentrated on the relationship with governments in power over a twenty-five year 
period.  
University of Queensland academic Dr Rose Melville has contributed to the limited 
“theoretical and empirical literature” on policy peaks in Australia (Melville 2003: 95) through 
“two ARC Small research grants conducted between 1997 and 1999 (including a pilot study 
of 24 peaks) and a three-year ARC Discovery grant (200-2002) (Melville 2003:2006). These 
studies employed mixed methods, including large scale survey research and in depth 
interviews7. These methods enabled the development of baseline data, which will assist 
researchers to compare the experiences and strategies of multiple community sector peaks. 
Survey research was not possible due to resource constraints, but this study contributes to 
                                            
7 Melville (2006) notes that “Important lessons about survey design were learnt during the pilot study (1998) 
which were then applied to the three-year ARC study” (2006: 102). 
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the study of peaks by analysing Shelter’s relationship with successive Queensland 
governments and the organisation’s contribution to public policy development.  
Halpin (2004) provides a historical account of interest group representation within the 
Australian agricultural sector. Halpin (2004) identifies several phases of rural representation 
over the course of Australian history: primary producer groups interests, political parties and 
peak groups. Halpin argues that three perspectives are required in order to study the 
evolution of interest groups: “… the pattern of social interaction, economic conditions and 
the prevailing political process in catalysing transitions between “phases of representation” 
(Halpin 2004: 469). The willingness of the government of the day to work with interest groups 
is referred to as the Political Opportunity Structure. As Eisinger 1973 writes: 
 The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is 
not simply a function of the resources they command but of the openings, weak spots, 
barriers, and resources of the political system itself (1973: 12).  
An understanding of the political climate, the willingness of the ministry to listen to advocacy, 
the historical relationship between Shelter and members of the government of the day and 
the state bureaucracy have been imperative to analysis within this thesis. In a review of the 
state of research on interest groups in the European Union and America, Beyers, Eising and 
Maloney (2008) argue that:  
A more explicit and thorough linkage of interest group politics with the overall 
structure of conflict in a polity seems crucial in order to better understand the role of 
advocates in a broader political context (2008: 119).  
Each of the narratives included within the thesis includes discussion on the political and 
economic environment. Grant (1989: 128) noted that “It must be emphasised that two 
governments within the same party label can be very different in their approach to pressure 
group activity”. This difference can be readily seen in the broader environment in which 
policy in Queensland is made. Government reviews into peak funding, such as the one 
mentioned above by the Australian Productivity Commission, are also important sources of 
historical information regarding the programs and policies put into place to strengthen and 
enhance peak participation in policy process.  
Earlier in this chapter I discussed the role of peaks in strengthening democratic practices. 
In order for this to occur, peaks must attempt to remain representative of their membership 
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base and provide policy advice that is based on well thought out positions, backed with 
appropriate evidence where available. Jeff Cheverton who has worked on a number of 
Queensland social peak boards, including Queensland Shelter, argues that “the role of 
members and the operations of governing bodies within peak bodies are under-researched 
and rarely publicly documented” (Cheverton 2005: 428). Further research is required in 
order to “document examples of responsive, membership-based governance practices in 
Australian peak bodies” (Cheverton 2005: 428). With this is mind, I pay close attention to 
Shelter’s emergence as the peak body for social housing in Queensland. The governance 
practices of Shelter are discussed in detail within chapter five and are also referred to 
throughout the thesis.  
This thesis engages with the governance narrative to explore the changes to advocacy work 
by community organisations8, contributing to the limited empirical research on the role of 
peak advocacy bodies in the development of social policy. An adaption of Wyn Grant’s 
pressure group typology (1989) is used to examine the role of Shelter in the development of 
social housing policy. Oral history has been used to document and analyse changes in the 
relationship between Shelter and successive governments of Queensland.  
                                            
8 Within this thesis I refer to not-for-profit, community sector organisations and NGO interchangeably.  The 
activities, legal structure and purpose of Shelter can be described using any of these terms. These terms, 
however, hold slightly different meanings, depending on academic discipline, ethnicity and/or time period. For 
example ‘NGO’ is used within the “development literature” to refer to “public-benefit nonprofit organisations …” 
but used “in government documents it often encompasses for-profit organisations as well” (Lyons 2001:9). 
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Chapter One:  
Persuading government: pressure to advocacy 
In recent decades governments have expanded the modes by which they govern, employing 
a range of tools to steer and direct, including governing through associations and markets 
and the use of persuasion and community engagement (Bell & Hindmoor 2009). This 
change is described within the literature as the governance shift (Salamon 1995, Sørensen 
2006, Bell & Hindmoor 2009). Governance can be understood as a contrast to traditional 
forms of governing, in which governments relied on hierarchal power (Grix and Phillpots 
2011). Within the governance paradigm, the government retains authority and increases 
capacity to govern by developing relationships with non-state actors (Bell & Hindmoor 2009). 
The role of the state within the governance paradigm is that of metagovernor. Governments 
have developed a range of regulatory rules which govern the governance arrangements of 
non-state actors (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 46). This has meant a nominally greater role for 
some community organisations in the development of policy – at the cost of 
bureaucratisation and a move away from grassroots representation. This chapter examines 
the impact of the governance shift on the role of not-for-profit advocacy groups; non-state 
actors have become drawn into complex contractual relationships with governments. 
Government and Governance 
Scholarly contributions on the impact of the governance shift9 are both descriptive and 
normative (see Osborne 2006). Australian governments have increasingly shifted from the 
direct provision of welfare services to a contract management role. The state has played a 
role in developing the community sector to provide social goods and services and at the 
same time become more willing to listen to the views of some community organisations. 
There is a normative expectation that the development and involvement of the community 
                                            
9Smith 2009 notes that the literature has taken an “Anglo-American view of the state,” the governance shift is 
not universal (Dunleavy 1994 & Hood 1995 cited by Smith 2009). 
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sector is beneficial: in terms of service provision and participation in discussions which 
underpin the understanding of social problems and their possible solutions. 
Torfing, Peters, Pierre and Sørensen (2012) describe modern governance as an: 
… enhanced interaction between public policymakers and relevant stakeholders, 
competent and knowledge-based decision-making, innovative policy solutions, 
flexible and coordinated policy implementation, and democratic ideals about 
inclusion, empowerment, and ownership (2012: 9). 
A key debate within the governance literature is whether the shift from government to 
governance has undermined the power of the state. Society centric governance scholars 
argued that non-state actors, as members of policy networks, are increasingly autonomous 
from government in public policy decision making (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, Kooiman 1993, 
de Bruijn and ten Heuvelfhof 1997 cited in Peters & Pierre 1996: 225). Self-organising 
networks have been touted as examples of the power of non-state actors and the increasing 
centrality of society (see Grix and Phillpots 2011, Duffy 2006, Newberry 2010); leading to 
claims of diminishing state capacity (Sørensen & Torfing 2009, Rhodes 1996). Others claim, 
as I do, that although the mechanisms through which governments govern have changed, 
the state is still central and remains in control (Bell & Hindmoor 2009, Marsh, Richards & 
Smith 2001). Empirically, while it is clear that public policy decision making involves 
“complex permutations of government and the private and voluntary sectors” (Bevir & 
Richards 2009: 5) it is debatable whether policy networks can be claimed to be “the heart of 
governance” (Bevir & Richards 2009: 5). For all the talk regarding the participation of policy 
networks, policy cannot be developed and implemented without the agency of government: 
This increasing clamour of voices does not mean that governments have allowed the 
reins of policy-making to slip from their grasp. At the end of the day, no matter the 
range and depth and variety of policy prescriptions and advice on offer, policy is not 
actually done until decisions are made and the legitimacy and authority of the 
government has been engaged (Stewart-Weeks 2006: 190). 
Bell & Hindmoor (2009) argue that rather than weaken state capacity these associations 
enhance the capacity of governments to govern. The state remains in control of complex 
relationships and associations by ‘governing the governance arrangements;’ which is 
referred to within the literature as metagovernance. Sørensen (2006: 100) defines 
metagovernance as “a way of enhancing coordinated governance in a fragmented political 
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system based on a high degree of autonomy for a plurality of self-governing networks and 
institutions”. More simply metagovernance is the “regulation of self-regulation” (Sørensen 
2006: 98), the “governing of governance” (Bell & Hindmoor 2009) and/or “the organization 
of self-organization (sic) (Jessop 1998: 42). It is unlikely that a non-state actor will have the 
capacity to metagovern (Mayntz 1993, Scharpf 1994). As Klijn and Koppenjan write: 
They [government] occupy a special position, which in most cases cannot be filled by 
others. Resources that determine this special position include: sizable budgets and 
personnel, special powers, access to mass media, a monopoly on the use of force 
and democratic legitimization (sic) (2000: 151).  
However, the possibility of non-government actors as metagovernors is not completely ruled 
out in the literature ... “the metagovernor can, in principle, be anyone with adequate 
legitimacy and resources to perform metagovernance; in reality, it will often be state actors” 
… (Lund 2009: 248). Sørensen and Torfing (2009) write that “legitimate and resourceful 
private actors” may also exercise metagovernance (2009: 246). But the instance of 
nongovernmental metagovernance is argued as rare. Bovaird (2005) argues that the phrase 
governance without government is at times reported within the literature but that “… in 
practice, few go so far as to suggest that successful governance can be maintained without 
the agency of government” (2005: 221). The powers of the state are unrivalled: 
The actors who control the modern state have a their disposal a set of powers and 
resources – from formal constitutional and legal authority to vast fiscal, administrative, 
informational resources and access to expertise – that are qualitatively and 
quantitatively unlike those available to other actors in society (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 
71). 
A dichotomy between government and governance is a false proposition: it is not a case of 
either top down hierarchy or governance without government (Rhodes 1996), but more that 
governments have increased their reach through the use of old and new modes of 
governance (Bell & Hindmoor 2009). The shift to governance has enabled governments to 
monitor and oversee the delivery of goods and services by the not-for-profit sectors: 
enhancing not diminishing state capacity. Bell & Hindmoor (2009) refer to this as state-
centric relational governance:  
Instead, we develop a ‘state-centric relational’ account of governance, arguing that 
states have enhanced their capacity to govern by strengthening their own institutional 
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and legal capacities but also by developing closer relations with non-state actors ... 
Our state-centric relational approach emphasises the importance of the state and 
also the importance of state-society relations in governance (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 
xiii-iv). 
Governments have increased capacity for regulating non-state activity development through 
the use of hard and soft regulatory mechanisms which shape and steer activity, examples 
include “new contracting, procurement and management structures, such as PPPs [private 
public partnerships], alliances and JVs [Joint Ventures]” (Pinnegar 2011: 10). Successive 
governments at all levels within Australia have introduced a variety of regulatory 
frameworks, including “industry standards, monitoring and reporting mechanisms and 
support for training for both workers and management in the human services” (Siemon 1997: 
4). The introduction of Incorporated Associations Acts by each Australian state and territory 
is an example of soft regulation; interest groups are encouraged (through tax breaks and 
increased opportunity for funding) but not forced into incorporating.  
There is no single explanation for the governance shift. Colebatch (2006) argues that the 
engagement of non-state actors in policy development is underpinned by several ideas: 
ideological – that, in a democratic society, all members of the community can and 
should join in determining how it will be governed 
cognitive – that the problems which policy are addressing are complex, and will not 
be adequately understood unless all those affected join in the definition of the 
problem and of appropriate responses to it 
tactical – that stakeholder will be more likely to accept the policy outcome if they had 
a hand in framing it 
functional – that for a policy decision to take effect it needs to be understood and 
accepted (owned) by a wide range of people, not just the officials responsible for its 
implementation and widespread participation in the policy process will help to bring 
this about 
developmental – that participation promotes a more collaborative form of governing, 
which actually has more impact than command-and-control models, that is, 
participation increases the capacity to govern (2006: 114-15). 
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The tactical and functional elements of Colebatch’s list suggest that non-state involvement 
can aid in legitimising policy decisions – this involvement may also improve implementation 
processes. The support and inclusion of non-state actors, preferably those that are involved 
in the program at hand, can aid in successful implementation (Bell & Hindmoor 2009, 
Pressman & Wildavsky 1984).  
Political and economic events and crises have also contributed to the acceptance of non-
state involvement. Many western countries experienced fiscal crises following the explosion 
of social welfare expenditure during the 1980s and 1990s (Bell & Hindmoor 2009). 
Governments have implemented cost reduction measures and new approaches to public 
administration – referred to by scholars as New Public Management (NPM)10. NPM is a 
critique of the inefficiencies of the welfare state (Maddison & Denniss 2009: 50-1). As Self 
(1999) writes “the reorganisation of government itself along market lines and utilising market 
motivations” (1999: 2). Scholars have argued that by outsourcing the provision of goods and 
services, governments have shifted the responsibility to the community sector (Lyons 2001, 
McGregor-Lowndes 2008). This may be true regarding day-to-day level of service provision. 
If, however, something goes terribly wrong the government remains at risk, politically 
governments are held responsible for either mismanaging the contract and/or not regulating 
the sector efficiently. A recent example where government was held to account is the Home 
Insulation Scheme, introduced by the Rudd Federal government. A Royal Commission into 
the Home Insulation Program was established to examine the actions of the government in 
light of the death of several employees employed by private contractors.  
Tragedies also provide the impetus for government action. In 2000 fifteen people were killed 
in a fire at the Childers Palace Backpackers Hostel (located in Queensland, Australia). 
Robert Long was charged with murder and sentenced to life in prison for deliberately lighting 
the fire which caused the death of hostel residents. Although the government was not 
responsible for the actions of Long, the incident promoted the Queensland State Labor 
Beattie Government to establish the fire safety taskforce, which led to the adoption of 
specific fire safety practices for hostels and boarding houses.  
The following sections of this chapter examine the changing role of advocacy groups and 
the work that governments have come to expect from these groups, in light of the 
                                            
10 See Osborne (2006) for a robust discussion examining the intersection between governance and New Public 
Management. 
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governance shift. An understanding of this shift is important to this thesis because it 
represents change to the way in which some community interest groups interact with 
decision makers. This thesis explores the nature of this change by examining the history 
and development of Shelter.  
Lobbying 
The meaning of the word lobby is derived “from the practice of frequenting the lobby of a 
house of legislature to influence its members into supporting a cause” (Oxford Dictionaries 
Online 2014). The derivation illustrates the limited access citizens had to decision makers, 
left with little opportunity other than to waylay politicians in parliamentary and bureaucratic 
foyers. This is a useful metaphor for understanding how the majority of interest groups 
operated prior to the governance shift. Unable to participate in policy discussions, groups 
aimed to persuade the government on alternative courses of action via an array of lobbying 
techniques. 
Lobbying of elected officials has occurred for “as long as nations have had governments” 
(Sheehan & Sekuless 2012: 1). The act of lobbying is a “concentrated, concerted attempt to 
inform, educate or persuade government to a certain way of thinking ... (Sekuless 1984: 2 
citing The Canberra Times). While groups and individuals have long been involved in 
lobbying, the language used to identify organisations, the strategies used to persuade and 
the political environment in which these organisations work have varied over time. Interest 
group, pressure group, lobbyist, peak advocacy, peak lobby – these terms are used by some 
interchangeably – yet others use these terms to imply specific types of activities and/or 
organisations. There is no clear definition of each term, and likely differences in meaning 
depending on the sector and/or historical period.  
Pressure group, for example, is a term and concept which has faded from popular 
vernacular. In part the term reflected the assumption that government is the elite – decisions 
were made by elected officials on behalf of the citizens, with little input from those affected 
by the reform. Affecting change required challenging the elite, applying ‘pressure’ on the 
government in order to force policy reform. During the social movement period of the 1970s 
there were public clashes over policies and issues such as the Vietnam War and equal pay 
and land rights for indigenous people (Maddison & Scalmer 2006: 3). Pressure groups 
formed in response to social justice issues including affordable housing, women’s rights and 
gender inequalities.  
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Many lobbyists were themselves former insiders, hired because they had connections with 
people in parliament and/or a good understanding of the ‘rules of the game’, both of which 
were helpful to interest groups (Sekuless 1984: 9). A survey conducted in 1978 by Geoff 
Allen11 revealed a wide range of activity, with the majority of lobbyists spending the largest 
percentage of their time monitoring government policy: 
90 percent: monitors of government 
80 percent: advice on strategy 
65 percent: assistance in preparing representations 
65 percent: arranging contacts 
15 percent: directly representing company’s interests 
(Sekuless 1984: xi) 
The hiring of former parliamentary insiders is viewed as problematic in terms of equity and 
financial probity. Powerful interests have the capacity to hire ‘insiders’ and rather than 
contribute to equality, these relationships may have helped to elevate powerful interests. 
These concerns led to the introduction of the Lobbyists Registration Scheme (LRS) in 1983 
by the Australian Federal Government. The LRS did not last long, abolished in 1996 after 
criticisms regarding its effectiveness (Hogan, Chari & Murphy 2011: 37). 
This was, however, a short respite for professional lobbyists, before dramatic instances of 
corruption and nepotism led to the reintroduction of lobby regulations; these days codes 
exist federally and in every state in Australia (Civitella 2012: 34). Western Australia was the 
first state to reintroduce regulations following the Burke scandal in 200712. Queensland 
introduced a lobbyist’s code in 2009, established to ensure “transparent and honest” conduct 
between lobbyists and the government. Unlike the other state’s codes, the Queensland code 
stipulated a “cooling off” period so that ministers could not move directly from parliament to 
a lobby position (Hogan et al 2011: 38) and banned lobbyists from collecting “success fees” 
(Hogan et al 2011: 39). The code remains in effect, requiring all ministers to keep a record 
of any meeting with lobbyists. The impact of this legislation was recently felt by Queensland 
                                            
11 At the time of the survey, Allen was working as an academic at the University of Melbourne.  
12 In 2007 Western Australia (WA) lobbyist Brian Burke ( and former Labor Premier of WA 1983-88) was 
investigated by the WA Crime and Corruption Commission.  
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MP Bruce Flegg. Minister Flegg was stood down as the Minister of Housing by Premier 
Newman, because his office violated the code by failing to record regular meetings he held 
with his son, a professional lobbyist.  
In Queensland, a not-for-profit organisation is not regarded as a “lobbyist” so the rules and 
regulations stipulated in the Lobbyist Code of Conduct do not apply (Queensland 
Government 2009: 6). On occasion, I heard Shelter Board or staff members refer to Shelter 
as a peak lobby group. Shelter is not a lobby group in the legal sense. I had the impression 
that this language was used because the purpose of a lobby group is well understood.  
Non-government organisations have had opportunity to participate more widely in policy 
development in recent decades (Hancock 2006: 5). A pattern of government action, request 
for comment and response from the community sector has emerged, supported by the 
rhetoric of the benefits of community ‘consultation’. In a book on Australian interest group 
activity published in 1980, Professor Harmon Zeigler indicates that very few non-state actors 
were involved in the development of policy: 
Governmental and non-governmental experts develop policy proposals which are 
then responded to by broader segments of the public, including the most visibly 
responsive interest groups. A few groups, those with technical resources, are 
involved in the development of policy. Most groups participate only in the response 
to policy (Zeigler 1980: 16 italics in original). 
Reactivity as the modus operandi makes sense within the context of vertical governmental 
decision making but within the environment of increasing engagement of non-state actors 
and horizontal networks, the community sector continued to expand and advocacy was 
legitimised through the establishment of peak policy organisations. In light of the governance 
shift, interest groups in the NFP sector are expected to do much more than just pressure 
governments into change. Various impacts of this expectation on Shelter are examined 
within this thesis research. How have Shelter’s strategies changed over its 25 year history? 
What impact have these changes had on the role of Shelter in the development of social 
housing policy? 
Advocacy 
If the meanings of both lobby and advocacy are taken at face value the work of an advocate 
or lobbyist appears more or less the same. According to Oxford Dictionaries Online 2014, 
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the work of an advocate is to provide “public support for or recommendation of a particular 
cause or policy” and is derived from the Latin noun advocare meaning “to call to one’s aid”. 
The modern inference of this is that advocacy provides a community service through the 
promotion of a marginalised interest to government. Notionally while advocates seek to 
represent the views of a minority to government, lobbyists try to influence changes to 
legislation to benefit a particular business interest. In reality this is a superficial difference – 
many would argue that real change occurs with legislative change and the NFP sector also 
tries to influence legislative change.  
Differences are embedded within the social values that are attached to each term. Lobbying 
is viewed as an activity undertaken to secure self-interest whereas as advocacy is often 
portrayed as an issue of social justice: 
For example, as actors within the policy-making process NGO [non-government 
organisation] advocacy provides an extra-parliamentary form of representation to 
communities and individuals ... This function is especially important since many 
groups within the community can be considered “electorally unpopular” [Sawer 2002: 
39] and may lack the influence and/or means to speak for themselves … (Edgar & 
Lockie 2010: 356). 
Governments within Australia have provided funding and support to the not-for-profit sector 
for advocacy work – although this support has waxed and waned. Changes to public 
administration during the 1990s caused the community sector to expand and 
professionalise. The rhetoric around the participation of non-state actors supported capacity 
growth within the sector. Prior to the managerial reforms of New Public Management (NPM) 
governments had provided pockets of funding to some organisations, but this was ad hoc, 
often tied to project funding and favouring larger organisations. As Hancock (2006) explains: 
A voluntary initiative might attract some government funding and this would be 
renewed each year unless there was some move to eliminate it (or to increase it). 
These historical funding allocations were criticised for their inefficiencies, lack of 
accountability and tendency to favour large established or centralised welfare 
organisations, which were seen as not necessarily efficient or responsive to 
community needs (2006: 54). 
While interest groups have in the past door knocked and tried to gain access to decision 
makers, the increased emphasis on the benefits of consultation meant that governments 
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began actively seeking the view of non-state actors. The growth of ‘consultation’ is more 
obvious in hindsight, with Salamon (1995) suggesting that: 
… this rhetoric of conflict has obscured a development of single importance in the 
contemporary position of the private nonprofit sector – namely, the growth of vitally 
important supportive relationships between nonprofit organizations (sic) and the state 
(1995: 11). 
While Salamon, writing about the USA, describes a warm and fuzzy environment of support, 
a highly productive relationship between governments and NGOs is not widespread. At the 
heart of the state-centric relational view of the governance shift is an assumption that it has 
created greater opportunity for citizens to participate. However while governments have 
encouraged consultation, they have been more restrictive in enabling participation. Co-
editor of Interest Groups and Advocacy journal and interest group scholar Grant Jordan 
describes how involving non-state actors in policy can expand “the policy mix”: 
This governance approach see the role of groups and causes in educating 
government, polishing proposals, criticising other group ideas as all positive. It may 
be a messy way to do business, but it actually both gives room for democratic voices 
and probably – it is assumed - improves the policy mix (Jordan 2013). 
Non-state involvement in the development of public policy takes various forms. The table 
below provides an overview of the various levels of engagement, at one end governments 
are involved in providing information, at the other governments may devolve decision 
making authority to non-state actors. The latter is considered rare, with consultation 
processes often criticised for merely acting as a means to provide information rather than 
enabling participation.  
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Table 1: Consultation objectives and instruments 
Information Consultation Partnership Delegation Control 
Survey 
Focus group 
Public information 
campaign 
Key contacts 
Interest group 
meetings 
Town hall meetings 
Circulation of 
proposals 
Public hearings 
Advisory 
committees 
Policy 
Public Inquires 
Impact 
assessment 
studies 
Communities 
Referenda 
Privatisation 
 
Source: Davis 1996: 18 cited in Bridgman & Davis 1998: 83. 
As table one indicates, at times the government will form advisory committees, including 
state and non-state actors, to discuss policy issues. Memberships of advisory committees 
are limited to a select few, at the discretion of the government and they often include 
individuals who can be relied upon to back the government of the day or at the very least 
not upset the applecart. Advisory committees enable the government to collect information 
and build support and agreement across various policy issues. But a key issue of bringing 
in some interest groups over others is to ensure that the group chosen can represent a 
particular sector or sub sector: “Representativeness must be carefully considered when 
consulting through partnership bodies” (Bridgman & Davis 1998: 85). One of the issues that 
governments have when forming advisory committees is to decide which organisations to 
include:  
Governments see their role as providing a forum for discussions, ensuring the 
participants are representatives of the broader community’s interests, and proposing 
policy ideas that can be debated, modified and adopted with some measure of 
common support (Bridgman & Davis 1998: 85). 
In order to ensure representation and to enable more efficient consultation processes 
Australian governments at both state and federal levels established peak bodies (Hancock 
2006, Bridgman & Davis 1998) to act as an umbrella group for smaller organisations. Melville 
& Perkins define a community peak as a:  
... non-government organisation whose membership consists of smaller 
organisations of allied interests. The peak body thus offers a strong voice for the 
specific community sector in the areas of lobbying government, community education 
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and information sharing between members and interested parties (Melville & Perkins 
2003: vii).13  
The development of peak advocacy organisations simplifies an increasingly complex web 
of policy actors. Peak organisations are a useful governance tool for the state, because 
peaks act as a conduit between the government and a particular community sector. As 
Hancock writes: 
One of the strongest demands for peak bodies comes from government because 
there is a need for a small number of representative bodies though which the 
government can communicate with the sector ... the community sector was not as 
well organised or resourced and, for this reason, government have offered financial 
support to peak bodies in the community sector (2006: 52). 
While some peaks are “founded and funded” by the government, the Consumers Health 
Forum for example (Bridgman & Davis 1998), the majority of peak groups within Australia 
were established by providing funding to existing community organisations (Australian 
Government 1995b cited in Cheverton 2005).  
Emboldened by the rhetoric which supported the engagement and participation of peaks in 
the policy process, many community organisations welcomed the opportunity to participate. 
In this environment interest groups either welcomed the possibility of working with 
government (on its terms) or were resigned to working outside of the system without 
opportunity for government funding: 
A close working relationship with government is often seen as a strategic goal for not-
for-profit organisations that engage in advocacy work ... Organisations without 
relationship with government are often seen as ‘outsiders’, and may find themselves 
with little power, funding or influence (Maddison & Edgar 2008: 188). 
While pressure groups during the 1970s and 1980s organised public protests and petitions 
to engender policy change, in the age of ‘new governance’ modern advocacy groups often 
have outwardly reciprocal relationships with government. Indeed “the rhetoric of ‘partnership 
and participation’ is increasingly promoted by government in Australia as the way to forge 
                                            
13 Peak organisation may also have individuals as members. Queensland Shelter and QCOSS for example 
have both organisations and individuals as members. 
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new and more meaningful relationships with the not-for-profit sector” (Melville 2008: 103). 
Governments have formed ‘partnerships’ with non-state actors in order to work on specific 
issues and/or for the delivery of goods and services. The nature and impact of these 
partnerships on service delivery and government/non-government interaction is contested.  
Pascal (1996) argues that “the term ‘government partnership’ is an oxymoron, given that 
governments have considerable difficulty sharing power and decision making” (Voluntary 
Sector Roundtable cited by Melville 2008: 105). In 2003 an Australian Research Council 
funded research project into Australian Peak organisations, found that some peaks were 
distrustful of their relationship with state and federal levels of government, frustrated by a 
lack of funds, “token” participation and federalism (Melville 2008). One interviewee 
participant, who was a member of the Queensland community sector declared: 
The relationship between the Government and the non-government sector here is 
dreadful. It is a whole lot of rhetoric on partnership and God knows what else, but it 
has taken a backward step in control (Interview respondent 27 cited in Melville & 
Perkins 2003: 66).  
Specifically the relationship between the state bureaucracy and Queensland peaks 
appeared shaky, one interviewee representing a Queensland housing peak stated: 
They invite us in only when it suits them, and if we find out about things after they’ve 
gone five miles down the track they say ‘I’m really sorry, I don’t think you’d be 
interested in being involved in that point of view. But, this is what’s already been 
decided and if you would like to make some comment, then fine’ ... (Interview 
Respondent 24 cited in Melville & Perkins 2003: 66).  
The quote above illustrates the frustration felt at the lack of power and involvement in 
decision making. As discussed in prior paragraphs there are varying levels of consultation 
and problems arise when the ‘consulted’ feel they should be in a partnership rather than an 
information sharing activity. While peak organisations had hoped to be at the table 
participating in the policy development, some peaks were discouraged by the lack of ‘real’ 
engagement by decision makers and/or the bureaucracy (Melville & Perkins 2003).  
One participant at the 2004 Queensland Council of Social Services (QCOSS) conference 
declared: 
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Our partnerships have not grown despite all the changes – it’s still about the 
government providing funding and then we deliver the services. We have no real say 
in policy development. In our capacity to respond to policy is very limited by our 
scramble to deliver services and by our accountability requirements. I’d like to see 
more equality in our partnerships with government (QCOSS 2004: 7 cited by Hancock 
2006: 55). 
It would appear from research discussed in this chapter (Melville & Perkins 2003, Hancock 
2006), that some community organisations believe their role in policy development is 
restricted. This provides a context for examining Shelter’s relationship (and role) with 
successive Queensland Governments. What impact has becoming a peak had on the 
capacity of Shelter to participate? What if any are the limits to consultation processes from 
Shelter’s point of view? Is there any evidence that Shelter was in a partnership with 
government players? Are the views illustrated here representative of Shelter? 
Compacts: Sharing a table not a bed14  
Ironically while funding agreements with the community sector provided community 
organisations with the funds to develop the capacity to deliver goods and services and/or to 
participate in the development of policy, scholars argue that funding contracts are a means 
to restricting advocacy – funded groups are fearful of damaging the relationship with the 
government so avoid criticising the government of the day (Maddison & Edgar 2008, Casey 
& Dalton 2006, Maddison & Denniss 2005, Melville 2001, Melville & Perkins 2003, Sawer 
2002 cited by McGregor-Lowndes 2008: 51). The interviews conducted for this research 
demonstrate that Shelter were aware of this tension but were also mindful of the need to 
represent the sector and provide meaningful policy advice. Political leaders and senior public 
servants were appreciative of policy advice that were informed by evidence and expressed 
a willingness to listen to critical advice. This willingness likely varies depending on the 
personality and political will of decision makers. As one interviewee suggested there is 
significant variability regarding the impact of government funding on the organisation’s 
capacity to advocate:  
                                            
14 Jill Lang, attributed this turn of phrase to former President of QCOSS Karyn Walsh “we [community 
organisations and government] are not in bed together we are at the same table (Lang 2013 interview by the 
author).  
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A government funded body ...  has to also worry about what its government funding 
will be and the government funding obviously comes with strings attached and 
sometimes it’s more and sometimes it’s less (Eastgate 2013 interview by the author).  
Attempts have been made by Australian governments and the not-for-profit sector to 
address these issues. Compacts were adopted by each of the states and territories in 
Australia15 in order to regulate the relationship between the community sector and the 
government, see table 2. These were based on similar arrangements developed in the mid-
1990s in the UK (Casey & Dalton 2006: 26).  
Table 2: Australian Compacts 
State Policy Title 
NSW Keep Them Safe: A Shared Approach to Child Wellbeing (2009) 
Stronger Together: A New Direction for Disability Services in NSW 2006-2016 
VIC The Action Plan for Strengthening Community Organisations (2008) 
QLD  The COMPACT Governance Committee Action Plan (2008) 
SA  Common Ground (2004) 
WA Funding and Purchasing Community Services Policy (2002) 
Western Australian Drug and Alcohol Strategy (2005-09) 
TAS The Office for the Community Sector (2008) 
ACT ACT Social Compact (2004) 
The Community Sector Funding Policy (2004) 
Reproduced in full (Australian Government 2010). 
As part of my research for this project I interviewed Jill Lang, former Director of QCOSS and 
Chair of the Queensland Community Services Futures Forum. The Futures Forum brought 
approximately 30 peaks and large community organisations to work on the negotiation of a 
Compact with the Bligh Labor government. During her interview Lang explained that the 
Compact was a formal agreement seeking to establish a more collaborative relationship 
between the social services sector and the Queensland Labor government led by Anna 
Bligh. In Lang’s words the purpose of the Compact was to foster: 
… a better working relationship – that’s all gone now [post the election of the Newman 
Government] … And part of the idea behind the Compact was that this 
funder/provider relationship the government has with us is unworkable when we are 
both providing complementary services for disadvantaged people. Governments 
                                            
15 A federal Compact was signed by the Rudd Labor government in 2010. 
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provides services, we provide services. We needed to be working together in 
partnership to do this (Lang 2013 interview by the author). 
Lang described the benefits of partnership between the government and non-government 
sectors, providing some work she had recently undertaken with child protection as an 
example:  
When government and the community sector work together there has to be some 
shared values and shared end goals and so even though they provide the funds, we 
both provide the services so you have to be able to work together, you can’t have the 
‘us’ and them’ mentality … A child protection worker has to have the support of and 
work with a whole range of organisations to work with that family. You’ve got to know 
what you’ve all got in common and what you jointly want to achieve (Lang 2013 
interview by the author). 
Former Director-General of Housing, Linda Apelt described the impact of the Compact as 
the “maturing of the relationship” between the government and the community sector. 
Because that, that policy trajectory was about maturing the relationship between the 
not-for-profit providers and also the stakeholder groups, peak bodies if you like and 
government policy making. Because prior to this Compact it is a bit hit and miss and 
quite a bit of animosity between … government and non-government (Apelt 2012 
interview by the author). 
The Queensland Compact illustrates the willingness of the Bligh Government to work in 
partnership with the community sector to provide social services. In this environment 
QCOSS were able to bring together members of the community sector to develop an 
agreement which would improve the relationship between the Bligh Labor government and 
the non-government sector. The political environment changed with the election of the 
Newman Government – the focus of this government was contractual agreements and 
contestable markets.  
In their research into Compacts in NSW and England, Edgar and Lockie determined that the 
success of Compacts between governments and non-state actors was dependent on the 
support of the government of the day: 
Working Together has received little support from the NSW government and has 
largely fallen on off their policy agenda, justified only through a change in Premier. 
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This highlights the flimsiness of compacts in ensuring NGO independence as it is 
only with a government onside that they have any meaning. If this is taken away (as 
has also occurred in Canada and France), NGOS will be left only with “great compact 
documents” [Osborne and McLaughlin 2002: 58] and little else (Edgar and Lockie 
2010: 364). 
Research conducted for the Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector report, published by the 
Australian government in the late 1990s, noted that there was “considerable variability in the 
extent to which these problems apply to any particular service area or the policies and 
programs of any particular government agency” (Australian Government 2010: 382). This 
variety gives cause for further research to understand the nuances of partnerships between 
governments and peak organisations. Compared with other western countries, there is 
limited Australian research16 on the impact of the governance shift on the role of peak 
advocacy groups (Lyons & Passey 2006 cited by Barraket 2008). Empirical research into 
the role and capacity of specific peak organisations is needed in order to determine how 
these organisations operate and to assess the barriers and opportunity for non-state 
participation in policy making. Forms of influence may change over time reflecting the 
composition of the peak (board, membership, and staff), the wider economic, political and 
social context and the organisations’ resources. 
Grant (1989: 117) included the following as important resources to interest groups: internal 
group structures, financial resources, staff resources, membership mobilisation capabilities, 
sanctioning capacity and choices of strategy. These are important considerations for 
ensuring that groups can effectively propose policy solutions and participate in the 
development of public policy. These resources support the work of interest groups in 
persuading governments to adopt ideas. I propose, however, that the existence of some 
may make up for shortages in others. Low financial and staff resources may be 
compensated by membership mobilisation capacity. Shelter had a very small number of paid 
staff in 1993, yet the organisation had an insider relationship with the Goss government. 
What they lacked in resources, in the early days, was circumvented by the strong 
relationships that members had developed with the government of the day while in 
opposition. While arguably Shelter worked with the government on a broader set of policy 
                                            
16 A notable exception is a comparative study by Onyx, Dalton, Melville, Casey and Banks in 2007. This study 
focussed on the relationship between government and community organisations using a case study 
methodology. 
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issues in the later period (during the Beattie era), low resource levels did not prevent Shelter 
from becoming an insider during the Goss era in the early 1990s. The political context is as 
important as the physical resources of a group. Within the social sector it is difficult to 
separate political will from group resources, because resources are often a result of a 
political commitment to support and/or develop a specific group. Nowadays insider groups 
are expected to have a sophisticated knowledge of policy problems and the capacity to 
provide evidence based policy solutions.  
In an article examining the power of the National Farmers Union during the Foot and Mouth 
crisis in the United Kingdom, Hindmoor (2009) argued the “NFU [National Farmers Union’s] 
influence over government policy can be explained primarily in terms of persuasion through 
priming rather than bargaining and resources” (2009: 76). The work of persuading 
governments by conceptualising a problem in a certain way, can be understood as 
‘communicative labour’ (Dempsey 2011). Communicative labour is the work of 
communicating social problems and prospective solutions. Providing evidence based 
solutions to policy problems is vital to a peak’s success at working with government.  
As elected governments are responsible for public policy decisions the ability of a peak 
organisation to push issues onto the policy agenda and set preferences for policy solutions 
is a very relevant focus in the study of pressure group power and influence. Dempsey argues 
that more research is need to: 
better understand the politics of communicative labour, including how non-profits 
mobilize (sic) discourse, and how these discourses carry their own sets of politics 
and forms of power (Dempsey 2011: 149).  
In mobilising support, community organisation may choose to work with other like-minded 
organisations. Shelter has worked closely with other peak bodies, including the Queensland 
Council of Social Services (QCOSS) and Tenants’ Union of Queensland. Tensions between 
organisations do, however, occur when resources are sparse. This is especially true of 
advocacy peaks which rely on government funding. From my research, conflict between the 
Queensland housing peaks was exacerbated by ministerial preferences for ‘one voice’ 
rather than the proliferation of advocacy from a number of organisations. Several attempts 
were made to reduce the number of peak housing organisations in Queensland before 
Minister Schwarten successfully reduced funding to one peak body in 2007. It suits both 
politicians and senior public servants to receive representational policy advice from one 
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representative, but this places more pressure on the ‘one’ to provide that advice. More 
recently the push for community providers awarded through a commercial (competitive) 
tendering process, has impacted on collaboration between organisations with the social 
housing sector (Hudson 2013 interview by the author). 
Participation by non-state actors has become normalised following the governance shift, 
although the extent and impact of this participation continues to be debated. This debate 
informed my adaption of an existing interest group typology in order to examine variances 
in the way in which an interest group, in this case Shelter, participates in the policy process. 
Participation differs depending on the specific interest group, policy issue and government 
will. Some interest groups are invited to participate more closely or fully in the development 
of public policy than others, an overt example of this is the funding of certain grassroots 
organisations to act as umbrella peaks. Survey research with members of the not-for-profit 
sector in Australia indicates that relationships between some community peaks and 
Australian governments have fallen short of expectations (Melville & Perkins 2003). In this 
study I examine the relationship between Shelter and governments of Queensland between 
1987 and 2012 to determine whether Shelter’s experience differs from those already 
documented. The next chapter proposes a theoretical framework which will be used 
throughout each of the case studies in order to closely examine the participation of 
Queensland Shelter in policy work.  
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Chapter Two:  
Insider typology: why insider status remains a privileged position 
This chapter proposes an updated version of Wyn Grant’s insider typology in order to provide 
a framework for analysing the relationship between a peak advocacy group and the 
government of the day. While the literature about community groups has openly criticised 
the limits of consultation and debated the merit and/or depth of participation there has been 
less scholarly attention, in recent times, to the variances experienced by community 
organisations - some groups gain greater access and participation than others. Wyn Grant 
developed his pressure group typology to distinguish between pressure groups that had 
gained access to British policy decision makers and those that were outside of the political 
process. The typology was developed in the late 1970s, prior to the governance shift outlined 
in chapter one, during a period where the involvement of interest groups in the development 
of public policy was more restricted (Grant 2004).  
The dominant assumption within Grant’s typology is that insider groups are more likely to 
influence governments than outsider groups (Page 1999, Baggott 1995, Grant 2004 & 2001, 
Binderkrantz 2005, McKinney & Halpin 2007). Grant’s typology acknowledges that some 
pressure groups enjoyed much closer relationships with the government of the day than 
others – he labelled these ‘insiders’. Grant argued that access to decision makers enabled 
an interest group to be influential. Without access it was much harder, although not 
impossible, for a group to influence policy decisions. Importantly Grant argued that the 
typology could be used to examine the process through which interest groups develop the 
capacity for systemic interaction with decision makers: 
… the distinction is an important one because it assists our understanding of the 
process whereby some outsider groups eventually become insider groups, thus 
uncovering some of the processes of change at work in the pressure group system 
(Grant 1989: 18). 
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In Grant’s typology, insider groups were “regarded as legitimate by government and are 
consulted on a regular basis” (Grant 1989: 14). According to Grant, insider groups have 
several defining characteristics. First the insider group needs to have legitimate, specialised 
knowledge of their particular policy interest and the ability to communicate this interest to 
parliamentarians and public servants. Second as insider groups they have permission to 
“engage” with the government on the issue. Last, having both communicated policy interests 
and engaged with government, as insiders “they [have] implicitly agreed to abide by certain 
rules of the game” (Grant 2004: 408). There were several sub classifications within insider 
status: high profile insiders, low profile insiders and prisoner groups. High profile insiders 
and low profile insiders were categorised by examining the strategies that these groups use 
to influence governments. A high profile insider seeks a high media profile while a low profile 
group prefers to work discreetly, continually fostering close relationships with decision 
makers, ‘behind closed doors’. ‘Prisoner groups’ are those that are ‘captured’ because of a 
shared ideology with government. Grant reasoned that over time the ideas of the interest 
group become synonymous with the ideas of government. When this occurs the insider 
group is unable to offer any contradictory advice and thus has become ‘captured’, in effect 
ceasing to have much impact within government decision making.  
 
Illustration 1: A typology of pressure groups 
Reproduced in full (Grant 1989:15)  
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Outsider groups are those that do not operate within the same circles as government. These 
groups are outside either because they do not share a common ideology with government 
or because they do not understand the rules of the game and lack political “sophistication” 
(Grant 1989: 17). The typology included three types of outsider group. Ideological outsider 
was a group that chose to remain outside due to political beliefs as opposed to an outsider 
by necessity, which is any interest group lacking the knowledge and/or political skills to work 
as an insider. A potential insider was a group which has “yet to win government acceptance” 
but has the potential to do so in the future (Grant 1989: 17). Grant made two central 
arguments in relation to this typology. First he argued that outsider groups were less able to 
influence public policy decisions. Second he suggested that strategy choice was dependant 
on status; outsider groups use outsider strategies and insider groups use insider strategies.  
Grant was not the first to acknowledge the variances in relationships between interest 
groups and the state. Schattschneider (1935) used the terms ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ to 
describe and discuss groups who were likely to have contact with decision makers and those 
who were not. Dearlove (1973) employed ‘helpful’ and ‘unhelpful’ to make similar distinctions 
and Newton (1976) used the terms ‘established’ and ‘non-established’ (Maloney, Jordan & 
McLaughlin 1994: 18). Maloney et al (1994) suggest that Wyn Grant has made the most 
“influential British contribution” to this body of literature (1994: 18). The prominent dominant 
assumption within the typology is that insider groups are more likely to influence 
governments than outsider groups (Baggott 1995, McKinney & Halpin 2007, Binderkrantz 
2005, Page 1999, Grant 1989, 2004 & 2001). 
A notable critique of Grant’s typology was provided by Maloney, Jordon and McLaughlin 
(1994), in which the authors argued that Grant had confused status with strategy. Other 
criticisms emerged within the literature in light of the governance shift. In the following 
paragraphs I examine the critique by Maloney et al (1994) and criticisms by others, 
defending the continued relevance of the distinction between insider and outsider groups 
and proposing some revisions to the original typology. 
Status and Strategy 
Maloney et al (1994) argued that Grant had ‘conflated’ status with strategy in his sub 
classifications of insider groups. They argued that the classifications of high and low profile 
groups related to the strategies that interest groups employed while the category of ‘prisoner’ 
groups related to the status of the group. In their revision of the typology, they consciously 
 
 
36 
 
separated what Grant had united, and developed separate categories for both status and 
strategy: 
The two dimensions [status and strategy] require a distinct vocabulary. This might be 
sensibly attained by explicitly attaching the insider/outsider terms to strategy, and 
developing a complementary set of terms to distinguish the status dimension from 
strategy ones (Maloney et al 1994: 29-30).  
In separating status from strategy they renamed the insider classifications as core insider, 
specialist insider and peripheral insider. Outsider group by necessity and ideological 
outsider group remained, but potential insider group was removed from the typology. 
Prisoner group was also removed - although Maloney et al (1994) agreed that capture was 
a possibility, but it was more likely the result of resource dependency than ideology. The 
Maloney et al (1994) revised typology is represented below: 
1. Insider status 
i. Core Insider Group 
ii. Specialist Insider Group 
iii. Peripheral Insider Group 
2. Outsider Status 
i. Outsider Group by Ideology or Goal  
ii. Outsider Group by Choice 
 (Maloney et al 1994: 30). 
In terms of strategy, Maloney et al (1994) outlined three types: insider, outsider and 
thresholder. The authors adapted thresholder strategy from May and Nugent’s (1982) work 
on interest groups. Thresholder groups fluctuate between “pursuing and not pursuing a 
symbiotic relationship with decision-makers and are “‘characterised by strategic ambiguity 
and oscillation between insider and outsider strategies” (May & Nugent 1982: 7 cited in 
Maloney et al 1994: 28). Groups that are thresholder may choose to operate across insider 
and outsider classifications. These types of groups may use “… an insider strategy of close 
consultation with decision makers and an outsider strategy based on public appeals through 
the media and mobilization (sic) of group members and citizens” (Gais & Walker 1991: 696, 
Jordan and Maloney 1997: 181, Kollman 1998: 23 cited in Binderkrantz 2005: 696).  
It is now widely recognised that interest groups have some flexibility in the types of strategies 
they use and many operate as thresholder groups (Grant 1989 & 2001, Maloney et al 1994, 
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Binderkrantz 2005). In a study on interest groups in Denmark, Binderkrantz (2005) also 
made a case for the separation of status from strategy in the study of interest groups:  
In order to avoid the connotations of the terms ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ and the 
assumption that outsider strategies are inferior, it is preferable to distinguish between 
direct strategies where groups approach public decision makers, and indirect 
strategies where influence on policy is sought in more indirect ways (2005: 696).  
Outside or indirect strategies are those which use mobilisation or target the media and direct 
strategies are those which target the public service, the parliament or the political parties. 
The table below outlines direct and indirect strategies. 
Table 3: Categorisation of influence strategies and examples of activities 
Direct Strategies Indirect Strategies 
Administrative 
Strategy 
Parliamentary 
Strategy 
Media Strategy Mobilisation Strategy 
Contacting the 
relevant minister 
Contacting 
parliamentary 
committees 
Contacting reporters Arranging public meetings and 
conferences 
Contacting national 
public servants 
Contacting party 
spokespersons 
Writing letters to the 
editor and columns 
Organizing (sic) letter writing 
campaigns 
Actively using 
public committees, 
etc. 
Contacting other 
members of 
parliament 
Issuing press releases 
and holding press 
conferences 
Arranging strikes, civil 
disobedience, direct action and 
public demonstrations 
Responding to 
request for 
comments 
Contacting party 
organisations 
Publicizing (sic) 
analyses and research 
reports 
Conducting petitions 
Table reproduced in full (Binderkrantz 2005: 696). 
Peak organisations, including Queensland Shelter, use both direct and indirect strategies in 
order to influence decision makers. I argue, however, that there are degrees to which these 
strategies can be employed and that this is based on their relationship with both politicians 
and public servants and especially with the Minister presiding over the housing portfolio. In 
order to preserve relationships with the government Shelter needs be cautious about the 
way in which they use indirect (outsider) strategies. A large protest rally for example may 
jeopardise their relationship with the government and be detrimental to their overall policy 
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goals. A less intense version of a mobilisation strategy, such as arranging a smaller meeting 
with members of the sector or arranging a conference and inviting the public, will often be 
seen by the Minister and/or senior bureaucrats as acceptable: especially if the tone of the 
activity is not explicitly critical of current policy. Shelter must also be conscious of their 
member base: if they are seen to be doing little in terms of advocating for housing this will 
not be viewed positively by their members or by the government. Grant sums up this 
predicament: 
The growth in the use of direct action strategies17 poses difficult problems for 
established insider groups. If they endorse or participate in the more militant forms of 
direct action, their relationship with government is likely to be damaged. On the other 
hand, if they fail to respond to demands from their membership for a more robust 
stance towards government, members may leave the organisation or organise 
dissent within it. Leaderships of groups are faced with a difficult balancing act 
between the requirements of a responsible relationship with government and the 
demands of members for more confrontational strategies … (Grant 2001: 343). 
Others argue that governments are aware of these pressures and that they accept that 
groups will often need to use outsider tactics. Governments expect that “groups loudly 
criticize (sic) governmental decisions” and this does not necessarily mean it will rob “them 
of insider access” (Jordan & Richardson 1987: 36-7, Page 1999: 212 cited in Binderkrantz 
2005: 695). I argue that a government’s acceptance of an insider groups’ use of outsider 
tactics is limited, impacted by the political ideology of the government of the day, state 
legitimacy on the issue at hand and the general political mood. While I agree that interest 
groups are likely to use a range of both insider and outsider strategies, the choice of strategy 
and the degree to which it is pursued are dependent on the status of the group, including its 
own power/ membership base. An issue with   (2005) categorisation of influence strategies 
is that these broad headings cannot account for the degree to which strategies have been 
employed. In terms of influence the outcomes of the strategy choice illustrates more than 
the strategy itself. A direct (insider) strategy, such as contacting the relevant minister, will 
have different outcomes depending on the status of the interest group. A core insider will 
                                            
17 Confusingly Binderkrantz (2005) used indirect to describe outsider tactics and Grant (2001) uses direct 
action to describe outsider strategies. Binderkrantz has chosen indirect because it involves the relationship 
with the public, through the use of mobilisation and the media and Grant uses direct to convey a message of 
confrontation and public protest.  
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have an existing developed relationship with the decision makers and is likely to be able to 
phone the Minister directly. Peripheral insiders will not be able to do this, and instead may 
find themselves talking with a ministerial staffer or having to wait to put forward their view at 
a formal routine meeting or consultation. An outsider on the other hand is most likely to 
resort to sending a petition to the Minister’s office. The indirect and direct classification may 
be useful as a tool for examining types of contact, but it tells little about whether the strategy 
can be influential. Because interest groups use a variety of strategies, strategy choices 
cannot be used to determine the status of a group. Separating status from strategy makes 
it difficult to examine the relationship between an interest group and the government in much 
detail. While I agree that interest groups are likely to use a range of both insider and outsider 
strategies, the choice of strategy and the degree to which it is pursued are dependent on 
the whether the group is an insider or outsider.  
The Age of Consultation – Why insider status remains a privileged position.  
As discussed in detail in chapter one, modern governance is characterised by the 
willingness of governments to include a range of organisations in making public policy 
decisions - leading scholars, including Wyn Grant himself, to argue that the typology may 
be less useful that when first developed (Maloney et al 1994, Grant 2001, Binderkrantz 
2005) because insider status is no longer difficult to achieve. However the willingness of 
governments to engage meaningfully is debatable and can vary with the personality of the 
premier or key minister of the day and/or the overall stance of a particular government. I 
argue that the number of interest groups that achieve insider status remains limited despite 
all of the rhetoric regarding community engagement, consultation, participation and 
partnership with non-state actors. It is clear that governments interact with interest groups 
more frequently than previously and interest groups make use of both insider and outsider 
strategies independent of the status of their relationship with the state. This makes both the 
issue of access and the study of strategy far less important to the question of influence than 
what was originally argued for in Grant’s typology. What is important is the ability of the 
group to form a relationship with decision makers in which frequent formal and informal 
interaction occurs, views are exchanged and there is acknowledgement from both parties 
that positive outcomes derive from the exchange.  
Despite protestations, made by Grant in the early 2000s that the pressure group typology 
“has some utility” but “the rent to be extracted from it is probably diminishing” (2004: 408), I 
argue that the distinction between insider and outsider groups remains highly relevant to the 
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study of participation by interest groups in the development of public policy. Insider status 
means more today than it did in the past. While insider status in the 1970s signalled some 
access to decision makers, in today’s political climate insider status permits “active 
participation’ which in the early 2000s the Queensland government defined as “relationships 
that enable government and citizens to share in agenda setting, policy dialogue and the 
development and evaluation of policy, program and service options” (Queensland 
Government 2011a).  
Consultation has become an expected part of the public decision making process and has 
led to the questioning of the continued relevance of an ‘insider’ group, in a political 
environment which outwardly encourages public consultation. In 2011 the Queensland ALP 
government adopted a three tier approach to engaging with communities.18 I have 
reproduced it below to demonstrate the differences between the objectives of various 
consultation processes: 
Table 4: Three tiers of engagement 
 Information Consultation Active participation 
Objective To ensure citizens/stakeholders 
have access to information that 
is accurate, relevant, 
appropriate, easy to access 
and easy to understand. While 
information sharing alone does 
not constitute public 
involvement, stakeholders need 
information in order to 
contribute to consultation or 
active participation processes. 
To seek and receive the 
views of 
citizens/stakeholders on 
issues that directly affect 
them or in which they 
may have a significant 
interest, and provide 
feedback on how citizen 
input contributed to the 
final outcome. 
To develop relationships 
that enable government 
and citizens to share in 
agenda setting, policy 
dialogue and the 
development and 
evaluation of policy, 
program and service 
options. 
Critical 
factors 
Citizens must have easy, 
equitable and timely access to 
information and the method of 
delivery must be appropriate for 
There must be clarity 
about the goals of 
consultation, the roles 
and responsibilities of 
government and 
citizens/stakeholders, 
There must be clarity 
about the extent to 
which the views of 
citizens will be taken 
into account in decision 
making processes. 
                                            
18 The three tiers are based on the Queensland Government’s Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Engagement Model. 
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 Information Consultation Active participation 
the issue and the intended 
audience. 
and their level of 
influence. There should 
be stated mechanisms 
for feedback. 
There must be sufficient 
time and flexibility to 
allow for the emergence 
of new ideas by citizens. 
Desired 
outcomes 
Citizens are better informed 
about government policies, 
programs and services and 
about how to access 
information and services. 
Greater involvement of 
citizens and 
communities in the 
business of government, 
greater understanding of 
government policy and 
decision making 
processes, and better 
community outcomes. 
More effective policies, 
programs and services 
that represent the 
diverse needs of citizens 
and communities. 
Heightened trust and 
confidence in 
government. 
Greater involvement of 
citizens and 
communities in the 
business of 
government, greater 
understanding of 
government policy and 
decision making 
processes. Civic 
capacity strengthened, 
roles and 
responsibilities clarified, 
resources mobilised, 
and more effective 
policies, programs and 
services that represent 
the diverse needs of 
citizens and 
communities. 
Heightened trust and 
confidence in 
government. 
Reproduced in full (Queensland Government 2011a). 
The three tiers of engagement illustrate the varying levels of non-state engagement. 
Employing the language from Grant’s original typology insider groups would be active 
participants, periphery insiders are consulted and outsider groups are likely to only be 
informed. This thesis explores insider status as a means to better understand the active 
participation of interest groups in the development of policy. The following section of this 
chapter outlines a revised typology which ties the status of the group to the level of 
engagement in public policy development.  
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Revised Pressure Group Typology  
In light of criticisms made of existing insider typologies I suggest revising Grant’s typology 
so that there is an emphasis on the level of interaction between the State and the peak 
interest group. I have revised the interest group typology to acknowledge that consultation 
(or access to decision makers) is not the same as participation. This study equates the 
likelihood of an advocacy group’s capacity to influence the government of the day with the 
increased opportunity to participate in the processes of public policy development. The 
revision classifies interest groups according to their relationship with public policy decision 
makers. Unlike Grant’s original typology which equated status with strategy, this revision 
equates status with participation. I argue that an interest group that participates in many of 
the stages of public policy development is an insider. In order to revise the typology so that 
it reflects the levels of engagement, the Australian Policy Cycle (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis 
2007) was used as a framework for analysing the participation of Shelter in policy 
development.  
 
Illustration 2: The policy cycle 
(Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2007: 37) 
The Australian policy cycle presents policy making as a rational process; through which 
decisions are made in an ordered cyclical manner and it is because of this that it has 
received scholarly criticism (Everett 2003). The authors however contend that it is a ‘useful 
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heuristic tool’ for examining and discussing decision making. While I agree that public policy 
is rarely, if ever, developed in a rational cyclical fashion, it is helpful to use each of the policy 
stages as a starting point in order to examine the role of interest groups in policy 
development. In particular the cycle was useful for providing a framework for analysing 
interest group participation. Insider groups can be involved in most of the stages, with the 
exception of decision making and the coordination stage. Government remains the only 
political actor with the authority to coordinate policy across departments and make public 
policy decisions. In contrast outsider and peripheral groups have minimal engagement.  
 
Illustration 3: Revised interest group typology 
I use terms from both Grant’s original typology (1989) and Maloney et al (1994) to 
conceptualise whether a group is working within, from outside or on the edge (periphery) of 
government decision making, see illustration 3. I argue that these terms are made more 
meaningful by describing the level of participation within the policy making process in 
Protest Level 
(Outsider Group)
Consultation 
Level (Peripheral 
Insider)
Relational Level
(Insider Group or 
Prisoner Group)
Decison Making 
Level  (Ministers 
Office) 
Insider Group: participates in most aspects of 
public policy, but decision making authority 
remains with elected representatives. 
 
Peripheral Insider: limited engagement with decision 
makers; does have involvement in formal consultation 
process and agenda setting. 
Outsider group: relies on indirect 
strategies to force issues onto the 
agenda. 
Prisoner Group: captured by decision 
makers 
 
 
 
44 
 
conjunction with insider or outsider status19. This negates the issues associated with using 
strategy choice as an indicator of status. 
Protest level/ outsider groups 
My revised version removes two of the categories of outsider groups: outsider by necessity20 
and potential insider. In the current political environment any group that has basic resources 
and political knowledge and that wishes to make comment on political decision making 
would be able to work as a peripheral insider. Therefore a group that works outside the 
system does so because it chooses to remain outside or chooses to retain an ideological 
position which leaves it incapable of working with government on issues. Outsider groups 
can be influential but only in identifying issues and in some limited capacity to set agendas. 
Their capacity to influence is based on their ability to frame an issue to capture the attention 
of the public. In order to do this they will need to use indirect strategies and rely on 
mobilisation or high profile media to get the attention of the government and the sympathy 
of the public. A good example of the type of group that works at the protest level is People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). This radical group uses stunts involving 
celebrities and often gruesome pictures of animal cruelty to get the attention of the media 
and force animal rights onto the policy agenda.  
Kingdon (1984) describes the policy agenda as “the list of subjects or problems to which 
governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those 
officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (1984: 3). In PETA’s protest 
against sheep mulesing, they employed indirect strategies including boycotts and protests 
in order to ‘force’ the hand of clothing retailers. From PETA’s point of view, as consumers 
became ‘aware’ of the issues associated with producing wool in Australia it was hoped that 
they would choose not to buy garments made with Australian wool. As PETA are 
ideologically opposed to the use of animals for any purpose, including farming and as pets, 
it is unimaginable that they would consider working at either the consultation level or insider 
level; their core ideology is vastly different from that of the status quo. Outsider groups can 
incite change using protest strategies. Their success and power is usually derived from high 
                                            
19 The role of interest group involvement in the development of policy is noted by Grant in Pressure Groups, 
Politics and Democracy (1989). 
20 Grant acknowledged that if the aims of the code of practice regarding open consultation developed by the 
Blair Labour Government in 2000 were achieved then “the outsider groups by necessity category should largely 
disappear” (2004: 410).    
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membership numbers and/or strong media coverage combined with support of the general 
public.  
Both insider and outsider groups are involved in agenda setting. Agenda setting is an 
important early step for advocacy groups; it is “The process by which demands of various 
groups in the population are translated into items vying for the serious attention of public 
officials …” (Cobb et al 1976: 126). Down’s (1972) seminal work on agenda setting identified 
several requirements for getting an issue onto the political agenda. The issue needed to 
affect relatively large numbers of people, have a realistic solution and capture the interest 
of the general public (Downs 1973). The work of presenting a clearly defined issue as one 
that affects the majority and is simple to resolve is referred to as “framing” (McCombs 1981 
cited in Howlett & Ramash 2003: 129). Framing can also be used to promote a particular 
solution to a problem. If an interest group successfully frames homelessness as an issue 
arising from high levels of poor mental health, as opposed to unemployment, for example, 
then it follows that solutions to homelessness will also be framed within a mental health 
paradigm. In reality, however, it is never this clear cut, with sustained competing views 
regarding the causes and possible solutions to public problems.  
Peripheral insiders/ consultation level 
Peripheral insiders have the ability to participate in both consultation and issue identification 
phases of the policy cycle. While they are likely to be routinely contacted by the department 
on various issues that may concern them, they do not have the resources (or acceptance 
by decision makers) to be involved in policy discussions which may also involve negotiation 
and/ or bargaining. Decision makers involve themselves with these groups to legitimise 
policy decisions and provide information on emerging policy directions. In the housing 
sector, peripheral insiders may receive part funding (in the form of grants) from the 
government. They may be contracted by the state to provide goods or services. Peripheral 
insiders will also have the opportunity to become members of a peak policy organisation, 
such as Shelter, enabling the submission of policy advice as part of broad consultation 
strategies. However the likelihood of this advice being incorporated within policy is at the 
discretion of decision makers. Successive Queensland governments have emphasised the 
government’s ‘need’ to choose the right level of engagement; this is dependent on the 
“stakeholders involved, the issue or policy being considered and the objectives of 
engagement” (Queensland Government 2011a). Peripheral insiders can involve themselves 
at the information and consultation tiers, but are unable to engage in active participation.  
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Insider group/ relational level 
Insider groups occupy privileged positions with decision makers. At the relational level 
contact between the government and the interest group is both formal and informal. Both 
the state and the insider group place value on the relationship - the relationship is positive 
sum. Insider groups will on some occasions be able to bargain with the state, but as Grant 
(2001) noted, in the case of groups that are funded by government this is a difficult 
proposition and insider groups will need to remain politically savvy in order to be able to do 
this, retaining their own policy vision while keeping governments and members in broad 
agreement. Interest groups at a relational level are likely to be involved in all parts of the 
policy making process, with the exception of the decision and coordination stages, as 
discussed in earlier paragraphs.  
Decision Making Level  
The insider typology is useful for understanding the relationship between an interest group 
and its ministry but is unable to account for a nuanced understanding of the role of other, 
important, institutions within Queensland decision making. The development of policy occurs 
within a much broader state and commonwealth political context. Legislative change must 
gain approval from the Queensland Premier’s office, Queensland Treasury and Queensland 
Cabinet, before policy is presented to parliament. The Premier of the day is likely to have 
priorities and state departments may also compete against each other, in order to ensure 
that their needs are prioritised over others. Not unlike the differences between interest 
groups, state ministers can be expected to wield varying degrees of power and influence. In 
order for a peak policy group, like Shelter, to influence decision making it is important that 
the housing minister be influential within her/his own political party and within parliament. 
Ministers have a role to play in the “championing” of policy ideas to the broader 
governmental context (Grant 1989: 58). Shelter’s ability to influence the policy debate relies 
on the influence that a particular minister has within the institutions of government. Like 
interest groups, government departments are also in competition for resources, and Grant 
argues that each ministry protects its own industry, citing the example of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food protecting and advocating for the interests of agriculture. In 
this way each ministry can be thought of as individual interest group (Grant 1989: 6). 
The power of the Federal Government is another important consideration. The Federal 
Government has gradually siphoned power from the states, most notably when the Curtin 
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Labor government persuaded the states to hand over their income tax power to the 
Commonwealth during the dire situation presented by World War II. The Commonwealth 
Government continues to encroach on the state levels of government with control over the 
collection of revenue, including the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Australian federalism 
has moved from the original design of shared powers between each state and the 
commonwealth, to a position where “... the states are concerned mainly with the delivery of 
services, while the Commonwealth supervises the distribution of money and provides some 
policy co-ordination in so doing” (Singleton et al 1996: 71). The federal housing ministry has 
provided each state with funds through the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement 
(CSHA) since 1945. The agreement is a significant example of the power of the federal 
Government to steer social housing policy in each of the Australian states.  
The revised typology does not capture the influence of other Queensland government 
authorities or federal policy direction. It focuses on the relationship between the ministry and 
the non-state actor. This research has demonstrated that it is the housing minister who 
decides whether Shelter is – and whether it remains – an insider group. While theoretically 
the Queensland premier has the authority to intervene in the relationship between Shelter 
and the state housing ministry, I found no evidence that this occurred. Nor did I find evidence 
of any intervention by the Treasury Department, other than Treasury’s standard 
unwillingness to include the budget of any portfolio area. Former housing ministers Tom 
Burns (1989-1992) and Robert Schwarten (1998-2009) enabled Shelter to work as an 
insider group: while David Watson (1996-1998) limited the engagement of Shelter to that of 
a peripheral insider. Following the election of the LNP Government led by Campbell 
Newman in 2012, Shelter became an outsider group. 
Problems of a close working relationship 
Capture is an issue for peak advocacy groups who have a close working relationship with 
the government of the day. When an insider group becomes captured it ceases to be 
influential. Grant (1989) labelled groups which were beholden to governments, ‘prisoner 
groups,’ arguing that groups become captured by the government of the day because the 
ideology of the government and the ideology of the group becomes the same. Governments 
expect interest groups to offer alternative policy solutions and are willing to listen to 
alternatives based on evidence. I argue that interest group capture remains relevant. 
Maloney et al (1994) argued that capture was due to resources rather than ideology. This 
research points to a greater complexity: a reliance on funding does not necessary mean that 
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an interest group will simply start singing the same tune as government. The impact of 
funding agreements on the activities of an interest group is impacted by the political will of 
the government and/or personality of the minister. If a Minister values independent advice, 
then a group may be dependent on the resources provided by the government while 
avoiding advocacy capture.  
Shared ideology remains a possibility. Group norms, social and ideological often develop 
within close working environments: political psychologists refer to this as group think. Group 
think occurs when “... members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (’t Hart 2010: 110 paraphrasing Janis 
1972). As a research psychologist Janis’ pivotal study investigated the problems associated 
with social cohesion within groups and argued that consensus among individuals may not 
always lead to the best decision making. Ideological group capture is the product of 
continued exposure to a closed group in which policy discussions take place.  
Insider status can also create challenges and problems with interest group membership. 
Recognising that some restrictions may be imposed by governments in exchange for funds, 
Maddison and Edgar argue that this can have detrimental effects on the membership: 
... problems arise for advocacy organisations that access political opportunities 
through collaboration with governments ... while these approaches may have short 
term gains, by producing ‘insider access’ to political resources, they run the risk of 
disrupting connections between advocacy organisations and their grassroots 
movements, leading to organisational homogenisation and a loss of innovation 
stimulated from the bottom up (Maddison & Edgar 2008: 11). 
Community based policy peaks cannot afford to be captured as this would ostracise their 
membership but is unlikely that not-for-profit interest groups can gain relational insider status 
without receiving some financial support from government. This funding provides peaks with 
the resources they need to employ staff, consult their members, and develop knowledge 
and policy advice. The ability to retain the capacity to provide critical advice is a well-
recognised challenge within the community sector, as well as the literature (Grant 1989, 
Cheverton 2005, Beyers et al 2008). Government funding signifies acceptance by the 
government, a recognition that working with this group can provide mutual benefit. There 
needs to be some ideological consensus to gain either peripheral or relational insider status 
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but advocacy groups must retain some differences in order to contribute to policy 
discussions.  
Insider status means more than it did when Wyn Grant first developed his typology in the 
1970s. Prior to the governance shift, insider status signalled access to decision makers, in 
today’s political climate insider status permits active participation, defined as “relationships 
that enable government and citizens to share in agenda setting, policy dialogue and the 
development and evaluation of policy, program and service options” (Queensland 
Government 2001). This thesis explores insider status as a means to better understanding 
the participation of interest groups in the development of policy. The revised typology 
provides a framework through which to analyse the role of Queensland Shelter in the 
development of social housing policy. In the following chapter I describe the evolution of 
Queensland Shelter, between 1987 and 2012. This chapter illustrates the impact of the 
bureaucratisation of the community sector, amid increasing government regulation. Shelter 
has shifted from using pressure tactics to working with the Queensland government, 
advocating on behalf of its membership. Firstly, however, I discuss the methodology used 
within this research.  
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Chapter Three:  
Study of Shelter: voluntary outfit to policy peak 
Oral history was instrumental in analysing the role of Shelter in the development of social 
housing policy in Queensland. Other methods such as document analysis were used to 
examine relevant material in light of the theoretical framework, the pressure group typology. 
In the second half of this chapter I describe and analyse the evolution of Shelter from grass 
roots community organisation to a government funded social housing advocacy peak. I use 
this discussion to illustrate the ways in which the Board, staff and membership impact on 
the overall direction of the organisation and the role of the state in enabling Shelter to 
develop the capacity to provide policy advice. Several days each week between 2011 to 
2013 I worked on this thesis from a desk at Shelter’s premises at Spring Hill, observing and 
at times participating in aspects of Shelter work. In order to understand earlier incarnations 
of Shelter, I rely on interviews and documentation. The study sits within two academic 
disciples, history and political science.  
Politics and History 
The degree of separation between history and politics oscillates, not least because political 
science has “no agreed approach or method of study” (Stoker and Marsh 2010: 1). 
Variances can also be attributed to the pervading academic methods of inquiry of the era. 
The question of whether political inquiry requires historical context, is impacted by the 
specifics of the research study and the assumptions underpinning the variety of sub-
disciplines within both study areas. Separation between the two is minor in political history, 
for example, as opposed to that in political psychology, where investigation is focussed on 
individual political behaviour and motivation. Even here, however, history is present – within 
the discipline of political psychology historical analogy is a causal mechanism used to 
explain how individuals base their choices on previous events (‘t Hart 2010).  
The disciplines of history and the study of politics were closely aligned until the study of 
political institutions was upstaged by behaviourism in the early 20th century. In the last one 
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hundred years or so since American ‘Political Science’ became institutionalised, the 
methods used within the discipline have expanded (Stoker and Marsh 2010). While British 
scholars continued to be taught political science by historians and philosophers, American 
scholars began showing less interest in institutional and historical contexts and instead 
focussed attention on quantitative methods and theoretical models (Kavanagh 1991). While 
there was a general shift towards scientific study, this did not occur without debate and as 
the study of politics matured ideas regarding the purpose of political study, the methods 
used and the scope of study diversified. Political science has become a very broad church, 
including the study of gender, voting behaviour, party politics, international relations and 
public policy to name but a few. While some note that the diversity can “give the impression 
of a subject which lacks a core” (Kavanagh 1991: 479), others argue that multiplicity is a 
positive: 
I am a great believer in pluralism in science. Any direction you proceed in has a very 
high a priori probability of being wrong; so it is good if other people are exploring in 
other directions – perhaps one of them will be on the right track (Stoker and Marsh 
2010: 2 citing Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon 1992: 21 italics in original). 
While research and theoretical diversity may lead to a wider understanding of the political 
world, it also creates ambiguity. Many of the theories involve contradictory positions 
regarding both the obtainment of knowledge and the methods used to obtain it. Approaches 
such as feminism and constructivism, for example, challenge the ontological and 
methodological assumptions of positivist theories such as behaviourism. While behavioural 
studies may have rejected history in favour of statistical evidence, other theoretical lenses 
within the discipline (for example new intuitionalism, feminism and constructivism) need 
history. Crudely put while history may be side-lined in a study which quantifies the 
preferences of voters, an understanding of gender politics cannot be obtained without 
historical context. By the latter half of the 1990s an analysis of the outputs of political science 
demonstrated that “the links with history are still strong, but it is history as a study and record 
of the past rather than as a method” (Kavanagh 1991: 495). 
Kavanagh provides a useful synthesis between the two fields, describing the “historical 
approach” to political study as: 
… studies which systematically describe and analyse phenomena that have occurred 
in the past and which explain contemporary political phenomena with reference to 
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past events. The emphasis is on explanation and understanding, not on formulating 
laws (Kavanagh 1991: 482).  
In order to research Shelter’s participation in the development of policy I developed an 
understanding of past events and behaviours in relation to decision making in Queensland. 
Historical and political methods were employed in order to gain a rich understanding of 
cultural and structural change impacting on the participation of Shelter within Queensland 
politics. In order to understand the role that Shelter has played in the development of social 
housing policy the changing political context over the twenty-five year period is a vital 
consideration. Without understanding both the history of the organisation and the political 
history of the era it would be difficult to provide an analysis of why Shelter was either included 
or prevented from participating at any particular point in time.  
While there are similarities between the approaches to historical and political study, there 
are also distinctions. For some historians the time period (1987-2012) covered in this 
research is contentious for an historical study, as it is considered far too recent: “... 
historians, particularly British ones, have argued that study of the present or of the recent 
past is an inherently impossible enterprise because of the lack of complete written records” 
(Kavanagh 1991: 479). Difficulty in obtaining documentation is also true of Australian 
studies. Access to government documentation, such as Cabinet papers may have provided 
beneficial insight regarding the influence of Shelter on government officials, the nature of 
decision making and the non-decisions that were canvassed in consideration of an issue. 
But, due to Cabinet in confidence protocols the records kept within Cabinet are not released 
for thirty years and as a result the Cabinet discussions regarding the first case study, the 
establishment of the Rental Bond Authority, will not be available until 2017 and the last of 
the case studies will not be available until 2047.  
A narrative method of inquiry was the overall methodological approach adopted for this 
thesis. Narrative analysis is useful for understanding complex human interaction and 
positioning these interactions within broader social, political and economic contexts 
(Webster & Mertova 2007, Ospina & Dodge 2005). Several research methods were 
employed to develop the narrative, including semi-structured interviews, ethnography 
(participant observation) and analysis of documentation. The use of these to examine the 
varying relationship between Shelter and successive governments of Queensland is 
explored in the first half of this chapter.  
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Oral history and elite interviewing 
While working on this thesis I was employed part-time by The Centre for the Government of 
Queensland. With funding support from the Australian Research Council and the 
Queensland government, the Centre developed Queensland Speaks, an oral history project. 
The project is a historical record of the perceptions and reflections on the governance of 
Queensland between 1968 and 2008. All interview testimony is available to scholars and 
the general public via a free website. Former Queensland premiers, ministers and directors-
general were interviewed for the project. While working on the project I was involved in 
writing the interview briefs, constructing the questions and interviewing. I was also employed 
to time code the material in preparation for the web site, requiring me to listen and re-listen 
to a great deal of the material.  
Oral history emerged as a method which “enabled the uncovering of hidden histories, the 
stories of people who lives hadn’t been documented and which weren’t in archives, working-
class history, women’s history, black history and so on” (Thomson 2008: 96 citing the work 
of Thompson 1978). From the 1970s the scope of oral history broadened “to include a wider 
range of communities defined by shared interest or identity ...” (Thomson 2008: 98). 
Interviewees for Queensland Speaks fall into the category of a community of interest. While 
half of the participants, namely the politicians may have had their work or aspects of their 
work documented, this was also an opportunity to hear the perspectives of senior public 
servants.  
The Queensland Speaks oral history project and my own elite interviews were useful in 
developing the analysis and understanding the context: 
Oral history, or interviews with key participants, while events are still relatively fresh 
in their minds, has often been found useful for recapturing atmosphere, a quality 
which no amount of documentation can convey… (Kavanagh 1991: 485). 
While there are differences associated with elite interviewing and oral history, any difference 
in the resulting interview style is largely intangible – especially true if the elite interview is 
loosely structured. Instead distinctions lie in the purpose of the oral testimony: oral histories 
seek to record events of a particular time while elite interviewing is used to address particular 
research questions. Elite interviewing is strongly influenced by the knowledge base and 
particular interests of the interviewer. Most Queensland Speaks interviewers had a deep 
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knowledge of Queensland politics, and some, including two retired directors-general had 
participated in public decision making.  
I primarily relied on documents and interviews in order to trace the path of each of the case 
studies. In thinking about the three dimensions of power discussed in the introduction 
chapter of this thesis, I have studied the decisions made, the alternate policy preferences 
and framing of issues and the overall assumptions held by stakeholders. While document 
analysis proved useful some knowledge gaps remained. Interview material was used to 
understand how a chain of events unfolded. Whiteley and Winyard “suggest that ‘a second-
best solution to observing the decision-making process directly’ is to interview participants 
and obtain their perceptions ...” (1987: 111 cited in Grant 1989: 116). I enjoyed talking with 
members past and present of the social housing sector, public servants and former 
ministers. The interviews provided me with both information and prospective explanations I 
could not have accessed through documents alone. There are nonetheless methodological 
and reliability issues associated with interviewing. These issues come to the forefront when 
accounts of events vary between individuals. Oral historians defend their use of interview 
material claiming that both written and oral accounts of the past are subject to the memory 
and perception of the individual: 
… there is little difference in kind between ‘reported’ accounts of an event after it has 
happened, whether it is written or recalled orally. Any attempt to give an account of 
what has happened, whether it be a news report, a letter, diary entry, testimony in the 
witness box or casual conversation, will be subject to interpretative reconstruction, 
even if the account is made on the same day as the event described (Douglas, 
Roberts & Thompson 1988: 21 citing Seldon and Pappworth 1983). 
During this research, problems associated with remembering locations, dates or names 
were either avoided by careful preparation prior to the interview or followed up after the 
interview. ‘Facts’ such as these are easily checked. More problematic were occasions where 
individuals perceived the same event differently. An example of this occurred when 
researching the origins of the Rental Bond Authority (RBA). I discovered that founding 
members of Shelter and former Queensland public servants held differing views on the role 
that Shelter played in advocating for the Rental Bond Authority. When this occurred, I 
triangulated the viewpoints of Shelter representatives, senior public servants and available 
documentation in order to understand the conflicts and differing opinions. I argue that while 
Shelter may have contributed to the establishment of the Rental Bond Authority, there were 
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a number of external factors, separate from Shelter, which also supported its establishment. 
This is my analysis of the role of Shelter, and I base my arguments on oral testimony, 
documentation and an understanding of the political context. I discuss the impact of my own 
subjectivity in a later part of this chapter.  
As touched upon earlier, the study relied heavily on oral testimony because while some of 
the information regarding the formal participation of Shelter was available through a careful 
analysis of existing documentation, informal participation was not recorded in 
documentation. The interview testimony revealed, for example, that several public servants 
agreed that one of the benefits of working with a peak group like Shelter was the ability to 
get in contact with Shelter staff outside of regular meeting times to informally discuss new 
policy or program ideas. The importance of informal communication is emphasised 
throughout the case studies. 
For each chapter narrative, documents and interviews were used to examine the 
participation of Shelter in conjunction with the relationship between the organisation, 
decision makers and other stakeholders. I used this information to develop a wide 
understanding of Shelter’s role in: 
 developing social housing policy 
 working with the public service 
 developing the Queensland community housing sector 
 engaging with external stakeholders 
I conducted twenty-one interviews for this research. Time and resources prevented me from 
interviewing all individuals involved over the last twenty-five years of Shelter history. I was 
mindful to ensure an even distribution of senior public servants as well as those that were 
involved with Shelter in the early years and those that joined the organisation at a later date. 
I also interviewed former housing ministers from both major political parties (see appendix 
one for a complete list of those interviewed). The first people interviewed for the project were 
Shelter staff members: Executive Officer, Adrian Pisarski and Operations Manager, Kate 
Cowmeadow. During that initial interview they suggested that I begin by interviewing one of 
the founding members of Shelter, Deirdre Coghlan. I interviewed Coghlan several months 
later. 
Around mid-way through my candidature I mentioned to Pisarski in passing that I was having 
difficulties arranging an interview with former Minister for Housing Robert Schwarten. 
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Pisarski offered to get in touch with Schwarten on my behalf. A few weeks later Schwarten 
rang me on my mobile to arrange a time for the interview. Pisarski also indicated that I should 
interview former federal housing minister Tanya Plibersek (2007-10) who was now presiding 
over the health portfolio. Plibersek’s office emailed a polite decline to a member of Shelter’s 
administration team, who subsequently forwarded the email to me: 
I have received a request from Adrian Pisarski requesting that Minister Plibersek 
agree to an interview with Maree Stanley. Unfortunately the Minister receives many 
thousands of requests for her time and is only able to accept those with direct 
relevance to the Health portfolio. As Minister Butler has portfolio responsibility for 
Housing, Adrian's request has been forwarded to him for consideration (Plibersek 
2013).  
This was the only decline for interview that I received during this project, although two 
interviewees declined to be recorded. To my knowledge Butler did not respond to the 
forwarded interview request and I did not follow this up, instead continuing to focus my 
attention on Queensland policy. Many of the earlier interviews were chosen using the 
snowballing technique. I simply asked each person I interviewed who I should interview next 
and then made a judgement about whether they should be interviewed based upon my 
existing knowledge and knowledge gaps. The interviews varied in length, from forty-five 
minutes to one and half hours. During the first year of research I develop a timeline which 
mapped Shelter staff and Board members, senior housing public servants and state and 
federal housing Ministers. Next I included major changes to social housing policy in 
Queensland and changes to Shelter’s organisational capacity. The map informed the 
structure of the narrative, assisting in plotting major developments over the twenty-five year 
period covered in the research. It was also useful in identifying interviewees and developing 
interview questions. Interview testimony, Shelter documentation and other grey literature, 
such as government documents and media reports were used to piece together the story. 
This was an iterative process, these sources were examined in conjunction with conducting 
interviews. This was time consuming, with interviews held over a two year period.  
Participants were very generous with their time, sharing with me their knowledge and 
experiences. The interviews were semi-structured to enable interviewees to talk about what 
they thought was important but a short list of questions was prepared in order to ensure that 
the objectives of the interview were met. In doing this my aim was to “understand the 
respondent’s definition of the situation,” but also I was “trying to place that definition in the 
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context of a theoretically informed research project” (Burnham et al 2008: 241). I was also 
fortunate to be able to study Shelter from within, enabling me to observe and participate in 
the culture of a modern policy peak organisation.  
Ethnography  
Over the course of three years (2011-2013) I worked on my thesis research at Shelter’s 
offices in Spring Hill. I observed the-day to-day business of Shelter, participated in meetings 
and wrote articles for various Shelter publications. At times my opinion was sought on issues 
as they arose and I attended fortnightly Policy and Communication Team (PACT) meetings, 
quarterly delegate’s meetings, annual general meetings, planning days and on occasion 
staff meetings. I was provided with a desk and computer which I used on an ad hoc basis. 
Ethnography is practiced by a number of disciplines including “anthropology, sociology, 
management theory, organization (sic) studies and cultural studies ...” (Neyland 2008: 1). It 
is less commonly used by political scientists which Vromen (2009) describes as unfortunate, 
arguing that it is a useful tool to study “micro-level processes such as interactions within 
organizations (sic) and socialization (sic) processes” (Vromen 2009: 261 citing the work of 
Bray 2008). As a methodology, ethnography:  
involves the observation of, and participation in, particular groupings ... This 
observation and participation aims to engage with questions of how a particular group 
operates, what it means to be a member of a particular group and how changes can 
affect that group (Neyland 2008: 1). 
Ethnographical studies usually result in a ‘thick’ description which Denzin (1989) describes 
as those “descriptions that are deep, dense, detailed accounts” as opposed to thin 
descriptions which “lack detail, and simply report facts (Denzin 1989: 83 cited in Creswell 
and Miller 2000: 128). I took copious notes while I worked at Shelter, but I would describe 
my observations on the thin side of thick. It was not my aim to write a complete history of 
Shelter and its activities. The purpose of the research was to understand the role that Shelter 
played in the development of public policy and the observations I made were useful to 
understand the current culture and work practices of the organisation.  
While working as a participant observer at Shelter, I analysed and sorted all notes taken into 
themes which included Shelter’s current priorities, culture and daily routine. In doing this I 
was able to develop an understanding of the current organisational culture, tasks and 
responsibilities. I was then able to compare these notes to my understanding of other eras 
 
 
59 
 
within Shelter’s history. Information gathered during this participant observation was also 
used to inform interview questions. How did the experiences of the current Shelter 
organisation differ from that in the past? How had the culture of Shelter shifted in its twenty-
five year history? My observations aided me to develop an understanding regarding the 
shifting role of Shelter during its twenty-five year history.  
There are issues associated with “getting close” to people while conducting an ethnographic 
study (Neyland 2008: 16). Neyland uses the terms insider and outside to describe the 
position of the researcher in relation to those being researched, but argues that these are 
not: “absolute positions – as the research develops, at times the ethnographer will be more 
‘inside’ and at other members more ‘outside’ the organanization (sic)” (Neyland 2008: 17). 
Neyland succinctly describes the role of the ethnographer as one that: 
... shifts between being ‘in’ of the organization (sic) (actively participating in what is 
going on) and being ‘out’ of the organization (sic) (writing and reviewing observations 
and taking these into account when observing further aspects of organizational (sic) 
activity (Neyland 2008: 17). 
This mirrors my own experience, at times I was included, and at others I observed rather 
than participated. While I was never dismissed or viewed as an outsider, nor was I on the 
payroll, so I didn’t ever get involved in administrative issues. I was included in morning teas, 
social events such as the annual Christmas party and staff birthday cake celebrations. At 
times I wondered about the risk of ‘capture’ by the organisation.  
Oral historian Valerie Yow (1995) reflects on the issue of ‘unconscious advocacy’21 during 
interviews she conducted during an oral history project with a psychiatric hospital. Reflecting 
on her representation and analysis of interview testimony. Yow writes: 
But the question I ask myself now is whether I approached the recorded testimony in 
a sufficiently critical manner, since I liked the individuals, respected the work the 
hospital does, and would not have wanted to publish anything that might harm the 
reputation of this work community. I would have viewed conscious suppression of 
information as unethical, of course, but my feelings may have unconsciously 
influenced my research questions and my handling of evidence (Yow 1995: 56). 
                                            
21 Carl Ryant (1990) refers to this as ‘good-will advocacy”, cited in Yow 1995. 
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Yow’s reflections resonate with my work. I too liked and respected the work of Shelter staff 
and Board members. Prior to starting with Shelter, my thesis supervisor had suggested that 
Shelter might make an interesting case study, fitting with my research interests of interest 
group participation in public policy. He was a member of the Board and acted as a gate 
keeper, introducing me to the Chairperson of the Shelter Committee, Wynn Hopkins. While 
my supervisor actively encouraged critical engagement at all times, I was conscious of my 
relationships with Shelter staff and other individuals I had met for interviews. Like Yow, at 
times I wondered if I was sufficiently critical during interviews and of the material I had 
collected while based at the Shelter. At various times I reflected on my ability to remain 
objective, as I developed a growing respect for the work of those within the social housing 
sector.  
In another of Yow’s articles published in the Oral History Review, the author examines the 
effects of the interview on both the interviewer and the interviewee, posing the rhetorical 
question of “do I like them too much?”(Yow 1997). Yow argues that both positive and 
negative impressions “influence the ways we ask questions and respond to narrators and 
interpret and evaluate what they say” (Yow 1997: 78). Reflecting on these impressions and 
understanding your own position within the research by integrating the questions, responses 
and analysis of interview material is necessary in order to understand how internal bias 
might impact on the research. In order to create awareness within the researcher, Yow 
provides a useful set of questions: 
1. What am I feeling about this narrator? 
2. What similarities and what differences impinge on this interpersonal situation? 
3. How does my own ideology affect this process? What group outside of the process 
am I identifying with? 
4. Why am I doing the project in the first place? 
5. In selecting topics and questions, what alternatives might I have taken? Why didn’t I 
choose these? 
6. What other possible interpretations are there? Why did I reject them? 
7. What are the effects on me as I go about this research? How are my reactions 
impinging on the research? (Yow 1997: 79). 
My use of these questions was not confined to the interview process. I used these questions 
to reflect on many aspects of the PhD project. An additional consideration for this research 
was the inclusion and/or exclusion of material used to write the thesis. As described in earlier 
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paragraphs of this chapter there are differences between history and political science. While 
Yow was mainly concerned with the questions she asked (or didn’t ask) during the oral 
history interview, I also had to be mindful of how I used the material following the interview. 
An oral history interview is not usually subjected to editing22 but the difference between my 
research and an oral history project was that I was using parts of the interviews to address 
specific research questions. As I made judgements on what was relevant to the purpose of 
the research, I excluded some interviewee material while focusing on others. 
The interviews conducted specifically for this research were not transcribed. In keeping with 
the methodology used within the Queensland Speaks research project and website each 
interview was thematically analysed, summarised and time coded (see Miller & Stanley 
2012, Stanley 2010). I started with an outcome (major policy reform) and then worked 
backwards examining the role of Shelter and its relationship with the government of the day. 
This type of analysis is referred to as path dependency (Neuman 2006).  
Webster and Mertova (2007: 93) argue that there are challenges to ensuring the validity and 
reliability of narrative inquiry research. “However, for narrative, it can be neither expected 
nor assumed that the outcomes from one narrative or a collection of stories will consistently 
return the same views or outcomes.” Despite these concerns it is a useful methodology for 
examining complex relationships such as that between Shelter and the government of the 
day.  
“Narrative inquiry attempts to capture the ‘whole story’, whereas other methods tend 
to communicate understandings of studied subjects or phenomena at certain points, 
but frequently omit the important ‘intervening’ stages” (Webster & Mertova 2007: 3). 
Both reliability and validity can be improved by ensuring “accuracy and accessibility of the 
data” (Webster & Mertova 2007:93). Accessibility to data makes it possible for the reader to 
access primary sources in order to make a judgement on the reliability of the narrative. All 
interviews conducted as part of the Queensland Speaks oral history project are available to 
the public via the website. I used a categorised bibliography to ensure the location of primary 
and secondary material is clear to the reader. The interviews conducted specifically for this 
research are not publicly available, but remain in the possession of the author. Sometime 
after beginning this research I became aware of the Australian Data Archive. In replicating 
                                            
22 Sometimes interviews are edited, for example if comments made by the interviewee are harmful to either 
themselves or others but editing is not considerable desirable in recording history (Yow 1995) 
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this type of research I would encourage researchers to consider archiving their qualitative 
data both as a means of strengthening the reliability and validity of the narrative analysis 
and to contribute to the collection for use by other researchers. The researcher would need 
to ensure that permission to store and share the research is given by all research 
participants prior to the start of the research process.  
Aside from working within the offices at Shelter I was also fortunate to spend some time 
working within a department of the Queensland Public Service. Towards the end of my 
candidature I applied for a role with a pilot program of PhD work placements. The program 
provided students with the opportunity to develop some experience and insight into work 
within the public service. I mention this role briefly here because although this role was not 
part of the research project, the experience coloured the way in which I viewed the role of 
public servants in the development of public policy. Members of the public service are often 
asked to provide policy briefs – with an emphasis on brief. Ministers are busy, unlikely to 
read long winded documents especially if complex and public servants have to convey 
necessary information in a format that does not take too long to read. It is necessary 
therefore that public servants, usually as members of a team, make judgements on what 
material is necessary and what is not. Despite interviewing several senior public servants 
as well as extensively listening to the interviews with Queensland Speaks participants, I had 
overlooked the importance of the bureaucrat’s influence in public decision making. For an 
advocacy peak a relationship with public servants, especially those who provide advice to 
Ministers is pivotal. The experience of working on placement for two months with the 
Queensland Government led to some revision of my ideas around the relationship between 
Shelter and the public service. While I had an understanding of the role of the public service 
to provide advice to the Minister, I had underplayed the importance of the relationship 
between Shelter and senior department staff and the opportunity that discussions with senior 
staff provides in steering and shaping policy direction.  
Documentation and Content Analysis 
I was fortunate to have the full support of the Shelter board and staff for the duration of the 
project. I had open access to all the available archival documentation and shared files on 
the computer system, with the exception of Shelter Board minutes. Unfortunately many of 
Shelter’s records were destroyed by a flood caused by a burst pipe. What remained, 
however, was useful in order to support interview testimony and also as method for deciding 
who to interview. My semi regular attendance at the Shelter office helped me to learn the 
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industry jargon. There are many, many acronyms used to refer to organisations, policies 
and programs, some of which are included in the abbreviation list at the start of this thesis.  
The research used primary and secondary documentation to build the historical narrative. It 
was helpful to think about the documents in these terms, in order to mitigate some of the 
issues associated with reliability.  
Table 5: Primary, secondary and tertiary sources used within this research 
Primary Sources Shelter documentation 
Shelter database 
Hansard 
Queensland Government documents 
Queensland Political Chronicles  
The Courier-Mail 
Brisbane Times 
Queensland Government media releases 
Shelter media releases 
Shelter Yearbooks 
Shelter Newsletters 
Media releases 
Secondary Sources Books 
PhD Theses 
Journal Articles 
 
Not unlike interview testimony, there is uncertainty associated with documentation research, 
“Since reality is constructed and experienced in so many different ways, determining what 
actually happened in any final sense is an aspiration impossible to achieve” (Gamble 2002: 
142 emphasis in original). These authors however provide some reassurance: 
However, careful use of a wide range of documentary material is one of the most 
reliable methods open to the political researcher and provides an opportunity for the 
production of authoritative studies, even if the ‘definitive account’ remains just out of 
reach (Burnham et al 2008: 212). 
In order to assess whether Shelter remained constructively critical throughout the Beattie 
Government period I collated copies of all of Queensland Shelter’s media submissions. I 
manually coded each of the media releases, highlighting criticisms and commendations 
made of the Beattie Government in each of the releases. Some submissions did not provide 
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commentary on the Beattie Government and a small number commented on the federal 
government but the majority of the media releases were categorised as ‘neither’. The 
majority of these promoted Shelter activity, aiming to draw public attention to social housing 
issues. The mixed category refers to submissions which made both positive and negative 
comments regarding Beattie government policy. For example “Queensland Shelter 
welcomes the State Government’s changes to the Residential Tenancy Act [positive], yet 
remain concerned as to the enforceability of the laws [negative]” (Queensland Shelter 2008).  
While a range of documentation was analysed to build knowledge of the case studies, it was 
not useful as a sole method for determining the role of Shelter in policy development. In later 
chapters where I argue that Shelter was an insider group, and therefore highly involved, 
documentation alone did not illustrate the informal interaction that Shelter had with both the 
Minister and the department staff. Technology also plays a part in reducing the amount of 
formal documentation: “Not all significant activities are recorded or filed, the telephone has 
almost certainly reduced the importance of letter-writing and some sensitive documents are 
held back” (Kavanagh 1991: 484). The rise and rise of email communication has provided 
another challenge for researchers. Very few individuals or organisations properly archive 
their emails, which are often lost forever when there is a changeover of computers and/or 
staff, let alone a change in the governing political party. 
These are the methods that were used to develop each of the case studies and to analyse 
the shifting role that Shelter played in the development of housing policy over a twenty-five 
year period. The remaining portion of this chapter provides an overview of the organisation 
from its early days as a community group to its role as a peak advocacy organisation for the 
social housing sector in Queensland.  
Shelter: Early Beginnings 
Australian Shelter organisations originated from a model operating in the United Kingdom. 
Shelter England formed in 1966, developing through general citizen interest in housing 
stress following the showing of Cathy Come Home on British TV as part of the Wednesday 
Play Series (Queensland Shelter England 2013, IMDB 2009-2014). The film examined the 
British welfare system through the story of young couple Cathy and Reg who lose their family 
home following an accident which prevents Reg from working. They become homeless and 
the final harrowing shots show the removal of Cathy’s children by social services staff at a 
train station. Twelve million people watched the film on the first showing, leading to 
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increased attention on housing and homelessness. Shot in ‘documentary drama’ style by 
leftist director Ken Loach, the film portrayed Cathy and Reg as an everyday couple. The 
ability of this drama to present homelessness as something that could happen to ‘ordinary’ 
citizens contributed to the impact of the film (Pisarski 2011 interview by author). While Hill 
(2011) argued that comments made on the UK welfare system as part of the film were more 
fiction than fact, the film resonated with people, successfully framing homelessness as a 
possibility for many, if not all, citizens. There is no Australian feature film or documentary 
that has ever had such an impact on attitudes to housing stress.  
The Castle (1997), for example, a well-constructed comedy, supported the status quo, the 
dominance of home ownership as the Australian dream and the capacity of the Australian 
Constitution to protect the Aussie battler from evil business corporations. This Australian film 
did not challenge any of the existing structures, with little impact on current policy. While The 
Delinquents (1989)23 depicted housing stress, this was a retrospective view of the Australian 
welfare state in the 1950s, ineffective in setting the current policy agenda. Samson & Delilah 
(2009) could be classed as a documentary drama, telling the story of two Indigenous youths 
who sleep rough for part of the film, but it seemed too far removed from everyday life to have 
much impact on community understandings of how widespread homelessness was 
booming. 
‘Shelters’ in Australia were established in New South Wales and Tasmania in 1975 (Shelter 
NSW: ND, Shelter TAS: ND). Shortly after the establishment of these, The Australian 
Council of Social Services (ACOSS) were successful in persuading the Whitlam federal 
government to fund National Shelter in early 1975 (QCOSS 1976). South Australia and 
Western Australia followed, both opening in 1979 (Shelter WA: 2003, Shelter SA 2013). Both 
Australian territories were without a Shelter organisation until 1996 (ACT Shelter 2012 & NT 
Shelter ND).  
The exact date of the emergence of a Shelter organisation in Queensland is unclear.24 
Groups first operated under the banner of Queensland Shelter during the 1970s but activity 
was inconsistent: 
                                            
23 The film is based on the book by Criena Rohan published in 1962 but rereleased in 1989 to coincide with 
the movie release. 
24 The organisation has been referred to as SHELTER, Shelter, Shelter Queensland, and occasionally South 
Shelter. From the late 1980s referred to as Queensland Shelter, Q Shelter and/ or Shelter. 
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Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, its members would come together and 
organise around particular issues which were of concern to its members, and then 
after a time would become inactive as the issue passed and other concerns became 
more urgent (Queensland Shelter circa 1991). 
Similar to the role played by ACOSS in the development of National Shelter, the Queensland 
Council of Social Services (QCOSS) was involved in early incarnations of the state Shelter 
branch by “facilitating the participation of Queensland consumer groups at state and national 
levels” (QCOSS 1975). Members of QCOSS were successful in bring together community 
groups from Brisbane, Mackay, Rockhampton, Townsville, Cairns and Mt Isa. Many of the 
issues that this early ‘Shelter’ group were considering would not be out of place on today’s 
policy agenda: 
 public housing 
 lack of rental accommodation and the rights of tenants 
 special needs and emergency accommodation 
 alternative purchase arrangements 
 housing policy, with respect to city zoning, caravan parks 
 co-operatives (QCOSS 1975). 
QCOSS developed other housing related working groups during this period , the Homeless 
Person Working group, designed to “act as an open forum and for the exchange of 
information, to develop the consumer in-put into agencies concerned with homelessness” 
(QCOSS 1976). At around the same time, a drop-in centre for people experiencing 
homelessness in Brisbane opened at 139 Charlotte St in the Brisbane CBD.25 
From 1975 the QCOSS Annual Report included a report on Shelter activities. In 1975 
ACOSS was provided funding by the Federal Department of Housing and Construction to 
employ Anne Cross who was “appointed as Co-ordinator to help develop the programme in 
Queensland” (QCOSS 1976).26 In 1976 Cross established a state wide Shelter steering 
committee with members tasked with collecting information from their area in order to 
develop policy ideas. Cross also attended the 1976 National Shelter conference in Canberra 
                                            
25 The 139 club was still operating in 2015, although has long since relocated to 505 Brunswick Street in 
Fortitude Valley (139 Club Website 2015). 
26 This funding was short lived, “Since the end of November 1975, funds have not been available for the 
employment of a Co-ordinator, however enough money was available to hold a small national meeting … and 
a national newsletter (QCOSS 1976: 21). 
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between the 9 and 10th August, in which she reported on the activities of Shelter. Following 
the conference there was a flurry of activity in Queensland, the Housing Commission 
Tenants Groups were established in Inala, submissions were presented to State parliament 
regarding “Landlord-Tenancy Legislation” as the group attempted “to influence legislation 
into greater protection of tenants in areas such as bond money and eviction orders” (QCOSS 
1976: 22). State based seminars and conferences were held in Brisbane and Rockhampton.  
Money that had been made available by the Whitlam government soon ran out and although 
it was the intention of Shelter members to continue to meet, priorities were stretched:  
Several of the local groups are still continuing to meet and information is being 
collected through an informal link-up but the formal Shelter organisation is now non-
existent due to lack of money and personnel (QCOSS 1976: 22). 
It was several years until the QCOSS executive prioritised the re-establish of a Shelter 
organisation in Queensland – the reasons for this are not explicit, but housing affordability 
issues had continued to grow in Queensland, as in other states. Members of QCOSS hoped 
that this new Shelter committee members would include “welfare personnel, builders, 
architects, town planners and so on” (QCOSS 1979: 12). Getting people involved in Shelter 
at this time was difficult: 
... the people working in the housing field have large time commitments to the 
activities of their own agencies, and they find it difficult to allot the time to take on 
further responsibilities (QCOSS 1979: 12).  
In 1982 Shelter was still experiencing low levels of resources and at this time energies were 
conserved, as demonstrated by the decision by members to “concentrate on addressing 
housing issues as part of the destruction of community affecting inner city suburbs ...” 
(QCOSS 1981: 4). At this time, a subgroup of Shelter developed to address issues regarding 
the Housing Commission. This group focussed on “matters related to quality of life of 
Housing Commission tenants and Housing Commission policy, with particular regard to the 
availability of rental accommodation for poor people” (QCOSS 1981: 4).  
Interest and support for a shelter organisation throughout this period waxed and waned. In 
1982 the coordinator of Shelter, Alan Hasler passed away on the 13th September, aged only 
44. QCOSS included a memoriam notice acknowledging Hasler’s contributions to Shelter 
and the community sector: “His efforts on behalf of SHELTER, and his personal contribution 
to QCOSS, are sadly missed” (QCOSS 1982).  
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Other community groups with an interest in housing were also operating during this period. 
The Catholic Social Welfare Committee hosted a housing forum in May of 1982. The forum 
was co-sponsored by QCOSS and titled, Behind the Boom: Housing Queenslander in the 
1980s. As Deirdre Coghlan, lifetime member of Queensland Shelter explained resources 
were limited: 
In the early 80s … there were no housing workers in Queensland, no housing workers 
whatsoever. There was a few workers in the Churches, a few neighbourhood centres 
that were not funded … from any government department … but there was … social 
action … coming from the people (Coghlan 2011 interview by the author).  
In 1983 National Shelter provided a “small grant” so that Queensland Shelter could develop 
a policy document (Shelter Queensland 198327). This money was used to employ Barbara 
Miller part-time: Miller was also working at QCOSS (Queensland Council of Social Services). 
The grant money enabled Miller, with input from the housing sector to develop Shelter’s 
housing policy, published as a booklet, titled Why Profit from Housing? On the 27th August 
Shelter hosted a meeting to amend and ratify the policy document before it was 
disseminated. The policy document was then “amended … [and] submitted for typesetting, 
and will be printed and circulated to all politicians and groups concerned with housing before 
the State elections” (Wiman 1983). Following the development of the 1983 policy platform 
there is no evidence of any formal activity from Shelter. QCOSS, however, remained 
involved in housing and homelessness issues (QCOSS 1985) as did churches and other 
community interest groups. 
The Hawke Labor Government was also encouraging the growth and development of 
housing cooperatives, through the Local Government and Community Housing Program 
(Queensland Shelter circa 1991). QCOSS employed a project worker for a six week period 
to help local organisations develop viable funding submissions in order to become a housing 
co-operatives. Several housing co-operatives were funded in the 1984/85 period, including 
the Wooloowin/Albion/Windsor Housing Co-operative, Spring Hill Co-operative, Red 
Hill/Paddington Community Housing Group, East Brisbane Community Centre as well as 
Rockhampton and Townsville. QCOSS reported that “for the first time, community based 
and tenant managed housing has become a reality in Queensland” (QCOSS 1985). Rose 
                                            
27 Around this time SHELTER was referred to as Shelter.  
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Wiseman, Housing Project Officer with QCOSS, noted that the Queensland community 
sector was ill-equipped to: 
… take on the sorts of tasks and responsibilities as were implied in the principles of 
the L.G.A.C.H.P [Local Government and Community Housing Program] as desirable 
as these may have been for solving some of the housing problems in this State 
(Wiseman 1986: 28). 
During the late 1980s, there were plenty of issues associated with housing that a group; 
such as Shelter could draw upon. The United Nations declared that 1987 would be the 
International Year of Housing and Shelter for the Homeless due to the numbers of people 
worldwide living in slums: 
 … despite the efforts of governments at the national and local levels and of 
international organizations (sic), the living conditions of the majority of the people in 
slums and squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing countries, 
continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms … (UN: 1982).  
The aim of the UN was to raise the profile of shelter for those experiencing homelessness 
and to ensure: 
… renewed political commitment by the international community to the improvement 
of the shelter and neighbourhoods of the poor and disadvantaged, and to the 
provision of shelter for the homeless, particularly in the developing countries, as a 
matter of priority (UN: 1982). 
Within Brisbane preparations for World Expo ‘88 had escalated existing housing affordability 
issues to crisis point. While it is sometimes argued that large public events have a positive 
effect on overall economic conditions, for some people Expo ‘88 caused significant housing 
stress. The development of the vast infrastructure required to host Expo had a direct impact 
on people living in the area. The existing homes on the site, mostly low cost rental houses, 
were demolished under resumption laws which provide remuneration for the home’s owners 
but forced tenants to move. 
Elsewhere in Brisbane and surrounding areas demand for housing, particularly rental 
housing, was extremely high and this forced rental and sale prices up. Media reports indicate 
that some landlords were cashing in on this demand, evicting tenants so that their vacant 
properties could be tenanted by high paying Expo visitors. The University of Queensland 
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reported that some students discontinued their enrolment because they were unable to 
secure affordable accommodation. Caravan parks reached full occupancy and there was a 
critical lack of accommodation in Woodridge, Logan City, Springwood, Daisy Hill and 
surrounding areas. When Prime Minister Hawke visited the Expo site in early 1988, 
protestors greeted him demanding that both the Federal and State government spend more 
on public housing (South Coast Daily 1988). 
 
Illustration 4: Sussex Street squat, West End Queensland 
(Photo: Mark Allen circa 1988). 
During the course of my research, I serendipitously met Mark Allen. At the time of Expo ‘88 
Allen was an Honours Student and was also working on a social and economic impact report 
for the Southside Urban Research Group (SURG). Illustration 4 is a photograph taken by 
him of a squat in Sussex Street, West End. The dwelling had previously been divided into 
12 units and was housing a number of families who had recently migrated to Australia. These 
families (all private market tenants) were evicted on the premise that significantly increased 
rents could be charged during Expo. The mass eviction “triggered a squat action that lasted 
for about 6 months to highlight the issue. It attracted a lot of media (and police) attention at 
the time” (Allen 2015). 
The State government responded to housing issues incurred due to Expo ‘88 by establishing 
The Expo Housing Hotline. This telephone hotline was specifically created to take calls from 
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people who believed that they were being forced to leave to enable landlords to make money 
from high paying tourists. Minister for Family Services, Welfare and Housing Peter 
McKechnie told the Queensland Parliament: 
I want people to ring in if they feel they have been unfairly evicted or if they have been 
on the receiving end of unrealistic rent increases… There is every chance that those 
people who are evicting tenants only for the duration of Expo may come a cropper” 
(The Courier-Mail 1988). 
Later the hotline expanded to provide a more comprehensive service for those dealing with 
housing issues, as well as collecting data on housing stress in Brisbane: 
The Housing Hotline did research … they kept data on their own calls and then they’d 
match that with other bits of data that they could get their hands on and did some 
quite good reports. As well as obviously spending a lot of time helping people 
(Eastgate 2013 interview by the author).  
Expo ‘88 continued for six months and it is estimated that it received over eighteen million 
visits, though many were repeat visits from locals who bought a multi-visit pass. When the 
exhibition finished in October of 1988 the area was redeveloped by the newly created 
Southbank Corporation. 
Housing stress exacerbated by Expo’ 88, the subsequent development of the Housing 
Hotline and The International Year of Shelter for the Homeless helped to put housing firmly 
on the political agenda. These events occurred during a period of political turmoil in 
Queensland. The Fitzgerald inquiry into corruption, National Party leadership spills and 
increasing demand for political reform created the perfect storm for major change. Pressure 
groups that were well organised, with informed ideas on policy would soon have the 
opportunity to walk through the open door that had replaced the former brick wall.  
Grassroots Organisation (1987-1991) 
This period of change and prolonged attention on housing and homelessness issues 
sparked a renewal in Shelter activity in 1987 (Eastgate 2013 interview by the author). 
Members of the social welfare sector were brought together by shared concerns regarding 
housing: 
In 1987 Shelter arose from a group of concerned housing activists who realised that 
individual housing workers couldn’t change things on their own, that they needed to 
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get together to share information and develop strategies for a better response” 
(Morgan-Thomas 1997a).  
In response to the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH), the IYSH 
committee formed to “raise awareness of housing issues around the state.” Membership of 
the IYSH committee included “supported accommodation workers, QCOSS, and Catholic 
Housing Working Party staff, LGCH [Local Government and Community Housing Project], 
architects, students and academics” (Coghlan circa 2012). The committee wound up at the 
end of 1987 but some members decided to continue to raise awareness under the banner 
of Queensland Shelter (Queensland Shelter circa 1990a, Eastgate 2013 interview by the 
author). As Coghlan writes, “People and organisations were invited to become members 
and it was with these subscriptions that Qld Shelter used to spread the word” (circa 2012). 
After the IYSH, a small group set up some ‘road shows’ and travelled around Queensland 
educating people on housing and homelessness issues (Eastgate 2012, Queensland 
Shelter circa 1990a).  
Shelter membership in the formation years was fairly fluid and informal; resources were few 
and far between. Shelter did not receive funding from any government, relying on donations 
and later paid membership fees. “No funding of any sort came at this stage … from the state 
… The chook raffles were a weekly thing” (Coghlan 2011 interview by the author). Jon 
Eastgate, recalls how the group “gradually rebuilt” from early incarnations: 
… thanks to the enthusiasm of some new people, particularly Deirdre Coghlan, who 
replaced Helen at the Catholic Social Welfare Commission, a number of people 
who worked in Brisbane's homelessness sector, and a young architecture student 
who became our treasurer and took care of our bank account which steadily rose to 
the heady sum of $600” (Eastgate 2012).  
As many of the members were also working with other organisations in both paid and 
voluntary capacities there was a fluidity within the Queensland Shelter group.  
After the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless, there had been this kind of 
burst of energy but then there was no resources ... At one stage I remember having 
a meeting with four people at Rosemary Grundy’s house…. It was almost, you 
know, is this going to die? Can we keep it going? … (Eastgate 2013 interview by 
the author). 
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Physical resources were extremely limited; those involved with Shelter at this time relied on 
innovation and commitment to continue their focus on improving housing outcomes. 
Eastgate explains how one member of Shelter designed a logo: “Helen Wallace … designed 
us a logo based on the National Shelter one. Theirs showed two human figures in a tiny 
house. Helen carefully whited (sic) them out and replaced them with two tiny pineapples” 
(Eastgate 2012). Without any government funding, “someone brought the milk, someone 
brought the tea ...” (Coghlan 2011 interview by the author). Roles within Shelter were at this 
time fairly ad hoc, with people taking it in turns to perform key committee positions. 
 
Illustration 5: Excerpt from Shelter Committee minutes 12 June 1990 
(Queensland Shelter 1990b). 
In 1990 Shelter committee members used the $600 held in the Shelter account to employ 
housing resource worker, Pam Burke (Eastgate 2012). With limited funds Burke was 
employed for an initial 40 hours of work, carefully prioritised by the Shelter committee 
including the production of a Shelter leaflet, drafting the aims of Shelter and preparing and 
disseminating meeting minutes. The key aims of Shelter during this period were: 
 Providing information on housing to the community 
 Maintaining and developing the networks that link into Shelter. 
 Co-ordinating with other agencies, including advocacy and lobbying. 
 Supporting and developing appropriate responses at the State and National 
levels to housing need and policies as identified by local and regional 
organizations … (sic). (Queensland Shelter circa 1990a: 6). 
Community participation was a core principle underpinning the work of the Shelter 
committee members. In addition membership provided much needed funds. While sector 
consultation is never an easy proposition, technology in those days added to the challenges, 
without the internet Shelter relied on teleconferences and faxes to communicate and 
encourage feedback. In 1990 a hand written note was faxed (recipients unknown) to 
presumably interested parties in order to increase membership numbers, see illustration 6. 
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Illustration 6: Shelter correspondence, cover page 
(Shelter circa 1990) 
In 1991 Shelter received funding (from the Goss Labor Government) in order to employ its 
first staff. Eleri Morgan-Thomas was appointed by the Shelter Management committee as 
the first paid coordinator and Madonna Bowman became the first administration worker. 
Committee members were also successful in applying for funding, in order to host a first 
state-wide Shelter conference. 
Funded Community Advocacy (1992-2006) 
The first conference was held in Townsville in August of 1992. The majority of the two 
hundred attendees were either community workers, public housing tenants or 
representatives from government (Queensland Shelter 1992a: 1).The conference was co-
funded through the housing and health government portfolios.  Some of the conference 
funding was used to appoint a conference organiser, Lyn Luxford. The conference was an 
opportunity to disseminate information among housing workers, tenants and government 
workers, and used as an avenue to “set the direction of work for Shelter” (Leeks 1993: 2). 
The administrative structure and policy advocacy goals of Shelter formed part of the 
conference agenda with participants given “an opportunity to develop and ratify aims of 
Shelter and to formally establish a management structure and process for the organisation” 
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(Queensland Shelter 1992a: 1). A number of resolutions were carried at the conference, 
illustrating the diversity and complexity within the housing sector in conjunction with Shelter’s 
commitment to represent the social housing sector.  
Prior to receiving government funding, Shelter demonstrated an awareness of the possible 
problems associated with receiving money from outside sources. An early newsletter stated 
that as Shelter was not “funded and is not affiliated with any religious, political or other 
organisation, this enables members a great deal of freedom and autonomy in discussions 
and action” (Queensland Shelter N.D: 1) 
After receiving government funding in 1991 from the Goss Labor Government, newly 
appointed Shelter coordinator, Eleri Morgan-Thomas, noted the difficulties in representing 
the sector to government and the government to the sector:  
Quite clearly Mr Burns [Minster for Housing] and the department see Shelter as 
having dual roles as both a community voice and as a voice for the department. How 
we reconcile these sometimes conflicting roles remains to be seen” (Queensland 
Shelter 1991b: 3).  
In a ‘letter to editor’ page of a 1991 Shelter newsletter, one Shelter member wrote of the 
importance of remaining independent and free from government funding. Citing Shelter’s 
early hand-written draft of aims and objectives, Lillian Geddes suggested that Shelter pursue 
funding through non-government means, specifying trade unions, churches, the Master 
Building Association, Myer Foundation and friendly societies, writing: 
I do not know of any other group in Queensland who have specifically taken a stand 
against applying for Government Funding (sic), and I am hoping that Shelter 
Queensland takes this issue up as a SPECIFIC part of your/our identity.”…“Yours in 
Peace – Lillian Geddes” (Geddes 1991: 2 cited in Shelter 1991b, emphasis in 
original). 
Geddes’ letter received a response from Deirdre Coghlan in the following newsletter, 
describing the challenges over the last “ten years or so” when Shelter had not received any 
government funding. 
During that time, Shelter had total autonomy but it could not hope to represent anyone 
other than the individuals who were involved. Without funds to organise mailouts (sic), 
and time to analyse policy Shelter was always on the back foot. During that time 
 
 
76 
 
Shelter was influential in a number of areas. Some submissions were even acted on! 
However, everything we did was through alternate (and definitely informal) means. 
Those of us who were active and were lucky enough to have jobs in the community 
sector used the resources available to us. Unfortunately this meant the redirection of 
resources from other areas (Coghlan 1992 cited in Queensland Shelter January 
1992a: 2).  
In this same response Coghlan argues Shelter should continue to receive funding from the 
Department of Housing and Local Government while at the same time ensure both the 
Department and the Minister were clear regarding the role of shelter:  
If the issue is independence from government processes then maybe we, as an 
organisation, need to make it clear to the Department that they do not own us. Just 
because they pay the bills doesn’t mean that Shelter is necessarily a puppet of DHLG 
[Department of Housing & Local Government]. ….Maybe it means that we have to 
take up the initiative and set the parameters for DHLG involvement (Coghlan 1991 
cited in Queensland Shelter 1992a: 2) 
Geddes responded to Coghlan’s letter in the next edition of the newsletter in March 1992. 
Quoting a portion of Coghlan’s letter in which Coghlan had written: “Shelter really only exists 
because there is a housing department”, Geddes replied: 
 “I so much wish this line would have read “Shelter exists because there is a housing 
need, and Shelter works with the department because it is a major player in 
responding to this need” (Geddes 1992 cited in Shelter 1992b: 2). 
Throughout the twenty-five year period that this thesis covers, Shelter remained aware of 
the need to retain advocacy autonomy from the government. Analysis and discussion of this 
issue occurs in chapters five through to nine, where a critique of the relationship between 
Shelter and the government of the day is discussed in detail.  
An early priority of Shelter was to establish an organisational structure which would draw in 
wider participation from regional areas of Queensland. Morgan-Thomas recalls that areas 
of Queensland outside of the South-East were concerned that they did not have 
representation. Shelter had unsuccessfully tried to persuade the government to fund more 
than one Shelter office but as Morgan-Thomas explained: 
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As I remember it, the people in Townsville and Cairns were very concerned, I mean 
this is the story of Queensland, very concerned about missing out on things. They 
thought that there should be two organisations one for south east Queensland and 
one for them ... The department had very wisely decided not to do that ... they only 
wanted one, provided with sufficient money (Morgan-Thomas 2013 interview by the 
author). 
In order to ensure representation of regional Queensland, Shelter developed a regionally-
based branch structure. Morgan-Thomas attributes this structure to her background in 
community development: 
At lot of it [early Shelter work] was about how we would run an organisation that had 
a state-wide focus and was inclusive and all those sorts of things, but do that from 
Brisbane ... we set up branches and the ability for them [the branches] to apply for a 
small pocket of money to do a bit of local type research that could feed into a state-
wide agenda … (Morgan-Thomas 2013 interview by the author).  
Each branch elected a delegate, who attended Shelter meetings and telephone conferences 
regularly in order to report on their region and communicate back to their branch after the 
meeting. Shelter provided some funds to each branch so that local areas could develop and 
implement project work in their own area. Much of the project work undertaken by Shelter 
during the 1990s relied heavily on the branch network. This structure enabled Shelter to be 
represented in local communities around Queensland. The branch structure also provided 
Shelter with the knowledge needed to represent regions within the state.  
Former Shelter Coordinator, Roksana Khan credits Morgan-Thomas for developing the 
branch structure and “linking delivery and policy together at the ground level” (Khan 2013 
interview by the author). Wynn Hopkins, former Shelter Delegate for Cairns during the 1990s 
(and later Chair of the Shelter management committee) recalls the value of the branch 
structure in ensuring representation:  
That was one of the reasons that I found Queensland Shelter really valuable was 
because of the branch structure and because of the input you got from all the various 
viewpoints and the various areas. It used to be so supportive and interesting to hear 
how people were managing and struggling in say Bundaberg or … Mt Isa, or wherever 
(Hopkins 2014 interview by the author). 
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In addition, to aid in regional representation it is a convention (not a formal role of the 
constitution) that the Vice-Chairperson of Shelter reside in either Townsville or Cairns to 
ensure balance of representation between regional areas and the south east corner 
(Hopkins 2014 interview by the author). 
The number of branches has fluctuated over the twenty-five year history. In 1996 there were 
seven branches in Queensland. Around one third of all members were also branch 
members.28 The nature of branches varies, while the majority in 1996 were geographically 
based other branches have formed out of a special interest.29 Whether brought together by 
location or special interest each branch will have its own history and policy focus. I include 
a very brief history of two of the branches in the following paragraphs to illustrate the role of 
Shelter branches in different locations. 
Mackay Housing Interest Network 
The Mackay Housing Interest Network began operations in 1992, and membership 
is made up of local and regional people whose main interest is housing. Because of 
the nature of a network, the membership was very informal and floating, with people 
having the ability to come in and out as their need saw fit.  
The Housing Interest Network has been very successful over those years, with 
people liking very much the ability to float in ana (sic) out. However, it was also 
recognised that there was a need in our community for a structure which could 
successfully see more houses on the ground as well. …. 
As part of our evolution, the Mackay Housing Interest Network made a formal 
decision in May, 1994 to become the Mackay branch of Queensland Shelter and we 
have progressed since then (Queensland Shelter 1996: 8). 
Branch membership enabled the Mackay Housing Interest group to apply for a Shelter 
branch grant. The funds were used to host a workshop to discuss (and produce a report) on 
the development of a housing association in the area.  
                                            
28 In 1996 Shelter had 178 individual and organisational members. A breakdown of membership was not 
recorded.  
29 In 1996 five of the branches were based on location and included Far North Queensland, Brisbane Inner 
City, Gold Coast and Hinterland Housing Network, MacKay Housing Interest Network, Redlands Housing 
Focus Group, while one was a special interest, “The Independents”.  
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Brisbane Inner City Housing 
Brisbane Inner City branch was established in May 1994. The group has a broad 
focus on monitoring the impacts of gentrification and social change including 
government involvement in inner city development projects and the impacts on 
boarding houses and private rental and traditional residences of the inner city area. 
Last year [1995] the branch successfully applied for funding from Brisbane City 
Council to conduct research into boarding house issues in the inner city. The project 
consisted of 2 parts. The first part was a study of existing boarding houses and the 
views of people living in them. This provides an important study of who lives in 
boarding houses and why. The second part of the project was concerned with law 
reform and looked at the inclusion of boarders and lodgers in residential tenancies 
and other legislation (Queensland Shelter 1996: 7). 
The Brisbane Inner City branch managed to secure funds from the Brisbane City Council in 
order to undertake a research project in the local area. Both examples illustrate the role of 
the branch structure in developing and sharing local knowledge with Shelter.  
The early 1990s was a period of rapid community sector growth in Queensland, underpinned 
by the development of formal legalisation (the Incorporation Act is one example) which 
supported the inclusion and burgeoning professionalisation of the sector. Shelter 
incorporated in 1993, enabling the organisation to apply for a wider range of government 
and philanthropic funding programs and receive tax benefits. In later chapters of this thesis 
I analyse the impact of various policies and programs (regarding inclusion of non-state 
actors) on the capacity of Shelter to participate in policy development, the point I make in 
this chapter is that these policies also impacted on the organisational culture of Shelter. 
Incorporation, for example, increased the bureaucratic demands made on the organisation. 
In order to incorporate Shelter was required to adopt a constitution, establish a management 
committee and provide financial reports. This impacted on the way in which Shelter 
conducted itself. Shelter no longer held informal committee meetings in each other’s homes, 
or neighbourhood centres, by this time they were located in a shared office space with the 
Queensland Disability Housing Peak.  
In 1997 Morgan-Thomas resigned from her position as the coordinator of Shelter. After a 
recruitment and selection process Roksana Khan became the second paid coordinator. 
Khan had a professional background in community development and had previously worked 
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with the Brisbane Migrant Centre. Prior to accepting the position Khan was aware of the 
advocacy work that Shelter had done on behalf of refugee housing. While Shelter 
membership remained steady30 the organisation continued to expand its role in policy 
development. Khan recalls that sometime around the mid-1990s Shelter hired a business 
consultant to assist in the development of a three-year business plan (Khan 2013 interview 
by the author). This process was the impetus for three year funding agreements with the 
Beattie Labor Government rather than the one year cycle Shelter had worked with until then:  
We also put it to the Department of Housing that we needed three year funding ... So 
we got the policy research position up, we got the two project positions, one was 
around the caravan park stuff and one was around getting the conference up … And 
the big thing was we moved from our little tiny offices which used to flood … (Khan 
2013 interview by the author). 
As described by Khan above, in addition to a longer funding cycle, the organisation received 
extra funding for staff (a policy and research worker) and projects and in 2006 moved to new 
premises at 167 Logan Rd Woolloongabba.  
During this period a number of other housing related interests also operated within 
Queensland. Many of these focussed on a particular cohort– these included the Queensland 
Disability Housing Coalition, Queensland Public Tenants Association, the Tenants’ Union of 
Queensland and The Queensland Youth Housing Coalition. At times, as the umbrella peak 
Shelter was required to balance the needs and wants of other housing interests. Former 
Shelter Coordinator Roksana Khan illustrates the role of board membership as one method 
of influencing the wider housing sector:  
We did have to straddle carefully because everybody wanted Shelter to do something 
for them and all those everybody’s something did not actually fit in the same cup. So 
there was a little bit of negotiation and management. The Board was the best thing 
because the Board always had everyone in it so they could not disown what came 
out of Shelter because their board members sat on our committee (Khan 2013 
interview by the author). 
When Khan left the organisation in 2002 to take a position with the Brisbane City Council, 
Adrian Pisarski was recruited by Shelter’s board as the Executive Officer. The new position 
                                            
30 Shelter had 164 members at June 1994 and 187 members at June 1998. 
 
 
81 
 
title mirrored relabelling of the Shelter Management Committee to the Shelter Board. The 
change in language did not represent any change to the legal structure of Shelter; rather it 
illustrated a change in culture (Hopkins 2014 interview by the author).  
Former director of QCOSS Jill Lang reflected on similar changes occurring across the sector 
The whole corporate governance thing got ramped up, partly driven by government 
during the Howard era - the managerial focus rather than the mission focus - and we 
all started to do board training about board responsibilities and risk management. 
Board members became very nervous about it and we all started to introduce tighter 
governance procedures. QCOSS was in the grip of that to a certain extent too (Lang 
2013 interview by author). 
Fully funded policy advocacy Peak (2007-2012) 
In 2007, Minister for Public Works and Housing Robert Schwarten selected Shelter to 
become the sole government funded housing peak. From its origins of grassroots advocacy, 
Shelter had become the social housing peak, responsible for providing evidence based 
policy advice to the Queensland Government. By this stage nearly all incoming funds were 
received by the state government. The following tables are abridged versions of the ones 
prepared by William Small, Shelter Treasurer for the 2008/09 Shelter report. The first table 
details the increased income received in the financial year 2008/09, which was “… the first 
financial period to be wholly core funded by Department of Housing as the Policy Peak for 
‘Community and Social housing’”(Small 2009: 4). 
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Table 6: Increases in Shelter income (2008/09) 
Funding Centres Increase over 
FY [Financial 
Year] 2007-08 
Per 
centum 
increase 
Main contributors to accounts in 2007/08 
Conference $122 614 100% Q Shelter Conference 
DoH [Department of 
Housing] Recurrent 
$157 260 18% Department of Housing 
Other income $169 676 75% Bank interest, management fees, 
membership/donations 
Projects $96 162 100% New projects managed: Women escaping 
domestic violence, Indigenous housing, One 
Social Housing System, NAHA, homeless 
picnics, National Seniors, Seniors projects.  
(Source: Small 2009: 4) 
Table 7: Increases in Shelter expenses (2008/09) 
Funding Centres Increase over 
FY [Financial 
Year] 2007-08 
Per 
centum 
increase 
Main contributors in accounts with % 
difference to 2007/08 
Accounting $3 439 52% Audit Fees 43% 
Communications $14 982 61% Phone/fax 65% 
Conference $88 929 100% Shelter conference 
Personnel $26 962 26% Provisions – superannuation 37%, annual 
leave/load 39%, long service leave 16%, 
workers compensation 77% 
Salaries $186 270 38% Admin. 18% Communications 73%, Office 
Management 65 %, Policy 57% 
Seniors $13 578 100% Research and Advice module 
(Source: Small 2009: 4) 
In addition to extra funding Shelter was relocated into larger government owned premises 
in Spring Hill, see illustration 7. 
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Illustration 7: Shelter Offices 515 Wickham Terrace Spring Hill 
(Source: Google street view) 
Spring Hill, at the edge of the CBD, is one of the oldest suburbs in Brisbane, and is a mixture 
of extremes: poverty interspersed with wealth and prestige. These opposing ends of human 
experience are mixed throughout Spring Hill without any sense of order: Brisbane Boys 
Grammar, one of the most expensive schools in Brisbane, is located across the road from 
several (very run-down) emergency accommodation hostels. Stylish bars and coffee shops 
are located within close proximity to far less salubrious hotels and pubs. There are also 
several hospitals located in Spring Hill. At the southern end of the suburb is Roma Street 
Parkland, a 16 hectare site which had previously housed an orphanage and later a railway 
goods yard. In 1999 the Queensland Labor government led by Peter Beattie, integrated this 
land with the existing park on the site, Albert Garden, in order to create the Roma Street 
Parklands. The Parklands is a popular destination in its own right but the pathways through 
the garden are also used as a conduit between Roma Street Station and Spring Hill. The 
diversity of those accessing Spring Hill are apparent on these pathways, fancy school 
uniforms, shirtless and shoeless men, young and old, suits and exercise gear, patients and 
hospital visitors. 
Shelter’s elegant office space overlooks the Roma Street Parkland. The Queensland 
Government owns 515 Wickham Terrace, in the past a maternity hospital before being 
turned into nurses quarters. The building was derelict in the years just prior to Shelter’s 
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tenancy, with the Department of Public Works specifically renovating the building so that 
Shelter could move in (Hopkins 2014 interview by the author). The free standing building 
neighbours Roma House, a support and accommodation service for those experiencing 
homelessness, which is run by Mission Australia with funding from the Queensland 
Government.  
By 2011 Shelter had ten staff on the payroll. Along with the Executive Officer there were five 
staff working within the secretariat – including an operations manager, two administration 
officers, (one employed full-time and one part-time), a part-time finance position and another 
full-time role dedicated to communications and marketing. The Policy team included four 
staff members, consisting of a senior policy officer and three policy officers.  
The excerpt from the 2011 service agreement below illustrates the role the Minister’s office 
expected Shelter to play:  
 
Illustration 8: Excerpt: service agreement between Department of Communities and Queensland 
Shelter 
(Queensland Government 2011c: 4) 
During my time working with Shelter I often wondered how the work that Shelter was funded 
for differed from that of work traditionally carried out by members of the public service. 
Reviewing the excerpt from the funding agreement above it is difficult to differentiate the 
purpose of Shelter from that of a government department. Not unlike a government 
department Shelter was funded to provide ‘frank and fearless’ advice. Interviews conducted 
for this project revealed that Shelter was, in some instances, in a better position to consult 
with the sector than the bureaucracy.  
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The culture of the organisation shifted after Shelter became the sole housing peak to receive 
government funding. No longer housed in cramped conditions, Shelter instead had fairly 
secure accommodation, which was well resourced with a security system, two fully 
functional kitchens, several meetings spaces and ample space for all staff. Arguably the 
resources enabled Shelter to provide better quality advocacy for the social housing sector 
but the offices of Shelter drew a sharp contrast to the experiences of some of the 
membership who had experienced housing stress themselves and/or worked with those that 
are experiencing housing stress. A question for this research is whether the government 
provided resources and funding impacted on grass roots representation. Following the move 
to Spring Hill policy ‘evidence’ continued to be developed through consultation with the 
sector but in addition Shelter was also financed to develop solutions based on research and 
ideas. 
Reflecting on the changes to Shelter operation since 1987, Pisarski argues that Shelter had 
shifted from a demand-based social rights organisation to a solutions-based policy peak:  
Most peak bodies and most organisations that have human rights principles 
embedded in them, which we still do, start off as serial complainers. Their job partly 
is to point out what’s wrong, that’s really why they’ve formed because they have 
noticed something wrong and they need to tell someone about it. I think that the 
mistake they make is assuming that nobody already knows because governments 
monitor this stuff all the time (Pisarski 2011 interview by the author). 
Over the nine years that Pisarski worked with the organisation, he argues that the 
organisation became increasingly solutions focussed, working less on representing 
problems to government but rather concentrating on offering sophisticated policy solutions: 
It [community sector] still sees itself as connected to the grassroots, and partly that 
means that it’s whingey and complaining but it does try and connect itself back to the 
people that its working on behalf of. Now we might have even moved away from that 
notion a bit since I’ve been here because it is not really my forte. I mean I think we 
are still mindful of people but I just think the scale of the problem requires a solution 
of scale and that means ... a very sophisticated solution (Pisarski 2011 interview by 
the author). 
In his interview Pisarski also discusses National Shelter’s role in developing federal policy. 
The intersection between national and state levels of politics is discussed further in chapter 
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9 but it is important to note here that the shift in thinking from state to federal level impacted 
on the way in which Queensland Shelter operated and the view that was taken of key staff, 
namely the Executive Officer’s role in influencing decision makers. 
The makeup of the Board was also changing, due to the move, by state and federal 
government to outsource the management of social housing to non-government community 
housing companies. By 2012 there were several Shelter board members who were CEOs 
of large housing companies. Board members were not just there because of their knowledge 
of housing and their concern about housing stress, but because more and more of them 
were employed in community housing. My point here is not to assert that one board is ‘better’ 
than another but to acknowledge that the backgrounds and skills of board members is likely 
to impact on the work or direction that Shelter takes. Each board member brings a 
perspective to Shelter based on their own experiences, knowledge and background. In the 
early days of Shelter committee management (as the Board was known then), committee 
members were sourced from the burgeoning community housing program in Brisbane, many 
had backgrounds in social or community work.  
Traditionally the role of the community board was viewed as one which set the policy 
direction of the organisation, while staff were responsible for implementing this policy and 
running the day-to-day operations. Fishel (2008) writes of the academic backlash to this 
“separation of powers” and posits that differences and shifts in the role and responsibilities 
of boards and staff are impacted by “the organisation’s stage of evolution, by pressures and 
crisis, by the nature of the non-profit’s work, and even by the chemistry of the key individuals 
concerned” (Fishel 2008: 12). Fishel proposes that boards swing between ‘hands on’ and 
‘hands off’ and offers the following:  
Table 8: Roles of board management 
Hands On Hands Off 
CEO Transition An established and trusted CEO 
Competition, threats, alliances Organisational stability 
New directions Program stability 
Financial challenges Healthy balance sheet and cash flow 
Stakeholder concerns Routinely positive feedback 
(Reproduced from Fishel 2008: 13) 
The information included in the table offers a good starting point in providing reasons why 
the board of the community organisation might be more or less involved at any given time. 
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Fishel also points out that during the establishment of a community group, the board is likely 
to be ‘hands on’, and “become more operationally involved than they would once the key 
staff team are in place and systems have been established” (Fishel 2008: 12). This is 
certainly the case with the early days of the Shelter committee. In addition to the work that 
had to be done in order to incorporate; some of the committee members had existing 
relationships with ministers and/or department staff and were instrumental in getting the 
voice of Shelter heard. In those early days the staff of Shelter did not have the connections 
to decision makers, rather the committee members, such as Deirdre Coghlan had 
established relationships with Members of Parliament.  
As the organisation developed however, just as Fishel (2008) argues, the board oscillated 
between approaches, involved heavily during periods of organisation change, which were 
often proceeded by political change. Staff sought to develop relationships with decision 
makers, senior public servants and other members of the social housing sector. By the later 
stages of Shelter, as described in the above paragraphs, the Board were more hands off; 
the organisation was experiencing funding and program stability. In addition, Pisarski was a 
strong leader who established working relationships with key governmental players, at both 
the state and federal levels. 
The community sector within Queensland was and remains a tight group – and this is 
particularly true of those involved in housing work within Brisbane. Former senor public 
servant, community worker and later locum coordinator of Shelter Penny Gillespie explains: 
I guess in the Brisbane context, Brisbane is a small town really, I mean I know we are 
a city but we are a small town in the way we operate in some ways … A lot of people 
in housing stay there for a long time you know they get kind of addicted to it … and 
so a lot of people are around for a long time and so they know each other and they 
know of each other and they know of each other’s reputations. They know who has 
got power and influence in that sector. So part of it will be that people have 
relationships that go beyond the workplace in the sense of … some connection 
through social things as well because that’s how people are and they have been 
around for a long time … (Gillespie 2013 interview by the author). 
Developing and maintaining relationships are important within the context of social housing 
advocacy work in Queensland. Many of those I interviewed had worked with the social 
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housing sector for decades – some held a variety of positions within federal, state and local 
government and/or roles within the not-for-profit sector. 
This chapter has provided an overview of the changing nature of the role of the Board, staff 
and members throughout the twenty-five year evolution of Shelter. A range of federal and 
local government incentives, programs and legislation within this period have increasingly 
supported the inclusion of non-state voices in policy development. As discussed in the early 
chapters of this thesis, this inclusion varies, governments choose some organisations to 
work with more closely than others. Government retains the authority to manage non-state 
organisations through funding agreements and other legislation, such as the Incorporation 
Act. Formal regulation also ensures organisations are accountable for government (or other 
funds) received. The following chapters analyse the capacity of Shelter to participate in the 
development of public policy between 1987 and 2012.  
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Chapter Four:  
Casting a shadow of disadvantage across the sunshine state31 
The way a population is housed is vital to the quality of life. Housing is both a traded 
commodity and a physical fact. To understand the world that Shelter operated in, it is 
important to have a sense of the development of housing in Queensland and why the state 
has, from time to time, intervened in the housing market. Legislations governing key 
elements of housing, including relations between the rights of landlords and tenants is a 
state government matter. But the legislative background, the nature of the housing stock 
and its ownership has changed significantly over time. This chapter sets out that historical 
context.  
Since 1788 government involvement in the provision of housing has waxed and waned, with 
religious and other community organisations stepping in to fill the gaps. In colonial times 
governments took full responsibility for the shelter of guards and prisoners for practical 
rather than benevolent reasons. Later within the early free settlement period the Queensland 
government oversaw purpose-built institutions to house people who either could not house 
themselves or were displaying characteristics that were deemed unsuitable for living with 
the general population. Following war and depression in the early 1900s the Queensland 
government lead the way in the development of public housing programs. Queensland was 
the first state within Australia to provide cheap loans to citizens for the purpose of building 
dwellings (Hayward 2008). The Australian federal government intervened in housing policy 
towards the end of World War II, establishing the first Commonwealth State Housing 
Agreement, which saw the merit of establishing Housing Commissions in each of the states. 
Initially public housing was built under the guise of ‘the right of housing for all’ – but states 
were unable to keep up with demand and have become reluctant landlords.32 The chapter 
discusses the provision of housing for vulnerable people within Queensland, providing 
                                            
31 Chamberlain argued that partnerships between the government and non-government sectors might address 
the inequality which she referred to as the ‘shadow’ on the sunshine state (1985: 112). 
32 Hayward, David. "The reluctant landlords? A history of public housing in Australia." (1996). 
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context for the subsequent case study chapters. With a relatively dispersed population and 
modest resources, Queensland did not develop the social infrastructure – from education to 
housing – to the same level as other states. Relations between the Federal and Queensland 
government have long held tensions, and these were exacerbated during the Bjelke-
Petersen era (1968-1987).  
Queensland: the ‘flogginest’ place in the Australia33 
The point at which Australian governments became involved in housing is contested. The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics argues not until after federation: “Before Federation in 1901, 
the provision of housing to low income groups was not generally seen as a government 
responsibility. Low income housing was largely provided by charities and church groups” 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 1992: 7). Others take a broader view, arguing that between 
1788 to the early 1800s the colonial government was entirely responsible for the welfare of 
white occupiers, including the provision of shelter. Historian Lacour-Gayet describes the 
accommodation of convicts and their guards: 
… convicts were housed in ramshackle lean-tos, where they were probably no worse 
off than in His Majesty’s gaols and hulks back home. The soldiers lived in tents, of 
course, or in huts; the sailors lived on board the two warships. Only the king’s 
representative had the right to a house made of bricks” (1976: 89).  
Convicts continued to be transported to Australia until 1868 with a usual sentence of seven 
years. Once they had reached Australia they were often given various types of pardons, 
while no longer required to serve the full sentence in confinement, they were not allowed to 
return to their country of origin before their original sentence date had been reached. Both 
convicts and released convicts formed ‘chain-gangs’ (Lacour-Gayet 1976: 92) and worked 
on clearing land for agricultural development. During these early years the gangs of workers 
built their own accommodation under the watchful eye of gang-masters. The labour was 
usually performed without the assistance of horses or other animals and was made more 
arduous by the climatic conditions, which were very different to those experienced in Britain: 
Heavy labour, low rations and debilitative living conditions, where un-acclimatised 
men worked by day in a semi-nude state in all weathers and slept without bedding on 
                                            
33 Moreton Bay was once reputedly ‘the flogginest place in the whole colony’ (Molesworth Committee on 
Transportation 1938 Report cited Evans 2007: 50). 
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the bare boards of a poorly constructed convict barracks in overcrowded dormitories 
(Evans 2007: 43).  
The dismal living conditions were secondary to the ever present fear of starvation. While the 
convict masters retained responsibility for shelter, there is very little resemblance between 
what has been briefly described here and the modern welfare state.  
Two penal colonies were established in what is now known as Queensland. Norfolk Island 
was established in 1788 and less than five years later it housed 1000 convicts. Forced to 
close in 1814 due to management difficulties, it reopened in 1824 as a secondary penal 
colony. The objective of secondary penal colonies such as these was to deter further criminal 
activity. Secondary penal colonies acted: 
 ... as the ultimate deterrent, short of death: forced labour camps of pristine discipline 
at the ever-widening margins of white occupation, administered militarily to enforce a 
regime of ‘utmost dread’ upon confines, as they prepared the way for free settlement 
to follow (Evans 2007: 27).  
Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania) is possibly the most well-known location of the secondary 
penal colonies but Moreton Bay was described as the most violent penal colony in Australia 
(Evans 2007: 50). The first stone buildings at Moreton Bay were built by convict work gangs, 
overseen by the ‘overseers’ who had been convicts themselves and were chosen for their 
brutality rather than any leadership skills (Evans 2007). The stone convict barracks were 
built between 1827 and 1830, eventually housing up to 1 000 people - many of whom lived 
and worked with the confines of the stone walls.  
A third colony was proposed for the area which is now known as Gladstone (Hogan 1898). 
Writing in 1838, Sir Richard Bourke, Governor of New South Wales (1831-37), wrote: “If 
transportation to New South Wales be discontinued, some other vent must be found for 
criminals sentenced to that punishment, or some other punishment must be substituted” 
(Bourke cited by Hogan 1898: 14). But the attempt was thwarted, with the primary argument 
against the establishment being that the cost was too high (Hogan 1898: 67-69). In 1841 
free settlers were officially allowed into the Moreton Bay settlement as the penal colonies 
began to shift towards free settlement. 
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Deviance and Institutional Care  
There was no shortage of problems following the separation of Queensland in 1859. Severe 
drought, the spread of the introduced pest prickly pear, high levels of alcoholism and 
increasing levels of mental illness and crime. By 1861, 30 000 people of European origin 
were living in Queensland supported by 1358 hectares of farmed land (Cameron 1989: 4). 
Within the old area of Moreton Bay Penal Colony there was a concentration of social 
problems: unemployment, prostitution and violence. These problems continued to be dealt 
with by confinement and/or public lashings. The more serious offences could be dealt with 
using the death penalty. 
The capacity of the new government of Queensland was poor due to a lack of resources, 
finance and knowledge (Evans 2007). Government welfare provision reflected the State’s 
poor governing capacity: 
... the colonial government took minimum responsibility for health, welfare or social 
services in nineteenth-century Queensland and the churches were slow to become 
involved. They relied upon the voluntary work of philanthropic organizations – usually 
founded, financed and run by middle-aged, middle-class women – to provide 
appropriate facilities, especially for ill or destitute women and children (McCulloch 
2010: 53). 
Several large institutions were built by the Queensland government in order to separate 
‘deviants’ from the general population. Deviant behaviour was classified in one of two ways. 
Voluntary deviance, which was subsequently framed as criminal behaviour and required 
some form of punishment to ensure it did not reoccur or involuntary deviance, which was 
believed to be caused by some sort of ‘sickness’. In the early separation period, however, 
these classifications did not have much impact on an individual’s fate. Queenslanders 
suffering from a mental illness (labelled dangerously insane) and those who had committed 
a crime both usually ended up in H.M Brisbane Gaol (Evans 1969). This was in part due to 
pressure from authorities at Brisbane Hospitals, who did not wish to house ‘dangerous 
lunatics’ and who had pressured the colonial secretary to seek alternative arrangements for 
their accommodation. Imprisonment due to criminal behaviour had always been a part of 
Moreton Bay society, but increasingly throughout the 19th century other forms of behaviour 
considered unacceptable by the authorities led to separation from society.  
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From 1865, institutions were purpose built for patients with mental health problems, women, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, those with a disability and the aged. In addition to the 
large long term facilities, reception houses were built by government and non-government 
organisations to provided interim accommodation for those in crisis. The purpose of a short 
stay in a reception house was to give a person the chance to regain his or her ‘sense’ 
enabling them to return to the community. It is now realised that some of those experiencing 
a form of mental illness were actually suffering from heat stroke. Swift recovery from this 
was often dependant on whether you were lucky enough to gain entry to a reception house 
or unfortunate enough to be confined in gaol where the physical, emotional and mental 
conditions were not congruent with recovery (Evans 1969). 
The first institution built specifically for those with a mental illness was the Woogaroo Lunatic 
Asylum34 which opened its doors in 1865 with 49 patients. It was the first mental asylum in 
Queensland and it would eventual become the largest and longest serving mental health 
facility in Australia (Finnane 2008). Woogaroo Lunatic Asylum was established with funds 
from the local government, and comprised of three buildings, one for men, one for women 
and “the superintendent’s quarters in between” (Finnane 2008: 40). The ideological 
reasoning behind housing people in an asylum was both for the ‘good’ of the patient and the 
safety of the rest of the population (Finnane & Besley 2010). The Mental Health Act (1962) 
later established medical differences between mental illness and senility, which impacted 
on the policies of care provided for these people - people with senility were re-housed in 
aged care homes (Finnane 2008: 41).  
Churches also established missions, providing accommodation and indoctrination. Between 
1837 and 1940 there were 44 missions established in Queensland by sixteen different 
organisations to confine and house Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The first 
mission was established in 1886 by the Lutheran Church at Cape Bedford and Bloomfield 
River (Long 1970: 93). One motivation of these organisations was to indoctrinate the people 
that were living there into their own religious beliefs. These institutions were embedded 
within the government policies of the time which were focussed on assimilation.35 In 1914 
the government established three large missions for those Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
                                            
34 Renamed many times, Goodna Asylum for the Insane (1880), Goodna Mental Hospital (1930s), Brisbane 
Mental Hospital (1959), Brisbane Special Hospital (1962), Wolston Park Hospital (1969) and The Park Centre 
for Mental Health Treatment (2000) (Finnane 2008). 
35 The struggles of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and the Stolen Generation 1997 The Way We 
Civilize Rosalind Kidd, Lane 1997. 
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Islander people, who had been labelled “the most difficult and severely disadvantaged” 
(Lane 1997: 24). By 1960, over 9000 Aboriginal people were confined in missions while, 
“Others lived in smaller, police supervised rural ‘reserves’ on the outskirts of white 
townships” (Evans 2007: 211-12). Many of these people were housed against their will.  
Philanthropic organisations also developed within Queensland to provide care and 
rehabilitation. The Brisbane Industrial Home opened in 1883 in Gregory Terrace, a 
philanthropic home for ‘fallen’ women. The home provided accommodation and training for 
newly arrived single migrants, reforming prostitutes, prisoners and unwed mothers. The 
Home received annual support of 300 pounds from the colonial government (Brisbane 
Courier 1885 cited McCulloch 2010: 51), and some funding from private donors. The 
majority of the funds were raised through the labour of the women who worked there. 
Brisbane Industrial Home was overseen by a committee of over 30 philanthropic women 
and managed by a matron who met with the management committee weekly. The women 
housed in the Home were trained in domestic duties, in preparation for joining the workforce 
as servants and also as a “source of revenue because, like most of the other charities, the 
Industrial Homes was responsible for raising most of its own funds from subscriptions and 
donations.” The Queensland Club, for example had its laundry done at the home (McCulloch 
2010: 51-52).  
Following the establishment of the Brisbane Industrial Home, a number of other charities 
were established including: Young Men’s Christian Association (est. 1885), Social Purity 
Society, Lady Musgrave Lodge Committee, Young Women’s Christian Association in 1887 
(McCulloch 2010: 52). The Lady Musgrave Lodge36 continues to operate today, with two 
separate properties containing a dozen self-contained units to accommodate young women 
who are unable to afford accommodation (Lady Musgrove Lodge N.D). McCulloch notes 
that “Although there was normally a strong Christian/redemption aspect present in most of 
the charities catering for ‘fallen’ women, this should not detract from the excellent service 
they provided” (2010: 53).  
This idea of redemption combined with the idea of ‘fixing’ the behaviour of the individual so 
that they assimilated with the rest of society underpinned much of the first half of the 19th 
century welfare state in Australia. Prior to this Australia had operated as a penal colony and 
                                            
36 Formally known as Girls Training and Protection Society (McCulloch 2010:53) and now known as Lady 
Musgrave Trust (Website) 
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the welfare of citizens were not considered, “We cared less about the convicts … who lived 
in makeshift and temporary accommodation as they laboured to build the accommodation 
of their superiors and ultimately to build their own – a gaol” (Troy 2012: 1). The idea of 
separation has been present since the arrival of the first fleet. Former Queensland Attorney-
General and Queensland Minister for Justice during the Goss and Beattie government, Matt 
Foley describes this separation as an “estrangement which runs through the core of the 
Australian identity” (Queensland Speaks Website. Matt Foley 2012. 19.16). 
The discovery of gold in 1867 led to a population and economic boom within Queensland. 
Large numbers of people migrated to Queensland in pursuit of riches. Many lived in tent 
cities close to the mine sites until they were able to secure more permanent dwellings. The 
first 45 years of the new century were a mixture of war and tough economic times (Evans 
2007). As the gold rush came to an end, people returned to the city areas looking for 
employment only to encounter the 1890s depression. Public transport was woefully 
inadequate so people needed to live within close distance to where they worked, or hoped 
to work. This population shift led to a critical housing shortage and the growth of slums in all 
of the major cities of which Brisbane was no exception (Australian Bureau of Statistics1992: 
4-5). During this depression people deserted their homes, forced to live with others or sleep 
rough, due to high levels of poverty brought on by increasing unemployment (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 1992: 7). Housing pressure was mounting, in the 1933 census 33 000 
Australians were living in tent cities (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1992: 10). 
Queensland was the first state to enact legislation to provide housing loans for citizens with 
the adoption of the Workers’ Dwellings Act (1909). The Queensland Workers Dwelling 
Branch administrated low cost loans and building advice. These loans enabled 
Queenslanders to build timber and tin homes at a low cost. In the early part of the century, 
workers dwellings were one or two room shelters with cooking performed outside over open 
fires (National Trust of Australia 2006). The Kidston Coalition government introduced the 
Workers’ Dwelling Bill in 1908 making Queensland the first state in Australia to introduce 
such a ‘welfare’ bill (Rechner 1994: 265)37. The Bill enabled any person who earned less 
than £200 per annum, but who owned land,38 was a British subject over the age of 21 and 
who did not already own a dwelling to borrow money from the Queensland government in 
                                            
37 See Rechner, Judy. "The Queensland workers' dwelling 1910-1940." Journal of the Royal Historical Society 
of Queensland 15, no. 6 (1994): 265-278. 
38 The land had to be free-hold, and not subject to any mining leases (Rechner 1994: 266). 
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order to build a dwelling. The purpose of this policy was to ensure that people of limited 
means were able to afford to build a home for themselves and their families (Rechner 1994). 
The Workers Dwelling scheme enabled the building of 23 000 dwellings between 1910 and 
1940. The average number built each year fluctuated due to war, scarcity of building 
materials and political will.  
The Great Depression, which engulfed Australia shortly after the Wall Street crash, led many 
people to return to Brisbane in the hope of gaining employment. Some families opened 
spare rooms to members of the public, providing board and lodgings for the transient 
population who had managed to secure work in major cities and trading centres. Shirley 
Ball’s book, Muma’s Boarding House (1978), is an account of her experiences of living in 
her parent’s boarding house in Spring Hill Brisbane during much of her childhood. Ball writes 
of the tenants: 
To the hard core of permanents in the house, usually twelve to sixteen of them, were 
added another dozen semi-permanents and casuals – the off-season shearers and 
canecutters. They were the affluent of those hard times, having enough money in 
their pockets to last through until the next job (Ball 1978: 8).  
Hard economic times were followed by Australia’s involvement in World War II. All building 
work came to a ‘virtual standstill’ with the start of World War II in 1939. In April 1944 Prime 
Minister Curtin established the Commonwealth Housing Commission (CHC) (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 1992: 11). Prior to this each Australian state had sole responsibility for 
housing policy but federal frustration at the speed at which the states were clearing slums 
in major cities, combined with the emerging chronic shortage in housing following the end 
of the war encouraged the Commonwealth to first establish a federal housing commission 
and shortly later establish a funding agreement with each of the states.  
Following the end of the war, population growth, caused by an influx of immigrants, 
Australian Troops and support workers contributed to housing shortages (Saunders 1999). 
These issues were compounded by a worldwide shortage in building supplies and skilled 
construction workforce (Saunders 1999, Simpson 2005). Many Queenslanders were living 
in rough conditions. Former Assistant Commissioner of Housing (1971-74), William Simpson 
who was working for the commission of housing at time, recalls the tensions and pressures: 
“thousands of families were virtually homeless or living in substandard or overcrowded 
conditions. Many were taking shelter in the discarded army camps” (Simpson 2005: 17). In 
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Brisbane some families were forced to make shelter with any material they could get their 
hands on: “Census statistics show that 4,218 families were known to be housed in dwellings 
of calico, canvas or hessian, while 70 families resided in bark structures” (Saunders 1999: 
13).  
From 1946 to 1960 tens of thousands of Queenslanders were housed in temporary 
accommodation as they waited for public housing. There were fourteen of these housing 
sites (known as temporaries) established in Queensland. Some of these temporary camps, 
such as those established in old army barracks, emerged as people without homes 
discovered the unoccupied space. At first people squatting in these camps were not required 
to pay rent but the Queensland Housing Commission stepped in to regulate and provide 
some protection for families living in the camps: 
… the State Government stepped in and directed the Housing Commission to take 
over all of the camps, check and record all of the occupants and examine each 
building thoroughly to ensure that there were no leaky roofs or broken windows, that 
both the plumbing and drainage were in good working order and that the electricity 
was functioning correctly and was safe and free from any dangerous hazards 
(Simpson 2005: 46).  
Revenue for repairs was raised by charging those living there a ‘nominal fee’ for the service 
the Commission was providing (Simpson 2005: 47).  
In 1945 the first Commonwealth State Housing Agreement (1945) was signed between each 
state and the commonwealth. Labor Premier Frank Cooper was the first Queensland 
Premier to sign on behalf of Queensland. This agreement led to the establishment of the 
Queensland Housing Commission, which in addition to taking on the loan and advice roles 
of the Workers Dwelling Branch, also set about building housing to be rented to citizens who 
were unable to afford to buy or rent privately.  
For a short period Queensland led the way for other Australian states in the development of 
public housing. Queensland was the first state to import pre-fabricated houses and other 
building supplies, including cement from Czechoslovakia, iron sheets from Belgium and tin 
from England, Finland and Sweden (Queensland Government 2004: 15). By the start of the 
1960s, the Queensland Housing Commission had constructed nearly 23,000 houses, half 
of which were sold and the other half were kept by the Commission and rented as public 
housing (Queensland Government 2004: 16). During this early post-war era, public housing 
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did not carry the stigma that it would later. The Queensland Housing Commission actively 
encouraged Queenslanders to take part and secure accommodation.  
The demographic of people accessing public housing has changed dramatically over the 
last three decades. The demographic of households requiring public housing was changing 
with increases in sole parent families, the number of people living alone and the aging 
population. The Housing Commission started building large unit blocks as opposed to 
detached dwellings and the problems associated with these contributed to the stigma that 
attached to public housing. The idea of public housing as a human right has long competed 
with the entrenched Australian aspiration of the importance of owning your own home. 
Governments developed the welfare state in response to the large need following the end 
of World War II but they have been unable or unwilling to continue to offer public housing at 
the same rate.  
At its core, the Queensland Housing Commission remained a building and landlord agency, 
unable to cope with the changing demands. The Commission was established to build 
housing and manage tenancies. The culture of the organisation was aligned to property 
management – collecting rent and managing repairs rather than addressing the social issues 
underpinning housing stress. As such Shelter had very little traction with the Queensland 
Housing Commission, as Deirdre Coghlan explains: 
We’d tried to crack the Queensland Housing Commission. We got a meeting, Helen 
and Ross went off for this meeting … and they wanted to talk about the people in 
housing and that. And he said … ‘you’ve got it all wrong’, he said ‘the Queensland 
Housing Commission is not about people, it is about bricks and mortar.’ So that was 
the culture at the top and that went right through (Coghlan 2011 interview by the 
author). 
Another founding Shelter member, Jon Eastgate described the difficulty in gaining access 
to decision makers within the Queensland Housing Commission. 
There was a few people … who organised tenants to speak up on their own behalf 
and the Housing Commission was quite hostile to that. At one stage they organised 
a tenant gathering in King George Square, you know the Housing Commission was 
just up the road and they invited the Housing Commissioner to come and speak to it 
- so they weren’t wanting to be confrontational. And he [Housing Commissioner] sent 
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them a two line letter ‘I receive many such invitations. All are refused’… (Eastgate 
2013 interview by the author) 
Dick Persson who moved from New South Wales to take on the position of Director-General 
of Housing (1989-1994) recalled the culture of the Housing Commission. He described the 
treatment of those seeking social services in comparison to those seeking a home loan. 
Persson explained the inappropriate process, used by the Housing Commission, to assist 
people escaping a domestic and family violence situation: 
If you went as a battered person, more likely a battered women, who was escaping 
domestic violence - and you wanted to seek housing assistance. You went to a 
counter in this Adelaide St office, which was like an old fashioned open counter, 
where there might be three or four people who had a work station … You’d take a 
number and you would be called up and you had to tell your story with no privacy, 
with someone standing less than a metre next to you telling their story (Persson 2013 
interview by the author). 
Persson then explained how those applying for a housing loan (in order to purchase their 
own home) were afforded privacy and respect: 
 If you applied for a home loan ... you actually made an appointment to come in and 
then you were taken into an office and interviewed with the door closed because well 
‘they discussed private information there about your finances’ (Persson 2013 
interview by the author). 
While some have argued that the Australian welfare state did not emerge until after World 
War II, it is clear that from the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788, successive governments 
have had little option but to take action over the provision and quality of housing. Initially this 
was in the form of controlling convict labour, a labour force that cleared land for farming, 
built the first stone buildings and was also forced to build the less than hospitable convict 
barracks. Free settlement led to a retreat by the state in most accommodation matters, 
except for the continued expansion of gaols. In the mid-1800s the Queensland Government 
began to build institutions to house and provide treatment for the mentally ill, the poor and 
the elderly. Queensland’s experience echoed that of the other colonies. Philanthropic 
organisations (with some funds contributed by government) were also established for ‘fallen’ 
women who had either become pregnant out of wedlock, worked as prostitutes or simply 
moved to Queensland and found no means of supporting themselves. Various churches 
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(and to a lesser extent) the government developed missions, under the guise of assimilation 
policies for some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and children. 
The state intervened at a number of points during the 20th century. The Queensland Workers 
Dwelling Branch was established in 1909 to provide low interest loans for people in order to 
buy their own homes. In the 1920s the federal government War Services Housing 
Commission acquired parcels of land in the capital cities to build houses for servicemen. 
One of the largest estates in Clifton Hill, near Moorooka in the western suburbs of Brisbane, 
offered 128 houses on substantial blocks of land. Just prior to the end of World War II the 
Commonwealth government established the Commonwealth Housing Commission in 
preparation for the housing shortage crisis. This led to the signing of the first Commonwealth 
State Housing Agreement, an agreement which enabled the Queensland government to 
begin building public housing following the end of the war. This was a time when large 
numbers of families were forced to live in temporary camps while they waited for housing to 
become available. The state’s largest landlord, the Queensland Housing Commission came 
under enormous pressure to deliver adequate housing for the state’s less well-off citizens. 
Although public housing shifted in the 1960s as housing for the ‘deserving’ poor, the Housing 
Commission continued to act as a landlord rather than welfare agency.  
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Chapter Five:  
A brick wall: Shelter on the outside (1987-89) 
In following chapters I use the revised insider interest group typology to examine the 
relationship between Shelter and the conservative party who held power in Queensland for 
thirty-two consecutive years until the election of the Goss Labor government in 1989.39 For 
19 years of this period, the state was led by Joh Bjelke-Petersen. The political era was 
characterised by a focus on economic development, law and order and centralised decision 
making. In the fall-out following the Fitzgerald Inquiry the governing party lost confidence in 
Bjelke-Petersen as leader and following a leadership spill Mike Ahern became the new 
premier. While Ahern (and his successor Russell Cooper) had a more conciliatory approach 
to governing, Shelter remained an outsider group. In the late 1980s Shelter supported the 
Tenants’ Union of Queensland’s campaign for the establishment of a Rental Bond Authority 
(RBA) in Queensland. The doors of the Rental Bond Authority opened in 1989. More 
notable, however, than the establishment of RBA is the inclusion of a member of Shelter on 
the Board of the Authority, which was a result of pressure for tenant representation. This is 
an example of outsider group success. The first section of this chapter provides context for 
understanding the political environment in Queensland in light of subsequent discussion 
regarding Shelter’s role in promoting a rental authority in Queensland.  
Minister of Works and Housing  
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen was elected to the Queensland Parliament as a member of the 
Australian Country Party40 in 1947. He served as a backbencher for sixteen years before 
becoming the Minister for Works and Housing in 1963. As Minister for Housing Bjelke-
Petersen was responsible for the Queensland Housing Commission and public works 
                                            
39 Joh Bjelke-Petersen was the Queensland Premier from 08/08/1968–01/12/1987, replaced by Mike Ahern 
who remained leader until 25/09/1989, after which Russell Cooper became Premier for a very short period, 
before the Goss Labor party took office on the 7/12/1989.  
40 The Country Party of Queensland became the National Party of Australia in 1974. 
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portfolio. Whitton argues that as Minister for Works and Housing, Bjelke-Petersen was “A 
frequent proponent of the virtue of law and order, he was a diligent and assiduous, if 
colourless, Minister in a portfolio that offered opportunities to store up political debts by way 
of government buildings in colleagues’ electorates” (Whitton 1989: 13). Wear (2002) 
concurs, “The great advantage of a portfolio like Works and Housing for an ambitious man 
was the opportunity for doing favours” (2008: 79). Bjelke-Petersen was responsible for the 
“design, construction and furnishing of all government buildings and the maintenance of the 
government’s capital assets” as well as “all Housing Commission construction in the state 
…” (Wear 2002: 79). 
In August of 1968 following the sudden death of Premier Jack Pizzey, Bjelke-Petersen 
became Premier of Queensland and Alan Hodges became the new housing minister. Law 
and order dominated the political agenda (Richards 1972). In the preface to his book, The 
Hillbilly Dictator, Evan Whitton (1989) describes the Bjelke-Petersen era as “a closely 
documented case study of the ease with which a parliamentary democracy can become an 
authoritarian state, tolerant of corruption and injustice, and destructive of the rule of law” 
(1989: Preface). A political opponent, quoted by Walter and Dickie (1985), described Bjelke-
Petersen as someone who “… makes up the rules ... within cabinet, within his party, within 
the parliament, within the state” (Walter and Dickie 1985: 37).  
Yet Bjelke-Petersen remains Queensland’s longest serving premier, holding onto the 
position for nineteen years. While some argue that his electoral longevity relied on 
gerrymandering, others argue that Joh Bjelke-Petersen achieved a great deal in Queensland 
and indeed his hard-line on law and order was appealing to some, “Among many voters 
such rhetoric had (and has) wide appeal” (Fitzgerald 1984: 574). Premier Bjelke-Petersen 
did accept some policy advice but this advice was not necessarily from members of his 
political party, the elected parliamentarians or even his Cabinet.  
This lack of consultation in combination with a premier who was increasingly unreceptive to 
both his parliament and his own political party led to ineffectiveness within the existing 
political institutions. Input from both government and the non-government sector was 
severely restricted Former Deputy Premier Llew Edwards contends that Bjelke-Petersen’s 
pilot Beryl Young and Alan Callaghan were among a handful of individuals who exercised 
influence on the Premier: 
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 He [Bjelke-Petersen] depended more on Callaghan and Beryl’s advice and opinions 
in that plane than he did on his public service who would have given him independent 
advice rather than advice with some political taste (Edwards 2009, Queensland 
Speaks, 00:31:17 – 00:31:33) .  
The political processes were limited during this period, as described by former ALP politician 
and historian Dr Denis Murphy:  
The Queensland parliament does not give the impression of being the vibrant forum 
of democracy. Standing orders seem to be designed to prevent rather than 
encourage debate; questions without notice are not allowed; ministerial statements 
are not debated and there is no private members’ debate at the daily adjournment 
(Murphy 1970: 92)). 
The ineffectiveness of parliament was associated with both the political structures and the 
agency of the members: a one tier parliamentary system and “… widespread ignorance of 
parliamentary convention and the expectation within parliament and the community of strong 
political leadership” (Wear 2002: 130). Backbenchers were described by one commentator 
as: 
 … de facto social workers, visiting flower shows, being patrons of local organisations, 
writing letters and asking questions in parliament. Many backbenchers feel 
completely frustrated at their powerlessness and their inability to become legislators 
(Murphy 1970: 92).  
Cabinet decision making was “hit and miss,” issues were taken to Cabinet but the process 
was “informal” (Wear: 2002: 130-52). While this informality enabled quick decision making, 
the benefits of speed were diminished by the impact on accountability and democracy. 
Reflecting on the era, former Labor politician and Queensland Treasurer Keith De Lacy 
wrote: 
 I understand that the previous Government would often consider 60-80 Cabinet 
submissions at each two or three hour Cabinet meeting each week. It does not need 
an arithmetician to realise that this leaves only a few minutes to discuss each item 
(De Lacy 1992: 123).  
While citizens in other states were free to involve themselves in marches and 
demonstrations, Queensland legislation could prevent the organisation of protest marches 
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without a permit under a clause in the Traffic Act 1949 (Brennan 1983). At first the laws 
preventing protest marching were applied with some discretion by police. On one occasion 
citizens handing out leaflets during a postal strike were charged while on another people 
carrying signs and chanting in protest to the Vietnam war were “described by police 
spokesmen as having constituted not a march, but simply a number of pedestrians who 
happened to be going in the same direction at the same time” (Barclay 1968: 430). But this 
‘light touch’ on organised marching was not to last, increasingly laws preventing marching 
were applied to the full extent.  
In 1976, during a student demonstration, a female student was struck by police, the filming 
of which was broadcast by media across Australia. While there were calls for an inquiry, 
supported by the Police Minister Rod Whitrod, these were squashed by Premier Bjelke-
Petersen (Fitzgerald 1984: 570). Throughout the 1960s Queenslanders had a right of appeal 
for any refused permit, but Bjelke-Petersen had this legislation amended in 1977, abolishing 
the right of appeal (Fitzgerald 1984: 559). On the 5 September 1977 Bjelke-Petersen 
declared:  
The day of the political street March is over. Anyone who hold a street march 
spontaneously or otherwise will know they’re acting illegally … Don’t bother applying 
for a permit. You won’t get one. That’s government policy now (The Courier-Mail cited 
by Fitzgerald 1984: 572).  
The ban on street marching lasted for several years and led to 2000 arrests. By 1979 the 
government was under pressure from national and other state politicians to remove the ban, 
due to its ‘anti-democratic nature’ (Fitzgerald 1984: 578).  
The relationship between the progressive Federal Whitlam government (1972 - 1975) and 
the conservative Bjelke-Petersen government became increasingly fraught. Whitlam was 
quoted as referring to Bjelke-Petersen as a “… bible-bashing bastard … the man is a 
paranoiac, a bigot, and fanatical” (Whitton 1989: 25). The Queensland Cabinet were highly 
critical of the Whitlam Labor government (Richards 1974: 3) and paranoid about many 
aspects of social change. In the mid-1970s Cabinet retained an Oxford University law 
professor to provide legal advice regarding commonwealth powers (Richards 1975). One 
area of concern for the State government was the Family Law Bill which paved the way for 
no fault divorce. The state saw this federal law, like many others, as diminishing 
Queensland’s autonomy (Richards 1975). Cabinet minutes expose a conscious decision 
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made by Cabinet to provide ‘limited’ social data to ‘the commonwealth as it might be used 
to criticise Queensland’s welfare policies” (Richards 1974).41 
Queensland had developed an inauspicious reputation with citizens in other parts of the 
country and the sustained electoral support of Bjelke-Petersen did little to change this 
impression of Queensland. As academic Rae Wear eloquently writes:  
… the state was frequently portrayed as rural, backward, racist, populist, authoritarian 
and corrupt. It was often referred to as the Deep North and considered to be ‘different’ 
from the rest of Australia, mainly because Queenslanders kept electing governments 
led by Bjelke-Petersen. To those of a liberal, democratic disposition, life in 
Queensland had the characteristics that the Premier himself once attributed to 
running along a barbed wire fence with a foot on either side: ‘it doesn’t work and it’s 
not very comfortable’. Bjelke-Petersen, however, celebrated Queensland difference 
and treated outsiders with contempt (Wear 2010).  
State housing policy in Queensland did little to alter this perception. Dick Persson recalls 
while working as a federal public servant on the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement 
(1989) that: 
Basically we used to talk about the Queensland clauses ... to a great extent this 
agreement was focused on how to overcome the dreadful housing policies and 
environment that were operating in the state of Queensland which was very much at 
odds with other states (Persson 2013 interview by the author) 
Queensland academic and former public servant, Linda Colley argues that the Queensland 
Public Service was constrained during this period; “They [the conservative government] 
weakened the career service conventions to the lowest point in Queensland’s history” 
(Colley 2009: 169). The Public Service Commissioner was replaced by the Public Service 
Board who were directed to “prevent growth of departmental staff numbers”, limit growth in 
wages or conditions and ensure that the government had “greater control and less 
transparency in the employment of senior officers” (Colley 2009: 69-70).  
                                            
41 (Decision 20195 (Submission 118010) 4 March 1974 and Decision 20498 (Submission 18282 7 May 1974 
cited in Richards 1974). 
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In contrast Paul Reynolds argues that a lack of interest by the Premier in the public service 
enabled the public service to develop some autonomy:  
So what happened was that it was a mixture of authoritarian rule, but the 
authoritarianism wasn’t consistent ... Mostly it was they [the Ministers] trusted the 
public service who had been there for their duration of their time in office, thirty-two 
years (Reynolds 2011, Queensland Speaks, 00:21:07-00:21:29).  
The impact of community pressure groups strategies during the Bjelke-Petersen era was 
low, as Chamberlain writes: 
With few exceptions, community groups in Queensland have been reticent in 
promoting their ideas and lobbying the government, let alone mounting a sustain 
critique. The non-government sector is poorly organised (Chamberlain 1985: 112). 
An exception to this was a successful campaign on the school curriculum, led by Rona 
Joyner. As founder of pressure groups, STOP and CARE (Scott 1980: 125) Joyner used 
both insider and outsider strategies and was instrumental to the decision to ban both ‘Man 
a Course of Study’ (MACOS) and Social Education Materials Project (SEMP) courses in 
Queensland Schools. Joyner was viewed as an outsider to the Department of Education 
staff but managed to influence members of parliament. Professor Ann Scott writes that while 
Joyner:  
... found her way barred when she tried to work through bureaucratic channels 
because of lack of sympathy for her views among public servants and her impact 
became important and ultimately crucial when she started more direct lobbying of 
political leaders (Scott 1980: 145)  
This strategy of direct lobbying was used in conjunction with gaining attention “in the public 
arena through her saturation of the letter columns of local papers and by exploiting public 
access to radio when ‘talk-back’ first started in Brisbane” (Scott 1980: 145). Scott argues 
that it is important to look at the combination of strategies used by Joyner, and that too much 
emphasis has been placed on her positive relationship with Flo Bjelke-Petersen (the 
Premier’s wife). This relationship would certainly have helped, Scott argues, but through the 
support of the membership of both pressure groups, Joyner was able to present her views 
on educational material as being supported by a network of people throughout the state of 
Queensland. Therefore Scott concludes that both her personal relationships with Flo and 
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the support of the membership base were instrumental in her lobbying power (Scott 1980: 
145). 
Joyner was a fundamental Christian with deeply conservative views. Both of which were 
likely to have helped her to achieve traction with members of the Bjelke-Petersen 
Government. During this period members of Shelter were aware that the ideology of the 
organisation and that of the government were vastly different: “It was the Bjelke-Petersen 
Government - there wasn’t a lot of support or sympathy for action on housing. It was a very 
conservative environment.” (Eastgate 2013 interview by the author). Long-time housing 
advocate and founding member of Shelter, Deirdre Coghlan recalled how the awareness of 
political ideology impacted on the framing of policy issues and solutions by Shelter 
members:  
When we talked to people on the left or people in Labor, we talked about social justice 
issues, human dignity, what have you. I learnt that lesson then and it’s never left me. 
But when we talked to conservative governments, we talked about the same thing 
but we talked about people pulling themselves up by the boot straps, skilling for the 
future of the country … So we said the same things but we learnt very   early to couch 
it in a way that went in. So it went beyond their politics it went into their philosophy 
(Coghlan 2011 author interview). 
Cracks on the conservative side of politics began appearing when a leadership spill led to 
Mike Ahern becoming Premier following the Fitzgerald Inquiry into corruption (1987-89). 
Political instability and increased pressure by citizen action groups contributed to wider 
demands for change. The United Nations declaration of the International Year of Shelter for 
the Homeless in 1987 and the increasing housing stress in Brisbane due to Expo ’88 were 
two factors which caused housing to gain media attention and some prominence on the 
political agenda. Shelter remained an outsider group, but the political instability and the 
increasing pressure by citizen action groups contributed to political support for change. It 
was during this period that Shelter supported the Tenants’ Union of Queensland in 
advocating for a rental bond authority. 
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Outsider Success: Rental Bond Authority 
The Rental Bond Authority (RBA)42 (now known as the Residential Tenancies Authority) 
opened on the 1st December 1989 – the day before the 1989 Queensland state election, 
which was won by the Labor Party led by Wayne Goss. The Authority was established 
through The Rental Bond Act. The reform required that agents and landlords lodge rental 
bonds with the Authority (Rental Bond Authority 1990). Prior to the Act, bond payments were 
held by individual agents and landlords. One of the functions of the Rental Bond Authority 
was to reinvest bonds and use the interest earned on these bonds to improve conditions for 
tenants (Thew 1989). In addition tenants would no longer be at the mercy of landlords in 
terms of receiving their bond back at the end of their tenancy. It has been suggested that 
prior to the establishment of the Rental Bond Authority, around 60 per cent of the work 
undertaken by the Small Claims Tribunal was attributed to tenant and landlord disputes 
(Petersen 1989).  
Shelter supported the Tenants’ Union of Queensland in pressuring the National Party 
government led by Mike Ahern, for a rental bond agency. Shelter argued that a bond board 
would create a more equitable situation for tenants, who would no longer have to rely on the 
‘good will’ of landlords. In addition the interest generated on the money held in bond would 
be used to provide tenancy support. While this campaign may have contributed to the 
establishment of the RBA, New South Wales and South Australia had already set up 
independent bond boards and the prior establishment of these boards was also being used 
to support the Queensland reform (The Courier-Mail 1989a). Attorney-General Paul Clauson 
was a key proponent of the Bill, which had the support of the Opposition Labor Party. The 
biggest opposition came from the Real Estate Institute of Queensland (The Courier- Mail 
1989a). Prior to the Rental Bond Authority, any interest collected on the bond money had 
been kept by the agent. The Liberal Party of Queensland also mounted some fairly weak 
opposition, claiming that the Bond Board would increase the costs associate with renting for 
property managers and that these cost would be passed onto tenants (The Courier -Mail 
1989b).  
Despite some reservations the Bill passed through the parliament on the 14th March 1989, 
with 67 votes for, (from the National Party and the ALP), and eight votes against –all Liberal 
Party members (Rental Bond Authority 1990). The implementation of the Rental Bond 
                                            
42 Confusingly at times the RBA was also colloquially referred to as the Rental Bond Board.  
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Authority proceeded. The Tenants’ Union of Queensland, supported by Shelter campaigned 
for this change but the timing was also favourable. As Coghlan explained:  
We pressured for the rental bond authority to come around … That was a time when 
that government listened because … the Fitzgerald Report had come down and so 
they needed to be seen to be doing some things … Mike Ahern was a pretty good, 
he was a good man and he tried to bring in some good things … and so we jumped 
on the wagon (Coghlan 2011 author interview).  
The campaign by the Tenants’ Union of Queensland and Shelter was also likely aided by an 
article published in November of 1989 by journalist Don Petersen, where he emphasised 
the additional level of protection the Authority would give to landlords. This was in contrast 
to previous media stories which had concentrated on benefits to tenants. The article featured 
examples of tenants destroying property. One story told was that of the tenant who was a 
model train enthusiast, who cut holes in each wall of the apartment he was leasing in order 
to create a “maze” of train tracks running throughout. Another example was of an irate karate 
champion who upon discovering his wife had cheated on him damaged walls, doors and the 
kitchen before turning his attention to the outside fence (Petersen 1989). The consideration 
given to these tenancies in this media report, demonstrates a shift in the type of attention 
that the issue was receiving. Unlike earlier media reports, the Rental Bond Authority was 
now being described as beneficial to both landlords and tenants, not just to tenants. While 
the Tenants’ Union of Queensland and Shelter had a wholly tenant focus, the issue was 
successfully reframed courtesy of Mr Ted Howard, whom journalist Don Petersen had 
interviewed in preparing his article. Mr Howard was both the Chair of the Property Owners 
Association and the Rental Bond Authority (RBA) when The Courier-Mail ran the story on 
the rationale for the Authority, one month prior to its opening.  
Successful pressure by the Tenants’ Union of Queensland and Shelter was demonstrated 
in the selection of the Authority’s board membership. In a Courier-Mail article Mr See 
(Chairperson of the Tenants’ Union of Queensland) was quoted as accusing the Attorney-
General Paul Clauson of appointing board members who were “critics” of the proposal to 
“shut them up” (Thew 1989). Shortly afterwards Family Services Minister, Craig Sherrin, 
announced that a member of the Catholic Housing Working Party, Deirdre Coghlan would 
“bring to two the number of tenants’ spokesmen on the authority eight-member Authority” 
(The Courier-Mail 1989c). Deirdre Coghlan was also a founding member of Shelter and her 
position on the board demonstrates that the campaign to ensure the board represented 
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tenants as well as business and government was successful. Coghlan was put forward by 
a Bishop involved with the Brisbane based Catholic Housing Working Party (Coghlan 2011 
interview by the author). Coghlan had, however very little influence on the Board of the 
Rental Bond Authority: “Mind you I never won a vote because they were all very conservative 
… developers, real estate, conservative lawyers and me” (Coghlan 2011 interview by the 
author). This was however an important step in the development of Shelter as an 
organisation and illustrates the organisation limited role as an outsider group during this era.  
 
There was very little opportunity for any social policy advocacy group to operate as an insider 
during the Bjelke-Petersen political era. The highly centralised government maintained a 
closed door, with few exceptions. When Mike Ahern took over as Premier, however, Shelter 
worked with the Tenants’ Union of Queensland to pressure the government for a Rental 
Bond Authority. Members of Shelter also successfully campaigned for the inclusion of a 
representative for public housing tenants on the board of the Rental Bond Authority. 
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Chapter Six:  
An open door: Shelter and the Goss Government (1989-96) 
While Joh Bjelke-Petersen had boasted about his lack of citizen consultation: “You don’t tell 
the frogs anything before you drain the swamp”43 the Goss government were explicitly 
consultative open to policy advice, from some non-government sources, especially if it 
appeared to come from a basis of expertise with genuine community support (Caulfield & 
Davies: 1995). Such was the level of emphasis on inclusive policy development that Patrick 
Weller (1993) labelled citizens at the start of the 1990s ‘participation happy’ (cited in 
Caulfield & Davies 1995: 227). Nonetheless many of the formal and informal processes of 
participation and consultation present in policy development during the late 1990s and 
2000s were yet to be developed. Political will of the Goss government supported 
consultation but participation was restricted due to insufficient institutional support. Shelter 
was an insider group during this era, providing advice on housing issues.  
After a long period in Opposition the newly elected Goss Labor government welcomed policy 
advice as it began reforming the social housing portfolio. Not least because the newly 
elected government had no ministerial experience: “The ALP had been out of office for 32 
years. No shadow minister had ever presided over a department” (Coaldrake, Davis & 
Shand 1992: 7). When Premier Goss announced that the first Cabinet meeting would be 
held the following Monday after the election some of the newly appointed ministers were not 
sure of the location of the Cabinet room (Scott et al 2001: 249). Experience, or lack thereof 
aside, the Goss government had a mandate for major reform and an ideological commitment 
to community consultation (Caulfield & Wanna 1995). The commitment to consultation 
reflected broader political rhetoric but was also underpinned by the need for policy advice: 
Community political activism in Queensland needs to be seen, first, as part of a wider 
phenomenon which has occurred elsewhere in Australia, indeed in most industrially 
                                            
43 Helen Cameron (comp), Feeding the chooks: a selection of well-known sayings of former Queensland 
Premier ND cited in Queensland Historical Atlas http://www.qhatlas.com.au/. 
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advanced democracies; second, it needs to be understood as a response to new 
opportunities for policy involvement afforded by political changes in government 
administrations at state and local levels (Caulfield & Davies 1995: 227).  
The state was ready for change but the capacity for change in both the public service and 
the not-for-profit sector was poor due to systemic underutilisation by the former government. 
The Goss government sought to reform the public service and develop the community sector 
in order to address this incapacity. Many of the reforms were reflected in the Goss 
government’s Making Government Work (1989). The policy document called for the: 
 … re-assertion of Cabinet controls, an end to proliferation of statutory corporations, 
reduction in the number of departments to the minimum possible and introduction of 
proper performance reviews for the public sector (Australian Labor Party 1989: 3 cited 
in Coaldrake et al 1992: 7).  
This was an era of deteriorating national and state finances. Many western countries were 
experiencing declining wealth during the 1980s and 1990s contributing to the shift to 
governance, as discussed in chapter one. Despite economic pressure, government, 
including that of Queensland were able to continue to offer services by shifting some of the 
costs of these services to the market. As former Queensland Treasurer during the Goss era 
Keith De Lacy noted in 1992:  
We are not the lucky country any more ... The challenge today is implementing 
economic reform to address the problems we as a nation must solve … we are 
consuming more than we are producing, importing more than we are exporting, 
spending rather than saving (De Lacy 1992: 110). 
Economic rationalism and the need for fiscal responsibility coloured Treasurer De Lacy’s 
views on the role of ‘lobby groups’: 
My bottom line is that government decisions have to be made in the so-called ‘public 
interest’ – for the well-being of all Queenslanders. I have become convinced that we 
cannot afford to be side-tracked or hijacked by lobby groups, even those within the 
Labor movement, who interests do not coincide with the ‘public interest’ (1992: 111-
12). 
The Goss government initiated a number of institutional reforms. While many of these were 
taken in response to the Fitzgerald Inquiry (Coaldrake et al 1992: 3), there was recognition 
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that in the previous governmental era economic growth was emphasised to the “detriment 
of other political and social considerations” (Fitzgerald 1989 cited in Coaldrake et al 1992: 
4). With this in mind, the Goss government initiated reforms which would “balance ‘financial 
efficiency and economy’ with ‘accountable government, individual rights and democratic 
principles’ ...” (Fitzgerald 1989: 149 cited in Coaldrake et al 1992: 4).  
It has been suggested that the impact of neoliberal thinking occurred later in Queensland 
than in the other Australian states. While the Goss government had been dealing with the 
repercussions following the Fitzgerald Inquiry, other Australian states were wrestling with 
reforms associated with economic rationalism (Coaldrake et al 1992). The Goss government 
was not as preoccupied with the privatisation of public utilities, as other state governments 
of this vintage. Housing stress had been building for some time and in 1988-89 a National 
Housing Policy Review was undertaken, but as Troy (2012) writes the review was “basically 
overtaken by events including a National Housing Summit in 1989 that drew attention to a 
developing housing crisis” (2012: 204). The Goss government demonstrated commitment 
to the development of the community housing sector and embraced community consultation 
as a valuable governance tool:  
… the current government [Goss Labor Government] and administration [are] in (sic) 
the process of building an expanded sector at the same time as increasing the supply 
and improving the management arrangement of community and public housing” 
(Queensland Shelter: circa 1990a).  
There was mounting pressure from the federal government to develop the community 
housing sector. Prior to the election of the Goss government, the 1984 Commonwealth State 
Housing Agreement had included an “innovatory community housing program, the Local 
Government and Community Housing Program...” (Wiseman 1986: 30). Federal Housing 
Minister Brian Howe (member of the Hawke Labor Government) instigated the National 
Housing Strategy in 1990, which had impressive terms of reference, and called for the 
inclusion of non-state actors in developing housing solutions, including Shelter. The terms 
of reference encapsulate the large scope of the project and the emerging inclusion of the 
community sector in developing and delivering housing solutions.  
The enthusiasm for public consultation and inclusion of non-state actors found a small and 
under resourced community sector within Queensland. As an organisation, Shelter was “in 
the frequent position of having to respond to requests by government for advice when 
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Shelter has no policy basis from which to give that advice” (Queensland Shelter: circa 1992). 
The purpose of consultation was also debated by many non-governmental groups: elevation 
was quickly replaced by disappointment regarding the level to which non-state actors could 
participate in policy making. While “euphoria developed in anticipation of a democratisation 
of government in Queensland” some were left feeling a little let down by the actual process, 
which was under resourced and remained under the control of the state (Caulfield & Davies 
1995a: 238).  
The election of the Goss government enabled the overnight transformation of Shelter from 
outsider to insider interest group. Members of Shelter had developed relationships prior to 
the Goss Labor Party winning power. In particular Tom Burns, the newly appointed Housing 
Minister was supportive of Queensland Shelter, having met members during political rallies. 
Following the election of the Labor government on the 7 December 1989, Shelter gathered 
momentum working up policy through interactions with housing workers and other members 
of the community sector. Burns inherited a housing department with the lowest rate of public 
housing in Australia, “at 3.5 per cent – half the national level” (Troy 2012: 214). Burns was 
committed to change: “… Tom was driven by a passion after a very long period in Opposition 
to make substantive changes” (Smith 2011, Queensland Speaks, 00:17:22-00:17:31). 
Former senior public servant Ken Smith recalls that Burns was particularly passionate about 
social housing reform: 
He was a delightful Minister, very committed to reform in public housing and as 
Deputy Premier, he at the time chose the, the housing portfolio because of his 
commitment to seeing major reform in public housing and some de-stigmatisation of 
the … Housing Commission brand to move away from everything being vanilla and 
similar to some diversification … of the way that public housing was provided (Smith 
2011, Queensland Speaks, 0:15:36-0:16:15).  
As part of the reform, the Goss Government established the Department of Housing and 
Local Government in 1989. For the next fifteen years the Department of Housing and Local 
Government worked alongside of the Queensland Housing Commission, until the 
Commission was abolished in 2004. 
Deirdre Coghlan, alongside other members of Shelter, had worked tirelessly to form 
relationships with the Labor Party while they were in opposition. “… we supported, we visibly 
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supported Labor politicians at their rallies” (Coghlan 2011 interview by the author). Coghlan 
describes meeting Tom Burns: 
 ”I can remember being at a housing rally at Red Hill one week and then at Caloundra 
the next week … Tom Burns was at both and he walked up to me at Caloundra and 
he said ‘where do you come from?’ .. And so he sat down with us … “(Coghlan 2011 
interview by the author).  
Coghlan explained how some of these conversations were later represented in opposition 
policy, “The Labor party was adopting our policy as housing policy … before the election” 
(Coghlan 2011 interview by the author). The election of the Goss Labor government created 
a favourable political environment for Shelter, “So once we got the new government in, well 
that was when we blossomed” (Coghlan 2011 interview by the author). 
As housing minister Tom Burns actively encouraged people from the housing department to 
attend Shelter meetings to “go out there and listen to the people” and to “listen to what the 
issues were” (Coghlan 2011 interview by the author). On appointing Ken Smith as the 
Director-General of Housing Tom Burns asked Smith to attend a Shelter meeting: “… the 
first thing he told him was, ‘you’d better get out to a Queensland Shelter meeting. I want you 
to meet the people and these are the people you need to listen to’ ...” (Coghlan 2011 
interview by the author). While it was clear that Tom Burns supported the work of Shelter, 
the organisation did not receive any funding from the Queensland government until 1991. 
In 1991 Minister Burns set up a review into community housing in Queensland, to examine 
current service provision here and in other Australian states. Shelter was involved in the 
review process hosting a workshop at its inaugural conference in August of 1992. The 
conference was held from the 27th to the 29th August in Townsville. Federal MP Gary Jones 
attended on behalf of the Federal Minister for Health Housing and Community Services, Mr 
Brian Howe. State Housing Minister Tom Burns was also in attendance. In the early 1990s 
public housing remained on the agenda, and in Jones’ address he spoke of the 
Commonwealth State Housing Agreement (CSHA) agreement of $4 billion (over four years), 
set aside for state provision of public housing. But he also spoke of the commitment to the 
“new Community Housing Program”. Community housing would be developed through the 
Local Government and Community Housing program (LGCHP). The purpose of the program 
was to develop the capacity of the community housing sector, which “had been in operation 
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since 1984 and has proven to be a valuable vehicle for the development of community based 
housing initiatives” (Jones 1992: 16). 
The 1984 CSHA had included an “innovatory community housing program, the Local 
Government and Community Housing Program ...” (Wiseman 1986: 30). Australian states 
were slow to react to the program (Troy 2012) but at this time the Keating Government 
continued to work to secure commitment from each of the states. The Goss administration 
demonstrated more commitment to this program than had the previous government – likely 
a mixture of the Queensland Labor Party’s commitment to community involvement as well 
as increasing pressure from the federal government to develop the capacity of the 
community sector to address rising issues regarding housing affordability. Burns was 
certainly dedicated to the development of the community housing sector in Queensland. 
Let me say in the clearest possible terms, we are committed to the expansion of 
community housing through a range of direct services that include construction 
projects and generating new local employment in the private building sector … (Burns 
1992: 19). 
In was clear that Burns saw a role for Shelter in developing the community housing sector 
in Queensland.  
In the field of community housing, this government encourages local input and to this 
end, we will continue our funding of organisations such as Queensland Shelter (Burns 
1992: 19). 
In 1991 members of Shelter received funding for two paid staff and further funding to host a 
state wide housing conference.  
Housing Bureaucracy 
While it was clear that Minister Burns valued the work of Shelter, the relationship between 
Shelter and the housing bureaucracy was ambivalent. Eleri Morgan-Thomas, Shelter’s first 
paid coordinator, recalled that when she started with Shelter she took responsibility for 
developing a relationship with senior public servants working in the housing portfolio. This 
was a strategic move, the volunteer membership had successfully developed relationships 
with the minister and his staff, but relationships with the state bureaucracy were less 
developed but seen as equally important. During my interview with Morgan-Thomas she 
stated that the relationship with senior public servants was positive: 
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I worked mostly with the department at that time ... because everything was up for 
change it was about how you helped shape that change ... I remember it [the 
relationship between the department and Shelter] being quite a close collaborative 
relationship” (Morgan-Thomas 2013 interview by the author).  
Speech notes from the era, however, reveal that the relationship in the early days of Morgan-
Thomas’ tenure was irregular. In a speech made in March 1993 to members of the housing 
sector Morgan-Thomas compared Shelter’s relationship with the government to that of the 
housing department: 
We need also to look at our relationship with the Department. At an opening of the 
Shelter office in 1991, the then Minister Tom Burns described the relationship as a 
“marriage” – as he cut the cake with his arm around me and Donna! I wonder how 
successful the relationship is between the Department and the sector. 
We are expected to be one half of a partnership but the playing field isn’t level. Most 
of the time we don’t have a bat and ball to take homeif (sic) we don’t like the rules. 
(Morgan-Thomas 1993 emphasis in original)44. 
Tensions continued, with cracks forming in the relationship between Shelter and members 
of the Goss government. Eleri Morgan-Thomas opened her editorial in the May 1992 
Newsletter with: 
 As long as individual organisations are accountable to both the government funding 
agencies and to the communities that they serve, then they must be able to organise 
their internal affairs in any way in which they choose (Morgan-Thomas 1992: 1). 
Former senior public servant with the Queensland Housing Department, Penny Gillespie 
attributes this to the political era rather than a reflection on Shelter.  
My recollection was that there wasn’t a lot of interaction, it wasn’t particular strong 
there would have been an awareness that there was this organisation. The 
Department was not a very mature organisation then, and so it kind of went on and 
did its thing. I think there would have been some views from some senior bods in the 
department … about working with peaks … Ken Smith and Dick Persson … they 
                                            
44 Speech delivered to the Community Rent Scheme training session held in March 1993  
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would have had a sympatric ear, I think, to peaks but I don’t think it was really … 
embedded as a thing that you did (Gillespie 2013 interview by author). 
Former Director-General Dick Persson45’s recollection was community groups like Shelter 
did not have much to complain about and that the tolerance for open criticism of the 
government that funded them was low. 
 Because we had come from such a low base and had done so much wonderful work 
they [community groups] weren’t really going to complain too much. Tom Burns 
wasn’t really comfortable though with anyone like that being critical. He still had a foot 
in a tough political camp and so that if, you know, Shelter put out a press release 
criticising something he was likely to ... ‘cut their funding or whatever.’ There was still 
pretty tough Queensland politics at play (Persson 2013 interview by the author). 
Eleri Morgan-Thomas spoke of the reforms occurring during that period, explaining that 
formal lobbying took a backseat to the involvement in the development of policy and ideas 
and Shelter’s representational role: 
Because they [housing bureaucracy] were reviewing everything. I think that a lot of 
what we did was write submissions, organise forums you know all those sorts of 
things about giving people a voice. I didn’t do a lot of the sort of lobbying that you 
might do now, which is about wanting something to change where you’ve got a set 
position … because everything was up for change, so it was about how you helped 
shape that change (Eleri-Morgan Thomas 2013 interview by the author). 
When I asked Morgan-Thomas why she thought Shelter was in a better position to gather 
the views of Tenants and housing sector stakeholders, she explained the role of Shelter in 
gathering information and then analysing this with a view to putting forward some policy 
ideas based on best practice: 
… now that I think about it and occasionally talked to Ken and Viv about it, that they 
[Goss Government] probably didn’t have staff in there, they had staff in the old culture 
and it was about wanting to get different ideas and outsourcing ... And it wasn’t just 
tenants it was about a range of stakeholders and they preferred that to come through 
                                            
45 Dick Persson was the Director-General of the Queensland housing portfolio (1989-1994).  
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us rather than have them [Department] have to do that ... (Eleri-Morgan Thomas 2013 
interview by the author).  
Morgan-Thomas recalled that at times there were things that Shelter wanted to change but 
that criticisms are best made within the context of the impacts of policy decisions. 
.. if it is a decision you are criticising, you would suggest, this is why, this is why it 
doesn’t work, this is the alternative and this is the impact on tenants ... In policy terms 
it is always best to be constructive (Eleri-Morgan Thomas 2013 interview by the 
author).  
Shelter used direct language in conversations with the Queensland Government after 
receiving initial funding. In a policy submission to the Residential Tenancy Law Reform 
Review Committee in 1991, submitted after the organisation first received funding from the 
Queensland Department of Housing and Local Government, Shelter made criticisms of the 
way in which the organisation thought the Review was handled. In the document, submitted 
to the Queensland Government, Shelter were particularly scathing of the consultation 
process: 
The Review process should be a consultative process. Merely calling for submissions 
to a set of inadequately framed guidelines is not public consultation. Given the 
present Queensland government’s (sic) commitment to community consultation - 
Shelter expects that proper consultation will occur in the future stages of the Review. 
The Review process to date has not been consultation. The community was 
inadequately informed about the process that was being undertaken. For example, 
no information was presented to potential participants on the expected time frame for 
decision making, the composition of the Review Committee, who would be making 
the decisions and so on (Queensland Shelter 1991). 
Terry Mackenroth replaced Burns as Minister for Housing Local Government and Planning 
in September of 1992, remaining with the department until the Goss government lost power 
in 1996. Commenting on his appointment to the housing ministry Mackenroth commented 
on his role in developing policy prior to the election of the Goss Government: 
… housing had been a great interest of mine and I’d written all the policies for 
housing, so. Tom Burns had been the minister for three years in housing and had 
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implemented most of them and it was really a case of me continuing that ... 
(Mackenroth, Queensland Speaks, 23:11-23:25). 
Mackenroth was highly respected, both within his own party and by members of the 
Opposition: his Liberal party successor, Dr David Watson, spoke well of him: “I have a great 
deal of respect for Terry. He was an extremely knowledgeable, you know, extremely 
knowledgeable minister ... he knew a lot about what was going on” (Watson 2011, 
Queensland Speaks, 34:39-34:52). Mackenroth was regarded as a powerful player within 
his party: “Even before he became treasurer, Mackenroth was a decisive influence in the 
government” (Preston 2003: 407). 
Following the appointment of Mackenroth, the housing ministry continued to demonstrate 
commitment to the development of the community housing sector, causing some concerns 
within the social housing sector regarding the supply of public housing. Shelter sought the 
views of the sector attempting to clarify its position on the role of public housing and/or 
community housing: 
We need to decide how committed we want to be to public housing, whether we would 
be prepared to accept cuts in funding for public housing if it meant an expansion of 
what we now call the community housing sector (Morgan-Thomas 1992: 4).  
Despite the promises of the Goss Government for inclusive community development and 
input into policy, some frustration was felt by members of Shelter. In an address to a Shelter 
forum held on the 29 November 1990, Eastgate outlined issues associated with the 
machinery of government: 
Governments in our age are so arranged that areas of policy are divided into neat 
compartments. Someone in one office is working on a review of the public housing 
system. In another office, in another building, someone else is working on local 
government building regulations. Someone in another city is working on taxation law. 
Yet all these factors and many more interact to produce our housing system, and 
more broadly the set of systems which impact on our lives. Here, where we live, 
policies do not fall into neat compartments. We are whole people and the various 
parts of our environment affect us as people. It is important, then, that planning and 
policy be geared to responding to the needs of people where we live, with all our 
many and varied dimensions (Eastgate 1990: 5 emphasis in original). 
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Shelter had developed a relationship with the Labor party while they were in Opposition and 
as the Goss government’s confidence grew, Shelter continued to work as an insider group, 
receiving for the first time, in the early 1990s, some government funding to employ staff. 
These resources enabled Shelter to develop a branch structure in order to facilitate regional 
representation.  
The analogy of an open door has been used to signify the willingness of the Goss 
government to engage with Shelter and other non-government organisations. This door 
replaced the virtual lock out by the previous governments. But enabling participation in policy 
process requires more than just a willingness to be inclusive. Using the same analogy, I 
argue that while the Goss government created an ‘open door,’ the door opened to reveal a 
cramped consultation room. It would be some time before Queensland legislators and 
bureaucrats developed the structures and processes needed to capitalise fully on the 
knowledge held by the not-for-profit advocacy sector. The Goss government were 
responsible for the beginnings of a reform process which eventually led to participation by 
Shelter in many aspects of the policy making process during the Beattie era.  
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Chapter Seven:  
On the periphery (1996-98) 
During the Borbidge National Party government (1996-98) the relationship between Shelter 
and the housing Ministry was cordial but distant, with limited opportunity for Shelter to 
contribute outside of routine public consultation. Shelter was on the periphery, consulted but 
not encouraged by the Queensland National Party government led by Robert Borbidge to 
actively participate in the development of social housing policy. The Queensland housing 
ministry continued to fund Shelter but funding agreements were short-term and often came 
through at the last minute. Shelter was reactive, responding to policy discussion initiated by 
the housing ministry. Peripheral insider status took some pressure off Shelter who used this 
time to further develop its own policy platform, in readiness for the next shift in political 
opportunity (Khan 2013 interview by the author).  
While the Goss government was preoccupied by accountability, the Borbidge government 
focussed on efficiency and private market solutions. Public policy was framed within an 
economic rationalist paradigm, with a continued focus on market orientated policy solutions. 
The Borbidge government trialled several different programs in order to improve efficiency, 
the Priority Housing Program, privatisation of the management of public housing and also 
conducted a review into funding arrangements for community housing. Emphasis on the 
development of community housing continued, and was also a ‘nod’ to the Commonwealth 
whose confidence in market-based solutions was undermined by the pesky problem of a 
growing waitlist for public housing. Between 1992 and 1997 the number of Queensland 
households waiting to access public housing had rose steadily from just over 22 000 to 
nearly 26 00046. In an attempt to make ends meet, the Commonwealth government, through 
the CSHA, steered each of the Australian states to move away from investing in new public 
housing, continuing to focus the state government’s attention on the role that community 
organisations could play in providing social housing. 
                                            
46 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends. Various Issues 1995 to 1999. 
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The 1995 Queensland election produced an inconclusive result. The Goss government 
remained in power but the close election results saw pressure from both sides of politics for 
recounts in several electorates. Wayne Goss eventually called for a by-election in the seat 
of Mundingburra, which was held on the 3 February 1996. The result of this ballot was that 
Independent Member Liz Cunningham became, albeit temporarily, one of the most powerful 
political figures in Queensland. After deliberating for a week, Cunningham chose to form 
government with the Coalition and Robert Borbidge became the thirty-fifth premier of 
Queensland. At the time, “Few reasons were given publicly for her [Cunningham’s] stance 
...” (Wanna 1996: 421). But in 2012 during an interview conducted for the Queensland 
Speaks oral history project, Cunningham explained that she had chosen to form government 
with the conservatives due to her perception that Queenslanders wanted change. In her own 
words, “The issues in my electorate certainly came to play but I believed that overwhelmingly 
the people in the state had said that they were looking for change” (Cunningham 2012, 
Queensland Speaks, 00:25:40-00:25:49). 
It proved a shaky start for the newly elected minority government. The Borbidge government 
faced criticism for bringing back former senior public servants from retirement and for 
changes to the tenure of these roles. Department heads were employed on either a three 
year contract, or until a change of government (Scott et al 2001). Limited tenure of this type 
undermined the traditional role of public servants to offer ‘frank and fearless advice.’ It was 
also noted by Professor John Wanna that a:  
vacuum of experience in policy matters was a major liability to the new government 
as it tried to make an impression and begin to improve services and stimulate 
economic development (Wanna 1996: 423).  
Former Queensland Director-General Jim Varghese47 noted that while there was some initial 
government suspicion of the capacity of the public service to provide “advice on hard issues” 
(Varghese 2011, Queensland Speaks, 01:09:15) this changed as the Borbidge government 
gained experience: 
I think what you had there was some suspicion of the public service and as they [the 
Borbidge Government] were in government a bit longer that suspicion started to 
recede … (Varghese 2011, Queensland Speaks 01:09:16-01:09:26). 
                                            
47 Varghese was the director-general of several Queensland departments between 1991 and 2008.  
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Like previous conservative governments, the Borbidge Government focussed on “health, 
law and order, and infrastructure” (Metcalf 1996 cited in Wear 2003: 392). Queensland 
political scientist Dr Rae Wear concluded that: 
… his [Borbidge’s] premiership echoed that earlier National Party regime: the Union 
Jack once again flew at Parliament House, deals were done with the police, the public 
service was politicised, and parliamentary convention was overturned, all against a 
background of enthusiasm for development (Wear 2003: 393-94).  
Borbidge’s leadership style, however, differed from previous Queensland National Party 
leaders: “Borbidge seemed unsure, sometimes drawing towards the Bjelke-Petersen style 
while never appearing comfortable with it” (Wear 2003: 387). Commentary in The Courier-
Mail suggested that this was perhaps because “his natural persona is more “new age 
sensitive guy” than brawny tough man” (Lehmann 1998 cited by Wear 2003: 393).  
The broader political landscape had altered dramatically since the Bjelke-Petersen years. 
Reddel and Woolcock write that this government operated under an “emerging place and 
community policy trend in Australian public policy” (2004: 76). Reforms to social housing 
policy during this period were developed within the burgeoning rhetoric of increasing non 
state participation – contrasting with the authoritarian style that characterised the Bjelke-
Petersen Government. Queensland did not return to the ‘closed shop’ decision making style 
of Bjelke-Petersen: strategies of public policy development had begun shifting and while the 
Borbidge government embarked on a period of privatisation there was also commitment to 
inform and at times listen to the community sector. The Borbidge Government continued to 
fund the not-for-profit sector with “approximately $107 million in funding to community 
organisations and local government for the provision of housing and housing-related 
services” (Phillips. Queensland Parliament. Estimates Committee. 1997: 217). Public 
housing reforms, which mirrored those made by the Commonwealth and other Australian 
state governments, were introduced with the dual aim of reducing public costs and improving 
efficiencies (Marston 2000: 353). Neoliberal reforms were illustrated by portraying public 
housing as a welfare issue rather than as a right of citizenship. At the same time “… the 
neo-liberal turn has been expressed through the tightening of expenditure on public housing 
in Australia, the US, the UK, and New Zealand, among others …” (Groenhart & Burke 2014: 
129). During this period all governments within Australian began ‘reforming’ public housing. 
Jacobs et al explain the Australian government’s policy direction during this period: 
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… public housing should be only made available for those with acute needs, the 
introduction of probationary tenancies as a way of regulating behaviour, and providing 
subsidies to landlords to encourage investment in the private rental market (Jacobs 
et al 2010: 7).  
The Queensland housing ministry was no exception, increasing rents for new public housing 
tenants, placing new public housing tenants onto fixed term leases and “tightened eligibility 
of public housing” by “lowering income thresholds and requiring tenants to produce two 
written reference reports before being housed” (Marston 2000: 353). This was a radical shift 
from early incarnations of public housing which represented a tenancy for life. Housing 
‘need’ came to dominate policy decision making as public housing was slowly eroded by 
community housing. The Priority Housing Committee tightened eligibility for public housing 
so that the citizens with the ‘highest’ need were prioritised for public housing. The Borbidge 
government also undertook a major review of all recurrent community housing funding 
programs,48 Future Ways, Future Means. The aim of the review was to ensure community 
organisations were “delivering the most appropriate and effective outcomes and meeting the 
greatest housing needs” (Phillips Queensland Parliament. Estimates Committee 1997: 217).  
The Borbidge Housing Ministry 
Two housing ministers served during the Borbidge era, Raymond Connor49 and David 
Watson50. When Raymond Connor was appointed Housing Minister he was relatively 
unknown by Shelter members: 
He [Connor] was interesting (sic) but not deeply wedded to the portfolio. I don’t think 
he’d even been the shadow before then, because you don’t always know how those 
things are going to turn out” (Morgan-Thomas 2013 interview by the author).  
Shelter had not developed a connection with the conservatives while they were in 
opposition. Morgan-Thomas struggled to recall the strategies that Shelter had used with the 
Opposition (Morgan-Thomas 2013 interview by the author). The minimal links between 
Shelter and the conservative opposition in the Goss era were in part due to the belief that 
                                            
48 Including The Community Rent Scheme, Housing Resource Service, Community Housing Resource Worker, 
Homes Assist/ Home Secure 
49 26 February 1996 to 28 April 1997 
50 28 April to 26 June 1998 
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the Opposition would not gain power. “Nobody really expected them to get in” (Morgan-
Thomas 2013 interview by the author).  
Unlike the pre-existing relationship between Shelter and the Labor Party, the conservative 
parties were known to have closer ties with business and religious groups. Clear lines drawn 
on political ideology have come to mean a lot less than they did during the 1960s and 70s. 
Party ideology between the two parties has become, outwardly at least, much closer. 
Reforms to public housing, and other services delivered by the government in the last 
several decades are underpinned by economic rationalism – adopted by both sides of 
politics. Policy in the last few decades was developed through the preference of efficient 
and effective management practices (underpinned by fiscal stress) and to a lesser extent 
the beliefs and values of political parties. Scholars refer to the third- way as the “political 
convergence”, of old terms of right and left wing politics which encouraged the development 
of contracts between the state and the not-for-profit sector in the provision of social goods. 
‘Community’ based organisations were viewed as the way forward with Adams and Hess 
noting that “Australian versions of the `third-way'51 all have a key role for community” (Emy 
1994; Latham 1996; Argy 1998; Tanner 1999, 2000 cited in Adams & Hess 2001: 14).  
Morgan-Thomas recalls an agreeable but distant relationship developed between Shelter 
and Connor during his period as minister. They meet on several occasions, and both 
attended a United Nations conference in Istanbul.52 On one occasion, Morgan-Thomas 
recalls Connor was unhappy with a criticism made by Shelter to the media and she was 
asked to meet with him in his office. As Morgan-Thomas recalls this did not appear to cause 
much damage to the relationship: 
We did have one occasion where … he [Raymond Connor] was unhappy about 
something we had done and so he did call me in ... He wasn’t happy about it but he 
just took it on the chin and moved on” (Morgan-Thomas 2013 interview by the author).  
Raymond Connor became a highly controversial figure in the Borbidge ministry, with a 
number of incidents contributing to his ultimate resignation from the front bench. He 
                                            
51 The third-way is defined here as the ‘coming together’ of old terms of right and left wing politics which 
encouraged the development of contracts between the state and the not-for-profit sector in the provision of 
social goods (Adams & Hess 2001). 
52 Habitat II – Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements held on 3-14 June 1996. 
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infamously missed an important vote in parliament – as a result the Borbidge government 
was unable to pass its Public Service Bill. He resigned from the Ministry in April of 1997.  
At the time of his resignation, Deputy Premier Joan Sheldon publicly commended Connor 
for his work with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander housing issues while also stating “He 
has made a few foolish mistakes” (Lehmann 1997). Connor returned to the backbench 
where he remained until his electoral seat was abolished in 2001. Former public servant 
Penny Gillespie recalls that as the housing minister, Connor was committed to the continued 
development of community housing but also had a particular interest in public housing wait 
times and on improving housing in the Torres Strait (Gillespie 2013 interview by the author).  
David Watson was appointed Minister for Housing and Public Works on the 28 April 1997. 
Watson had served as the deputy leader of the Liberal Party from 1990 to 1992 and was 
considered a “commerce specialist” who the party believed could “accelerate the 
Government’s $4 billion capital works program” which had been criticised heavily for the 
speed in which the government was rolling it out (Laffan 1997). Within the first six weeks of 
his ministry, Watson attended a Senate Estimates Hearing Committee in order to defend the 
proposed expenditure on Housing and Public Works. During the hearing Watson praised the 
Queensland Housing system as having the second lowest waiting list in the nation.  
Queensland is in a fortunate position as we have a fairly efficient housing sector 
already and any changes that we will introduce - and let me say, no decisions have 
been made - will be made for future tenants (Watson. Queensland Parliament. 
Estimates Committee 1997: 210). 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of public housing applicants waiting more than 2 Years at June 30 1995 
(Source: Australian Government. Review of State/Commonwealth service provision report Melbourne: 
Commonwealth of Australia 1995a) 
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In comparison to the other Australian states and territories, Queensland did appear to be in 
a better position, with the second lowest wait times for public housing, as shown in Figure 
1. This graph however, does not capture the existing disparity between regional areas of 
Queensland. Families on the Gold Coast were waiting up to four years before securing public 
housing: in other parts of Queensland the wait was a great deal longer. On Thursday Island 
for example people were waiting up to twelve years (Ackfun. Queensland Parliament. 
Estimates Committee. 1997: 219). During the Borbidge era wait times for public housing 
would steadily increase, as did the waitlists in most Australian states (Troy 2012). 
Prior to the appointment of Watson as the Minister for Housing, Morgan-Thomas had 
resigned from her position as the coordinator of Shelter, accepting a role with the NSW 
Housing Federation. Tracey Douglas, who was frequently on the Board of Shelter, was 
appointed as the interim coordinator until Roksana Khan was appointed in March 1998 
following a formal selection and interview process. Khan’s early impressions were that 
Shelter had “a very good committee …” but “I was not used to this confrontational approach 
to government” (Khan 2013 interview by the author). Khan’s experience with the Australian 
government was that it “wore a supportive hat and actually helped us to write submissions 
to get money …” The government played a role in developing the sector (Khan 2013 
interview by the author). In contrast her early experience with the Queensland government, 
as the coordinator of Shelter, led Khan to note feelings of distrust between the NGO sector 
and governmental staff. Khan argues that despite the differences she was able to build 
partnerships with many of the people in housing because she came from outside of 
Queensland and although Khan was aware of the baggage of the past, she did not carry it 
herself (Khan 2013 interview by the author). 
Khan recalls that it was not easy to get a meeting with Minister Watson, “Shelter was not an 
organisation they had much time for anyway” (Khan 2013 interview by the author). Despite 
limited contact, Khan respected Watson, who she felt “judged the merit of our arguments” 
(Khan 2013 interview by the author) without judging the ideological position of the 
organisation. Khan (accompanied by members of Shelter’s Management Committee) recalls 
that she met with Watson on two or three occasions (Khan 2013 interview by the author). 
Khan describes the tone of the meeting as one in which engaging with Shelter was viewed 
as a duty rather than as a vital source of information from the community housing sector. In 
her opinion the view of Watson towards Shelter was: 
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Best not to not meet them but when I do meet them let’s not create any reasons for 
future conversation or more conversations ... Let’s not upset them … on the other 
hand let’s not do anything either (Khan 2013 interview by the author).  
This is not to suggest that Watson was opposed to working with community or commercial 
organisations. Shelter was not engaged by Watson to work as an insider during this period, 
but Watson did enable other groups to actively participate. During an interview with David 
Watson conducted as part of the Queensland Speaks Oral History project, Watson 
describes how he encouraged the participation of a consortium of commercial construction 
organisations to develop a policy submission for Cabinet. In another example, provided by 
Watson, he enlisted members of the social housing sector to draft a letter to public housing 
tenants, informing them of changes to their public housing tenancy.  
In the first example Watson describes a process of working with fourteen organisations 
within the construction industry, including the Housing Industry Association (HIA), Master 
Plumbers and the Master Builders Association in order to develop policy for consideration 
by Cabinet. Watson describes how he worked with this network:  
I actually sat down with the construction industry, and the group that was in charge 
of it ... Over half a dozen months we hammered out an agreement which I was able 
to take to Cabinet and get complete approval and I had fourteen of those people sign 
off on it ... I actually got the whole fourteen together in a room … and hammered out 
the final thing myself ... I think I got the feedback that they were very impressed the 
Minister actually had complete understanding of the detail (Watson 2011, 
Queensland Speaks, 00:44:02-00:45:04).  
Watson describes how support from these organisations, as representatives of the 
construction industry, was important in “getting things through Cabinet” but that conversely 
their demands were constrained by the Cabinet process:  
And I told them things like, look I might agree with you on that, but I can’t get that 
through Cabinet, I’m not even going to bother so if that’s your answer, if that’s what 
you want then we haven’t got an agreement. And then I’d say yeah ok that’s tough 
but I’ll get that through. So I actually helped, you know, put together the package in 
a way that got their [building organisations] support and I could get it through Cabinet 
(Watson 2011, Queensland Speaks, 00:44.04-00:45:32). 
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In this example non-government actors, in this case commercial, had input into the 
preparation of policy for consideration by Cabinet. In the second example, Watson describes 
how he engaged tenant advocacy groups to draft a letter to public housing tenants in 
Queensland. The purpose of this letter was to inform public housing tenants about incoming 
changes to tenancy law. In describing the interaction between him and members of the 
social housing sector there is less emphasis on the development of policy but recognition of 
the benefits of engaging members of the sector to disseminate information to public housing 
tenants. While the Tenants’ Union was consulted and involved in the development of 
material used to inform public housing tenants, they were not involved in the development 
of the policy proposal itself. As Watson explains: 
The other thing was the public housing ... First of all I thought we needed to reform 
the way public housing was done … I think about 2 800 of these tenant unions 
[Exaggeration by interviewee] and I went and saw a lot of them … And I actually 
spoke to them and we actually sent out some letters at one stage, and I got some 
feedback … ‘if I was an academic, if you had a PhD you might understand the letter, 
but it was totally hopeless for getting to us people in public housing.’ So when we got 
to the public housing reform what we said well ok well you come and help write the 
letters … But more importantly we had a long series of discussion with people about 
the kinds of issues that were really concerning them … We put together a … set of 
reforms which we thought would have fairly broad support and, but for me it was also 
starting to address the, I think the abuse that was occurring by some tenants, I mean 
not all tenants … So we, we put together a package and I took that to Cabinet 
(Watson 2011, Queensland Speaks, 00:45:32-00:47:29). 
During the interview, Watson suggested that the package was leaked to the press, which 
brought forward the public announcement. Informing public housing tenants of the upcoming 
changes was prioritised, with Watson engaging members of the social housing sector to 
develop a letter which could be more easily understood: 
We decided that the best way of handling the issue was to simply announce it … we 
just announced all of the reforms ... We had people who had volunteered to come in 
and did the letters … We developed the letter in the afternoon … I sent a letter 
personally signed to every tenants union … explaining what we were doing (Watson 
2011, Queensland Speaks, 00:48:23-00:49:30).  
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Watson argues that the involvement of the community housing sector helped to legitimise 
the policy decision and paved the way for acceptance from the public housing sector: “Did 
we have any reaction from the Tenants’ Union .. ? No we really didn’t ... we actually had 
some of their people actually help us, you know, put the letters together. So we got the 
communication, I think basically correct” (Watson 2011, Queensland Speaks, 00:49:49-
00:50:09).  
Both examples demonstrate the different levels of engagement that can occur within a given 
consultation process. Arnstein’s well-known Ladder of Participation (1969) illustrates the 
degree to which power is shared during a ‘consultation’ process. 
 
Illustration 9: Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation (1969). Illustration source: Wilcox 1998 
Applying Arnstein’s ladder of participation to the first example, there was a combination of 
placation and consultation; Watson worked with representatives to come to an ‘agreement’ 
before developing the policy submission for Cabinet. This agreement, however was 
developed within the constraints of what Watson thought would be acceptable by Cabinet; 
there is no indication that power was shared between the Minister’s office and the 
construction group.  
Further information is required to determine the level of participation by members of the 
social housing sector. Drafting a letter could fall into any rung between manipulation and 
placation. This extremely small sample cannot be used to make any broad assumptions 
regarding Watson’s inclination to include the social housing sector, but instead is used here 
to illustrate the differences in engagement and the impact of the various levels of 
engagement on policy development. 
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Prioritising public housing for the ‘most needy’ 
From the mid-1990s the federal government progressively introduced policies which shifted 
attention and resources from public housing to the burgeoning community housing sector 
(Gabriel & Jacobs 2006, Troy 2012). By 1995 nearly 26 000 thousand Queenslander 
households were on a wait list for public housing.53 The 1996 CSHA agreement increased 
funding for the development of the community housing sector: although Troy (2012) notes 
that “the level of funding increased substantially but not enough to make up for the fall in 
Commonwealth support for public housing generally” (2012: 196).  
As the Commonwealth retreated from public housing, some funding was redirected to 
support the development of the community housing sector. Several states within Australia 
implemented priority housing systems’ (Water. Queensland Parliament. Estimates 
Committee 1996: 6) shifting from a wait turn54 system of allocation to a priority55 system; 
supported and encouraged by the Commonwealth (Queensland Parliament 1997). Former 
senior housing bureaucrat Penny Gillespie recalls that during this period there was also a 
notion of ‘deserving poor’:  
But the Borbidge government, I clearly remember they had views that you had to be 
both poor and deserving. ...I don’t suppose … deserving ever got into a policy 
document because they would never appear, but that was the intent ... [Deserving] 
being good, ‘showing a bit of an interest in your life’ maybe if you’d had things 
happened to you that were beyond your control you would be seen as deserving 
…That notion wasn’t there before, that was a kind of new notion that crept in (Gillespie 
2013 interview by the author). 
The Borbidge government established the Priority Housing Committee in order to implement 
a system in which the provision of public housing would be based on ‘need’. The first meeting 
of the (Queensland) Priority Housing Committee was held in December 1996. The formal 
role of the committee at this stage was to devise a “strategy which allowed for the 
introduction of its important priority housing policy in the shortest possible time, yet allowed 
                                            
53 Department of Housing, Local Government & Planning 1994/95 Annual Report page 29 cited in Shelter 
1997. 
54 Wait turn refers to “a process of allocating housing to those who have been on the waiting list the longest” 
(Queensland Shelter 1997b). 
55 Priority refers “to a particular need or circumstance that is said to be greater than others” (Queensland 
Shelter 1997b). 
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for housing interest groups to have clear channels for policy enhancement and access to 
the committee members” (Carfoot Queensland Parliament. Estimates Committee 1997: 
224). Curiously, in light of the formal acknowledgment of the importance of the housing 
interest groups to “have clear channels” for participating in policy development, (Carfoot. 
Queensland Parliament. Estimates Committee 1997: 224) most of the committee members 
were outside the housing sector.56  
There were 90 applications for membership on the committee, and from this process 13 
“were selected on merit” with most members demonstrating “experience in (for example) 
youth, aged care, the law and social work” (Morgan-Thomas circa 1997). Most members of 
the committee worked in sectors which were familiar with the dilemmas of those needing to 
access affordable housing. Penny Gillespie explained this mixture as “the early attempt to 
understand that housing did not operate in isolation and that there were other issues in 
people’s lives” (Gillespie 2013 interview by the author). In a similar vein senior public servant 
Eric Carfoot told the Estimates Committee in 1997 that “The members of the committee 
themselves were selected and endorsed by Cabinet because of their expertise and 
community links and because of their capacity to make recommendations to the Minister on 
the most effective priority housing policy for Queensland” (Carfoot. Queensland Parliament. 
Estimates Committee. 1997: 223). 
The Priority Housing Committee (PHC) was involved in the analysis of existing public 
housing policy and the development of policy reform; at one stage the PHC directed the 
Queensland Housing Department to research the priority housing systems in other 
Australian states. Shelter was not represented on the committee but the Department 
continued to acknowledge the importance of input from the broader community sector. “The 
community organisations and individuals will be encouraged to contribute post 
implementation policy improvement ideas by direct contact with individual committee 
members, written submissions or formal meetings with representatives of the committee” 
(Carfoot. Queensland Parliament. Estimates Committee 1997: 223). The PHC also met with 
the Queensland housing peaks as part of an ‘extensive’ consultation process (Carfoot. 
Queensland Parliament. Estimates Committee 1997: 224).  
                                            
56 Members of the Inaugural Priority Housing Committee were: Dr Janet Irwin (Chair), Juliet Gross, Beryl 
Holmes, Frank Lippet, Pam Maher, Rose Colless, Glenda McChesney-Clark, Lorna Moxham, Geraldine Neal, 
Margaret Phillips, Geoff Smiley, Margaret Steinberg (Eleri Morgan-Thomas Circa 1997). 
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On 6 January 1997, the PHC met with several housing policy peaks, including Shelter “to 
discuss its policy concerns and expectations, with each committee member spending up to 
two days consulting with a variety of housing interest groups in their local areas” (Carfoot. 
Queensland Parliament. Estimates Committee 1997: 223). Morgan-Thomas noted several 
issues were raised by the social housing peaks: 
Shelter pointed out that the sector does not hold a consistent view about the necessity 
of a priority housing system. Some think it is absolutely necessary, others think it 
leads to queue jumping and others think that the Community Rent Schemes (CRS) 
are a better option for priority housing. 
QDHC [Queensland Disability Housing Commission] warned of the undesirability of 
housing excessive numbers of people with psychiatric disabilities in one area - 
possibly close to outpatient services that they may need to access. What happens to 
people who get priority listing for disability modified housing but there is none. There 
will have to be good links between the capital works side of things and the priority 
housing system. 
QDHC warned that the costs of applying for priority housing shouldn't be borne by 
the applicant. An example could be the costs of getting psychiatric reports to prove a 
genuine case. 
The impacts of the priority housing system on CRS must be considered. It will be 
important to see priority housing and CRS as complementary rather than competing. 
Shelter suggested a joint working party of the PHC and the CRS Association to look 
into coordination between the two. 
A lengthy discussion took place about the ability of priority housing to provide 
housing. Priority housing will not expand the amount of housing available, particularly 
in areas where there is low levels of stock already 
(Eleri Morgan-Thomas circa 1997) 
Shelter made a formal policy submission to the Review of Priority Housing after consulting 
their membership. Shelter’s overall position on a priority housing system was that the ‘need’ 
to rationalise housing was based on a lack of housing supply. While appreciating that a 
priority system may help those who need it ‘more’, there was concern that some people 
would remain on the list indefinitely, due to perception of ‘low need’. But the shortage of 
public housing was not a political priority at this time: the Priority Housing Committee was 
raising the bar for access to existing housing stock.  
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In the submission made to the Queensland government regarding priority housing in 
November 1997, Shelter suggested a hybrid of both systems: “the overall means of making 
new public housing and transfer allocations should involve a combination of both wait-turn 
and priority housing systems” (Queensland Shelter 1997c: 4). In this submission the 
organisation made a number of recommendations: 
Recommendation 1: A Priority Housing system is necessary but should not be at the 
expense of those already on the wait turn list. 
Recommendation 2: A percentage of public housing should be retained for priority 
allocation. 
Recommendation 3: The types of circumstance that should qualify as “priority” to 
include the following: 
 ‘severe crisis’, 
 ‘medical condition’, and 
 ‘domestic violence’. 
Recommendation 4: Priority housing allocations should be available in all public 
housing areas. 
Recommendation 5: An independent appeals mechanism should be available under 
a priority allocation system, and should focus on response times, independence and 
locality  
 (Queensland Shelter 1997c: 4-7). 
One of the first responsibilities of the Priority Housing Committee was to write policy 
regarding a Priority Housing system. The Committee was also responsible for assessing 
applications for public housing. Aside from making a submission as part of the formal 
consultation, Shelter was not invited to participate in the development or implementation of 
Priority Housing policy. They remained on the periphery; formal submissions were accepted 
but did not appear to have much impact. It is unclear whether any of the ideas or suggestions 
regarding the Priority Housing system made by Shelter or other organisations, would 
eventually have been accepted by the Borbidge government as the committee was 
abolished by the incoming Beattie government. In 2013 Labor Minister Robert Schwarten 
retrospectively declared the PHC: 
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… bullshit in my view. You cannot abdicate the responsibility of the minister to an 
advisory group ... You’ve got a whole department that can advise you ... All that did 
was convolute the whole process (Schwarten 2013 interview by the author). 
Restricted to the outside, Shelter engaged in outsider strategies, using the media to gain 
public attention for issues in order to try and influence the government on policy direction. 
One issue that gained attention was the closure of boarding houses in the inner suburbs of 
Brisbane. Boarding houses typically provided more affordable inner city accommodation for 
single people, especially older men. In just under a decade one third of Brisbane’s boarding 
houses were demolished or redeveloped for different purposes (Morgan-Thomas 1997b). In 
March 1997 Shelter and the Tenants’ Union of Queensland published press releases which 
called on the government to retain the remaining boarding house stock.  
Shelter’s media release used emotive language to harness citizen support for boarding 
house residents:  
I want to paint you a picture of a reasonably typical boarding house resident. Imagine 
an older single adult male receiving a benefit from the Department of Social Security. 
He’s lived in the boarding house for more than 5 years …The rent here is a bit 
expensive and there’s not much left out of the pension, but he likes being close to the 
shops, in an inner city area where everyone looks a bit odd and no-one stands out 
and where he can get into the hospital for his regular check-ups ... (Morgan-Thomas 
1997b). 
Boarding house tenancy reform was a recurring issue on the Queensland political agenda 
throughout the twenty-five-year period covered within this thesis. The Tenants’ Union of 
Queensland and other members of the social housing sector, including Shelter, had 
unsuccessfully advocated for the inclusion of boarding houses under the Residential 
Tenancies Act (1994).  
 ‘Future Ways & Future Means’: Queensland Shelter  
The social housing sector was divided between ideology and pragmatism on the shift from 
public housing to provision of housing by community groups. Academic and former member 
of the Shelter Management Committee, Greg Marston argued that “The continuing 
entrenchment of market-orientated policies in public housing, symbolized by the reforms, 
created considerable conflict among members of the policy community” (Marston 2000: 
353). There was concern that the development of community housing would come at the 
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expense of public housing. This concern was ongoing and would continue well into the next 
government period. In a submission to the Future Ways & Future Means program proposal, 
Shelter warned the Department of Housing of possible distrust developing within the social 
housing sector: 
The sector will predictably be likely to react negatively to changes along those lines, 
particularly if they think that there was a hidden agenda during the consultations. 
Indeed many already suspect that there was. The Grants Board should be aware that 
there will be significant resistance to changes anyway, and more so if the sector 
thinks it has been misled. This highlights the need to manage any change sensitively 
and by ensuring that the sector is willing to go along with any changes that are 
suggested. (Queensland Shelter 1997a: 2). 
Future Ways & Future Means was a review of community housing programs, undertaken by 
the Housing Ministry in 1997. The aim of the project was to “review the basis for existing 
recurrent funding programs and advise the Minister on the policy and funding processes 
which best achieve the highest priority needs and outcomes” (cited in Queensland Shelter 
1997a: 1). Four community housing programs were reviewed: Community Rent Scheme, 
Housing Resource Service, Community Housing Resource Workers and Home Assist/Home 
Secure (Queensland Shelter 1997a). Linda Apelt who became the Director-General of the 
Department of Housing in 1998, explains how this was an early attempt to shift the 
management of social housing to commercial providers: 
Future Ways Future Means was about testing the viability of the private sector taking 
on the portfolio as a rental and portfolio manager ... and I guess once we got really 
close to it, it just didn’t seem to make sense. There was strong lobbying from staff 
within the regional offices as well as from tenants, to say ‘hey we don’t like this, we 
don’t think this is as efficient as what the government was doing and how they used 
to do it before’ … (Apelt 2012 interview by the author). 
The Borbidge Government lost power before many of these reviews had any impact on 
housing policy. One member of the Queensland public service, who did not wished to be 
named or recorded for the purpose of this research, suggested that this review process 
caused some members of the public service some work dissatisfaction as the review 
process did not go anywhere. My research on this particular program was impeded by the 
reluctance of key participants to discuss it. 
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The Borbidge government continued to provide funding to Shelter, with a slight increase in 
funding over the period as illustrated in figure 2. News of the continuation of funding was 
however, often conveyed at the last minute. Government funding is one sign of interest 
group success, although little is made of this in the academic literature. “A big event this 
year was the funding of a policy and research worker ... Shelter has been trying for years to 
get funding for a policy and research worker and it is great that it has finally happened” 
(Gould 1997: 1). This success contrasted with the winding down of the CSHA consultation 
project which experienced uncertainty during this period. “This has been a difficult year for 
the Project. Funding has been a problem, and there was a time when the workers were 
given redundancy notices. The funding came through at the last minute, but not in time to 
keep Lyn Luxford, who left to work with Brisbane City Council (Gould 1997: 1). 
 
Figure 2: Funds received from the Borbidge Government (1996-98) 
(Graph developed from Queensland Shelter annual reports 1996-98) 
Although funding levels were steady, “Funding periods became shorter and for the first half 
of the year, like others, Queensland Shelter was on month to month funding” (Gould 1997: 
1). Grant (1989) recognised resources as an important aspect of interest group 
effectiveness. Funding is an obvious source, but the way in which funding is delivered also 
impacts on the capacity of an organisation to advocate effectively. “The impact that this 
[short-term funding contracts] combined with continuing funding uncertainty, had on staff 
morale and therefore productivity should not be underestimated” (Queensland Shelter 
1997d: 4). The capacity for Shelter to research and develop policy was constrained during 
this period, by small staff numbers and funding that came through at the last minute. During 
the 1996/97 financial year Shelter commissioned two research projects: an analysis of the 
impact of the proposed rent assistance model and a second project on the changes to 
community housing (Queensland Shelter 1997d).  
$0.00
$50,000.00
$100,000.00
$150,000.00
$200,000.00
1996 1997 1998
Annual funding received
from the Department of
Public Works and
Housing (1996-98)
 140 
 
Privatisation of public housing trial 
A one-year pilot of private management of public housing was announced by the 
Queensland Department of Housing in the later part of 1997. Chesterton International and 
Network Real Estate were awarded, through a government tender process, the 
management of 5 000 public housing units in the Stones Corner and Woodridge areas. “The 
Department of Public Works and Housing is moving towards the privatisation of public 
housing. It is proposed that some of the tenancy management functions such as rent 
collection, maintenance and property inspections be outsourced” (Queensland Shelter 
1998: 3).  
Shelter was adamantly opposed to the use of private real estate agents to manage public 
housing tenants on the grounds that: 
Public housing is and should be about housing justice ... The real estate industry 
operates from a profit motive so it is difficult to imagine how real estate agents will be 
able to incorporate the current practices of the Department (Queensland Shelter 
1998: 3) 
Reflecting on the privatisation trial sometime after, former senior housing public servant 
Penny Gillespie argues that the decision to trial privatisation of public housing was driven 
by ideology:  
They obviously had the view that things could be done better by the private sector ... 
I doubt that was a particularly well informed decision ... I think it was ideological. ... 
some decisions are about a government or minister saying we would like to achieve 
x. ‘You the department come and tell us how we can achieve x’ ... There is nothing 
wrong with that ideology necessarily but … clearly it was not well thought out because 
it failed miserably (Gillespie 2013 interview by the author). 
The Queensland Services Union weighed into the issue of privatisation by sponsoring a 
campaign, Public Housing Works – Coalition against Privatisation, urging “groups, 
organisations and individuals to join. Involvement can be anything from circulating petitions 
to participating in strategy meetings” (Public Housing Works - Coalition against Privatisation 
Flyer: circa 1997). Similar coalitions had developed in other parts of Australia, the United 
States and Europe, where similar experiments with privatisation were embraced to manage 
public housing. The privatisation trial went ahead despite objections made by Shelter and 
others.  
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The incoming Beattie Government did not pursue management by commercial organisations 
when they come to power. Former Director-General of Housing, Linda Apelt, explained the 
issues of getting a private provide to manage social housing tenancies 
The poor private provider was finding it extremely challenging to be able to manage 
a social portfolio, they were only ever used to managing … other private rentals out 
there …The tenants in the social housing portfolio were much more resource 
intensive ... much more property damage, more call outs that sort of thing … I think 
they were starting to realise if there was money to be made in this, the private sector 
would have been in this a long time ago. There is actually a big subsidy, government 
subsidy that goes into this program because it is a public service (Apelt 2012 interview 
by the author). 
This is not to suggest that the incoming Beattie government were opposed to working with 
the private sector. Former Housing Minister Robert Schwarten argues that the Beattie 
housing ministry “formed alliances with the REIQ and real estate agents … to move people 
who we thought would make good tenants into the private sector” (Schwarten 2013 interview 
by the author). 
During the Borbidge period, Shelter operated as a peripheral insider group, involved in 
consultation but unable to participate in the development of policy. Neither of the housing 
ministers during this era was open to engaging Shelter in the participation of policy 
development, although both Ministers had limited dealings with Shelter as per the rhetoric 
of ‘community engagement’. The Queensland government was under pressure, through the 
Commonwealth State Housing Agreement to rationalise public housing to the ‘neediest’ and 
at the same time there was a gradual emphasis on developing the community housing 
sector. Wait lists for public housing grew, along with relatively rapid population growth, rising 
maintenance costs, housing affordability and diminishing Commonwealth funding.  
The community sector was identified as a way to fill some of the gaps: diversifying the way 
in which social housing needs could be met. Shelter was on the periphery, as an 
organisation that had long advocated for an increased supply of public housing. The Shelter 
Board belatedly came to recognise that the provision of social housing was shifting towards 
the community sector, especially new start-up housing providers. Shelter, in conjunction with 
the Tenants’ Union of Queensland used outsider strategies to draw media attention to the 
issue of tenancy rights. But they had little success in more conceptual aspects of housing 
provision, failing to persuade the conservative government to buy or at least subsidise the 
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existing boarding house stocks which continued to decline. Of course, many occupants of 
the boarding houses were on Commonwealth government benefits – from disability and 
unemployed allowances to the old age pensions, and some of these were also eligible for a 
rent subsidy.  
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Chapter Eight:  
Shelter on the inside (1998-07) 
Queensland Shelter became and remained an insider group during the Beattie era. A 
relationship based on collaboration and trust developed between the Executive Officer of 
Shelter, Adrian Pisarski and the Minister for Housing, Robert Schwarten. This chapter 
examines this relationship within the context of several major reforms to social housing 
policy during this period: the development of the Brisbane Housing Company, The One 
Social Housing policy and a review of state funding to housing policy peaks. The result of 
the 2007 review into peak funding was that Shelter was funded as the ‘peak’ social housing 
group, relocated to larger and rather glamorous government-owned premises. As a result of 
the move to the new premises, the additional responsibilities and a new policy and strategy 
team, as well as additional administrative staff the capacity of the organisation to engage 
with the government and state bureaucracy expanded. Despite insider status, Shelter 
avoided advocacy capture, continuing to provide critical assessment of government action 
and proposals.  
From the start the Beattie Labor Government demonstrated a strong commitment to 
community consultation. A consultative style concurred with Peter Beattie’s populism and 
the impact of burgeoning pockets of dissatisfaction within electorates around Australia. A 
new federal political player, Pauline Hanson capitalised on locational inequality, calling for 
the ‘right to a fair go’ for ordinary Australians. While support for the One Nation Party was 
“spatially specific” (Davis and Stimson 1998 cited Reddel and Woolcock 2004: 76), the One 
Nation Party won 11 seats in the 1998 Queensland election. Smyth and Reddel argue that 
the election result encouraged the Beattie Government to initiate a range of programs that 
would engage and empower citizens: 
Initially based on the need to address the electoral success of the Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation Party in 1998, a range of initiatives have been constructed by the Beattie 
Government in Queensland around the need to respond to increasing citizen 
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alienation and disillusionment with traditional political and policy processes (Smyth 
and Reddel 1997 citied Reddel and Woolcock 2004: 76). 
Following the 1998 election, the Beattie Government enjoyed a relatively long period of 
strong political support and “By late 1999 Beattie had emerged as the most popular premier 
in the country” (Wanna 2000: 237). This was a period of radical cultural change with 
Queensland. The Beattie Government’s Smart State’ agenda grew from an initial promise 
to increase “workforce skills” and improve “overall education standards” (Salisbury 2013: 
33) to an overarching strategic direction, which underpinned and propelled the development 
of many areas of public policy within Queensland.  
The Minister for Public Works and Housing (1998-2009) 
Robert Schwarten was appointed Minister for Public Works and Housing following the 1998 
election. Prior to this appointment he had served as Opposition Spokesperson for Lands 
and Natural Resources. Preceding his political career he worked both as a carpenter and a 
teacher. Schwarten was infamous for his colourful language and outbursts, both in 
parliament and elsewhere. The language he used in parliament could favourably be 
described as passionate and less favourably as bad-mannered: “The Halloween pumpkin is 
at it again!” (Queensland Parliament. Record of Proceedings 1991a: 6528), “I can see the 
honourable idiot from Flinders engaging in sleight of hand” (Queensland Parliament. Record 
of Proceedings 1991b: 7780) and "Sit down, you ratbag" (Queensland Parliament. Record 
of Proceedings 1991c: 286).  
During his interview testimony for this research, he described both the difficult decisions 
governments face when housing need is greater than supply and the vulnerability of those 
experiencing housing stress. His interview, like many others conducted for this PhD 
research, was interspersed with anecdotes regarding the impact of public policy on 
individuals. Schwarten recalls the difficulties in providing suitable public housing for families 
with a child with a disability. According to Schwarten the department could spend up to a 
million dollars on one dwelling in order to provide purpose-built accommodation. If the child 
were to pass away the family might be asked to move to another dwelling, so that another 
household (who had a member living with a disability) could reside in the modified 
accommodation: 
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It’s a pretty hard thing to do, look a family in the eye and tell them [that they had to 
move] … I could see it through their eyes too, but I also had to see it through the eyes 
of the next family that was waiting (Schwarten 2013 interview by the author). 
At the start of his appointment as housing minister, Schwarten demonstrated a willingness 
to hear from his department staff as well as members of the social housing sector. He hosted 
the Housing Policy Retreat, at the Legends Hotel Surfers Paradise, in November 1998. The 
purpose of this housing retreat was to gather information in order to reform housing policy:  
The retreat is an important activity in the overall process. It presents a unique 
opportunity for policy decision makers and department staff to discuss and consider 
a range of critical issues confronting the department. The retreat won’t give us all the 
answers but will help us to identify spheres of activity and influence … (Queensland 
Government 1998).  
While Schwarten was impressed by the policy capacity of the department staff he was critical 
of the way in which the previous government had utilised the bureaucracy:  
We had some excellent people who had up until then basically had a collar around 
their neck and the government basically said this is the policy coming from us. And I 
always saw policy making as a two way street. I wasn’t there to be dictated to by the 
department and the department wasn’t there simply to be dictated to by me 
(Schwarten 2013 interview by the author).  
While a very limited number of community housing groups attended the Housing Policy 
Retreat many more were consulted.57 Shelter was one of the three non-government 
organisations which were invited to attend. Roksana Khan attended as Coordinator of 
Shelter, Penny Carr represented the Tenants’ Union of Queensland and Michael Willett 
attended on behalf of St Vincent’s Community Services (Queensland Government 1998). 
                                            
57 The following organisations submitted papers: Aborigines and Islanders Alcohol Relief Service Ltd, 
Aboriginal Coordinating Council, Australian Pensioners & Superannuates League Queensland Inc., Local 
Government Association of Queensland, Cairns & Regional Housing Corporation Ltd, Cairns Housing Network, 
Caravan and Mobile Home Residence Association, Combined Church Community Service Forum, Community 
Rent Schemes Association Queensland, Council on the Ageing Queensland Inc., Far North Queensland 
Regional Tenant Advisory Group Inc., Island Co-ordinating Council, Thursday Island, Joint Ministerial Advisory 
Committee Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure, Queensland Advocacy Inc., Queensland Community 
Housing Coalition, Queensland Council of Social Service Inc., Queensland Tenants Public Assn. Inc., Shelter, 
Rural Community Housing Peak Organisation, South East Queensland Youth Accommodation Coalition, 
South Queensland Council for Homeless Persons Inc., Combined Women’s Refuge Group, Pine Rivers, 
Redcliffe, Caboolture and Kilcoy Accommodation Reference Group, Tenants Union of Queensland’s North 
Queensland Office. 
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Schwarten had first met Khan when Terry Mackenroth was the Minister of Housing during 
the Goss era and Shelter had made a favourable impression (Schwarten 2013 interview by 
the author). 
Former Shelter Coordinator, Roksana Khan recalls that it was a great deal easier to arrange 
a meeting with Robert Schwarten than it had been with David Watson. “He [Robert 
Schwarten] would call us on a Friday afternoon and say, ‘Come over I want to talk to you 
about this’ ... “(Khan 2013 interview by the author). Despite recollections of the ease of 
access to Schwarten’s office and the inclusion of the community housing sector in the 
Housing Policy Retreat, former housing Director-General Linda Apelt58 recalls that 
Schwarten had some misgivings about the role of peak advocacy groups in the development 
of policy, recollecting early suspicion from Schwarten’s office towards Shelter, as a 
community sector organisation. Apelt describes how at the start: 
There was also a lot of animosity between Shelter and the Minister and I think that 
was more that the Minister had a bit of a suspicion about community sector 
organisations anyway and what value did they add for what they were costing?” (Apelt 
2012 interview by the author).  
This distrust was not based on any personal relationships or prior experiences with any of 
the housing peaks but instead was based on the issue of representation. As Apelt explains: 
I think at that time politicians thought, well who are these people representing the 
interests? They have never been elected. What right do they have to represent 
interests and to lobby on behalf of someone? They haven’t been elected, they’re just 
appointed. And so Robert Schwarten used to talk about, well how about we structure 
these groups like Shelter and others a bit like the way the unions are structured … 
and you have a bit more of a representation structure. (Apelt 2012 interview by the 
author).  
Shelter was able to demonstrate representational capacity; engaging the views of the sector 
through regional branch membership and state-wide housing conferences. Shelter’s policy 
mandate was also broader than that of other housing peaks, which covered specific 
populations, including youth, disability and housing co-operatives. In 2002 Schwarten 
indicated an intention to reduce the number of funded housing peaks. As part of this initiative 
                                            
58 Linda Apelt was Director-General of Housing from 1998 to 2004. 
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he requested information from Shelter regarding its role and purpose. Shelter responded 
with a fifteen page report which provided information on the “purpose, role and operation of 
Shelter as a housing peak body and of the mechanisms that exist for the provision of advice 
to you as the Minister for Housing.”59 In the submission Shelter argued that it was an 
umbrella peak, with a role in bringing together satellite peaks (Queensland Shelter 2002: 8). 
Schwarten did not reduce the number of funded peaks at this time but the distinction made 
by Shelter in this document regarding the capacity of the organisation to act as an umbrella 
peak became particularly relevant in the review of funding to social housing peaks 
conducted in 2007.  
The capacity for a peak to act as an umbrella for the social housing sector was highly 
regarded by Schwarten and was an important factor in the continued funding of Shelter, 
discussed in the later part of this chapter. Despite some initial misgivings about the role of 
not-for-profit advocacy groups, Schwarten was open to developing a relationship with 
Shelter; he made himself available to meet with staff and committee members. In the 
opening address of the Shelter Annual Report, former Shelter management committee 
member Coralie Kingston writes: 
I acknowledge the Department of Housing for the ongoing funding of Shelter and for 
the relationship that is developing continually. A special acknowledgement goes to 
the Minister of Housing, the Hon. Robert Schwarten MP, for his support and his 
willingness to meet with Shelter (Kingston 2002).  
Former Shelter Coordinator Roksana Khan describes meetings with Schwarten in positive 
terms, recalling that Schwarten was ‘open’ to hearing from Shelter, “He was very committed 
to housing as a whole and very committed to providing long term support to people …” (Khan 
2013 interview by the author). While Schwarten may have displayed an initial uneasiness 
regarding the representational capacity of policy peaks, he grew to appreciate and trust the 
advice provided by Shelter. Engagement with community groups during the Beattie era was 
normalised with the government rapidly expanding avenues for nongovernmental 
engagement and participation, including a relatively generous level of financial support for 
some organisations.  
Commitment to community engagement  
                                            
59 Correspondence: Shelter chairperson Coralie Kingston to Robert Schwarten, 3 October 2002.  
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The Beattie Government introduced a range of programs and processes to encourage policy 
advice from outside the state bureaucracy. One of these programs was the result of a 
promise made by the Beattie Government to Independent Member Peter Wellington. As in 
the election of the Borbidge government in 1995, the ballot numbers were tight: but this time 
there were two Independent members in a powerful position; Liz Cunningham and Peter 
Wellington.  
In an article describing the expansion of community engagement in Queensland, Reddel 
and Woolcock argue that Peter Wellington agreed to form government with Beattie with the 
stipulation that the government introduce Community Cabinets (Bishop & Chalmers 2001; 
Davis 2001: 224 cited in Reddel & Woolcock 2004). However in an interview with Wellington 
as part of the Queensland Speaks project, he credits Peter Beattie with the idea of 
Community Cabinets, claiming that was how Beattie had responded to a broader suggestion 
by Wellington that citizens should have more of a say in policy making: “That was how Peter 
Beattie responded to my proposal for ‘well I think you have to look at how you are going to 
connect with Queenslanders’ …” (Wellington 2012, Queensland Speaks, 00:21.41-
00:21.48). 
Judging from the subsequent reforms that Beattie implemented, the establishment of 
Community Cabinets was not just a concession to Wellington. From 1998 to 2003 the Beattie 
Government established ten citizen engagement initiatives, including Community Cabinets, 
the Community Engagement Division, community renewal program, crime prevention 
strategy, Cape York Partnerships, Brisbane Place Projects and South East Queensland 
2021, Far North Queensland 2010 Wide Bay population growth plans (Reddel & Woolcock 
2004). The Community Engagement Division was created to “ensure that the public sector 
injects community ideas into government services” (Scott et al 2001: 198). The Division was 
responsible for “two projects to influence consultative processes and behaviours across the 
public sector - the Public Consultation Project and the E-Democracy Project” (Scott et al 
2001: 198). Beattie attempted to embed community consultation practices across all 
departments to reflect the “... attention being paid to consultation and a greater diversity of 
means of service delivery” (Scott et al 2001: 198). Consultation processes, which had been 
the source of some derision during the Goss and Borbidge eras, were improving but still 
faced criticism.  
Institutions and policies which encouraged and supported the inclusion of non-government 
organisations continued to be developed and refined by the Queensland government, but 
 149 
 
the limits to this ‘consultation’ continued to trouble the ‘consulted’. In 2000 Shelter and the 
Tenants’ Union of Queensland were engaged by the Department to consult the social 
housing sector on the Future of Public Housing (Queensland Shelter 2001: 3). In a document 
circulated to members, Shelter criticised the consultation process, disappointed that the 
consultation was an “information giving” opportunity rather than an “analysis” by the social 
housing sector (Queensland Shelter 2001: 4).  
This political environment, however, provided Shelter with other formal and informal 
interactions with both the Ministry and the bureaucracy. Consistent and sustained advocacy 
by Shelter paid off in the lead up to the 1998 election. During the lead-up Shelter advocated 
(to both sides of politics) the case for regular meetings. Shelter recommended a regular 
meeting between the peaks and senior members of the government. Shelter was: 
... recommending a Ministerial Advisory mechanism which consists of a mix of 
representatives from the peak housing sector and others that a Minister may deem 
to be appropriate. A mechanism that is accountable, transparent and with expertise 
that is able to consider a whole of housing approach to the future development of 
Housing in Queensland (Queensland Shelter 1998: 9).60  
It took some time for the incoming Beattie Government to agree to and arrange this 
reoccurring meeting. This is an example of successful advocacy by Shelter with the first 
Senior Manager/Peaks forum held on 22 May 2000. The meeting was attended by 
representatives of several housing policy peaks and senior public servants.  
                                            
60 Shelter repeated this request in their 2000 Budget Proposal submission. This submission was endorsed by 
The Queensland Public Tenants Association, Queensland Community Housing Coalition, Tenants’ Union of 
Queensland, Queensland Disability Housing Coalition, South East Queensland Youth Accommodation 
Coalition, Community Rent Scheme Association Queensland, and South East Queensland Council for 
Homeless Persons, Social Action Office. 
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Illustration 10: Excerpt: inaugural Senior Mangers/Peaks forum 
The Minutes of the inaugural Senior Managers/Peaks meeting indicate department staff had 
a high regard for Roksana Khan. At this meeting, Department of Housing staff presented 
Khan with flowers to mark the start of her maternity leave. A short speech followed where 
Khan was thanked for her “contribution to the department” (Queensland Government 2000). 
The minutes also illustrate the common goals of the social housing peaks and the 
Queensland Department of Housing. Many of the issues raised were consistent between 
department staff and the housing peaks.  
In particular all parties present at the meeting were interested in “influencing the whole 
system, getting housing back on the social agenda, increasing resourcing for housing ... ” 
and “ ... particular products and services, such as new funding arrangements” (Queensland 
Government 2000). Minutes of the first meeting also indicate that the Queensland 
Department of Housing wanted to work with the community housing sector “effectively and 
efficiently” (Queensland Government 2000). Several of the housing peaks, including Shelter 
were invited to give a joint presentation at the meeting on the topic of “working with non-
government sector peaks” (Queensland Government 2000) to share views on how this might 
be better achieved. Increasing formal meeting arrangements had the effect of providing 
opportunities to develop informal relationships. Formal meetings are important avenues for 
developing ongoing policy conversations, between various policy actors. As Dalton et al 
(1996) write, “In the shadow behind the formal process, there is often a series of phone calls, 
lunches, breakfasts, media leaks, meetings of both a regular and irregular kind” (1996: 107).  
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Housing bureaucrats engage with peak policy groups for reasons similar to those of the 
Ministry; social advocacy peaks can be an important source of expertise and provide 
legitimisation (Maddison & Denniss 2009). The support of a policy peak, such as Shelter, 
can be strategically advantageous for the bureaucracy. As Peters (1977) notes: “The 
administrators need the political support and influence of the pressure groups in their 
external relationships with other political institutions, and they further need the information 
supplied by pressure groups for making and defending their policies” (1977: 192). While I 
did not draw the conclusion of ‘co-dependency’ between interest groups and the 
bureaucracy from my interviews, the senior public servants I spoke with were aware of the 
benefits of working with policy peaks in the development of social policy.  
The role of peaks in acting as sounding boards was highlighted in several interviews with 
senior public servants. Former Director-General of Housing Natalie McDonald (2004-09), 
explained the importance of gathering different perspectives:  
Testing ideas, exploring issues that are of concern and trying to identify potential 
solutions to those things. Testing communication and how that works and are we 
getting the right messages out ... The peaks bring a different perspective ... I valued 
it during my time to have another perspective being put on the table. Otherwise … 
you wallow in your own self-confidence (McDonald 2013 interview by the author). 
Former senior Queensland public servant Penny Gillespie also described how public 
servants might ‘test out’ ideas with members of Shelter and other community groups, 
illustrating the importance of trust within the relationship:  
Senior public servants want relationships that they can trust because they are bound 
by the conditions of their employment… they are actually bound by law about what 
they can and can’t do. And so they might want to test things out ... Those relationships 
are really critical, I think, to NGOS and particularly peaks who want to influence 
(Gillespie 2013 interview by the author). 
The less structured interactions between Shelter and the bureaucracy is illustrative of 
Shelter’s status as an insider group. While this thesis focuses on the relationship between 
the Ministry and Shelter, the importance of a good working relationship with the state 
bureaucracy should not be under-estimated. Insider status is a result of acceptance and 
invitation by the Ministry, a positive well respected relationship with the bureaucracy is a ‘tick 
in the box’ towards achieving this acceptance. Furthermore the public service is heavily 
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involved in the framing of policy problems and solutions. Maddison and Denniss (2009) note 
their “multifaceted function in the policy process”, arguing that while public servants are 
“answerable both to their minister and to the parliament, there can be little doubt that some 
senior public servants play a direct role in policy making, while other public servants 
influence the policy decisions made by ministers” (2009: 150). Positive relationships 
between advocacy groups and members of the public service enable peak policy 
organisations to have influence through discussion and debate regarding the framing of 
problems, opening up avenues for discussion around policy solutions. 
The death of public housing is imminent!61 Contracting out affordable housing 
As commonwealth funding for public housing diminished, discussion around the provision 
of ‘affordable’ housing intensified. Affordable housing is a contested concept, with some 
sources acknowledging that it means more than “the relation of costs to income” (Brisbane 
City Council 2003: 8) and should take into account the housing standard, location and 
suitability. In purely economic terms affordable housing is usually defined as housing which 
costs no more than 30 per cent of total income. Aggregate housing affordability is often 
measured by the 30/40 rule, which refers to overall numbers of “those spending more than 
30 per cent of their income on housing, while earning in the bottom 40 per cent of the income 
range” (AHURI 2015). Figure 3 below illustrates both the growth of community housing and 
the decline in public rental stock in Queensland during the 1990s.  
                                            
61 Heading of article featured in Shelter Newsletter August 2002 
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Figure 3: Annual addition of housing stock: Aboriginal and Torres Strait housing, public housing and 
community housing (1990-1999) 
Source: Queensland Government Budget Papers: Ministerial Portfolio Statements pp 2-10, 2-37 Queensland 
Government circa 2000 in Shelter Submission "Putting People First" Queensland Shelter 2000: 11 
Throughout much of this period the federal government continued to encourage home 
ownership or access to the private rental market, in the form of first home owners’ grants 
and rent assistance payments. Public Housing continued to be rationalised for the ‘very’ 
weak and vulnerable; accessible only to those who really needed it. In Queensland, 
population growth and the maintenance of aging housing stock added to the burden of 
declining federal funding (Queensland Government 2003a: 3).  
The focus on ‘affordable housing’ occurred within a broad welfare reform, which saw the 
continuation of devolution of services to non-government providers. Large scale privatisation 
and contracting had also occurred in both the UK and the USA (Austin 2003), where “a 
broader movement toward complex combinations of diverse institutions drawn from both the 
public and private sector” occurred (Gais, Nathan, Lurie, and Kaplan 2001: 43 cited in Austin 
2003: 97). Earlier in this thesis I identified this as the governance shift; a move from 
government to governance. This shift continued to impact on the role of advocacy groups 
and government bureaucracies in the development and implementation of public policy. The 
Beattie Government continued with the previous government agenda of outsourcing the 
delivery of ‘affordable housing,’ although there was less emphasis on contracts with 
business, with a stronger commitment to developing the capacity of community housing 
providers. 
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In 2003 the Beattie Cabinet endorsed the Housing Department Strategic Action Plan, 
Improving People’s Lives through Housing (2003-08). A key goal of the plan was to improve 
“access for Queenslanders to safe, secure, appropriate and affordable housing” 
(Queensland Government 2003b: 1). The government demonstrated commitment to 
developing community housing providers in order to develop affordable housing services. 
The plan contained five goals, and numerous objectives. Several of the objectives related 
to the development of the community housing sector, illustrating the Beattie Government’s 
intention to work across federal, state and local levels of government, as well as with other 
agencies and Queensland government departments to develop the capacity of the 
community sector to manage community housing needs.  
The objectives which directly relate to the development of the sector included: 
1. Influence relevant policy, statutory provisions and institutional arrangements to 
maximise responses to the housing needs of Queenslanders; 
2. Maximise the opportunities for all stakeholders to plan comprehensively and 
effectively for the provision of affordable housing in sustainable communities; 
3. Initiate new partnerships and mechanisms to deliver affordable housing in 
sustainable communities; 
4. Ensure effective communication, provide key market information and build 
stakeholder capacity to support initiatives for affordable housing in sustainable 
communities; 
5. Develop and deliver products and services to support the provision of, and access 
to, affordable housing in sustainable communities.  
(Queensland Government 2003b: 13-25). 
An outcome of the willingness of the Beattie Government to develop the community housing 
sector was the establishment of several large scale affordable housing sites in partnerships 
with other entities. These affordable housing initiatives were characterised by a mixture of 
tenure and included the new community housing project in Bowen Hills (2001) and the Kelvin 
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Grove Precinct (2003)62 which was built in partnership with the Queensland University of 
Technology. 
Brisbane Housing Company 
The Brisbane Housing Company is a not-for-profit entity and the first housing company 
developed in Queensland,63 established as a result of the commitment to community 
housing from both the Queensland state government and Brisbane City Council (BCC). 
Former senior public servant Penny Gillespie argues that the development of the Brisbane 
Housing Company was the start of the ‘professionalisation’ of the Queensland community 
housing sector: “ Brisbane Housing Company was probably the most critical point actually, 
because there you are, you’ve suddenly got a professionalised thing” (Gillespie 2013 
interview by the author).  
While local governments throughout Australia can build and lease housing, this practice is 
minimal, not least because of the up-front capital required. While BCC had a prior interest 
in issues of homelessness they were not “the main agency responsible for affordable 
housing” (Brisbane City Council circa 2003: 6), this had been left to the Commonwealth and 
State governments. Local councils are integral to the goal of developing affordable housing 
as they have responsibility for planning legislation (Integrated Planning Act 1997) and were 
able to use this to “facilitate the development of affordable housing” (Brisbane City Council 
circa 2003: 6). While the BCC, which at the time held a strong Labor majority and a Labor 
Lord Mayor, acknowledged that it “cannot hope to make up for the gap in assistance created 
by shifts in State and Commonwealth policy” they expressed an intention to work with both 
levels of government to achieve some positive outcomes (Brisbane City Council circa 2003).  
An overarching theme of the Council-hosted affordable housing summit (Brisbane 
Affordable Housing Summit November 2002) was the role of local and state governments in 
facilitating “private sector investment in affordable housing” (Brisbane City Council circa 
2003: 5). In line with the BCC vision that “Brisbane will be a city where all residents have 
access to affordable, well-costed, secure and physically adequate housing,” (Brisbane City 
                                            
62 For the story of the development of the Kelvin Grove Village see Klaebe, Helen. Sharing Stories: Problems 
and Potentials of Oral History and Digital Story Telling and the Writers/Producers Role in Constructing Place. 
PhD Thesis QUT Creative Writing (2006). 
63 The first housing company developed in Australia was the Aboriginal Housing Company Limited which was 
incorporated in 1973 and continues to operate from Redfern in Sydney (Aboriginal Housing Company Website 
2014).  
 156 
 
Council circa 2003: 10), the council resolved to support the Brisbane Housing Company to 
“add to the supply of affordable housing managed by non-profit organisations in Brisbane”64. 
The Beattie Government committed 50 million dollars in equity towards the Brisbane 
Housing Company (BHC) while the council committed 10 million (Queensland Government 
2002a).  
Brisbane Housing Company is a not-for-profit organisation, limited by shares. These 
shareholders are a mixture of government, commercial and non-profit organisations65. There 
are two types of shareholders, ordinary and community. Both the Queensland housing 
department and the Brisbane City Council are ordinary shareholders. When BHC was 
establishing, the ordinary shareholders were responsible for deciding which organisations 
could be shareholders - individuals are not permitted to be shareholders. Community 
shareholders must meet the following criteria: 
                                            
64 Objective 1 of the Brisbane City Council Affordable Housing Strategy 2003-05. 
65 Complete list of shareholders of the BHC, as it is now known, in 2015: The State of Queensland represented 
by the Department of Housing and Public Works, Brisbane City Council , The Urban Development Institute of 
Australia (Queensland), Property Council of Australia Ltd, Australian Property Institute Inc, Planning Institute 
of Australia, Compass Housing Services Co (Queensland) Ltd, Queensland Shelter Inc, Queensland Disability 
Housing Coalition Inc, Foresters Community Finance Ltd, Communify Queensland Ltd, New Farm 
Neighbourhood Centre Inc, Churches of Christ in Qld , The Corporation of the Trustees of the Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of Brisbane (operating as Centacare) 
 (Brisbane Housing Company 2015). 
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Illustration 11: Excerpt: a guide to the Brisbane Housing Company 
Source: (Queensland Government 2002a)  
Expressions of interest were tendered: with a written application required to be submitted in 
order to be considered as a community shareholder. While the shareholders were able to 
participate in and influence the business of the Brisbane Housing Company this was not an 
example of power sharing between the government and community sector. The Queensland 
housing department remained in a position of authority, the only policy actor to have two 
shares in the Brisbane Housing Company; the other ordinary shareholder, BCC only having 
one share. The ordinary shareholders retain the authority to choose community 
shareholders and the Chair of the Board of Directors. In addition ordinary shareholders 
retained the right to remove the chair at any time. The ordinary shareholders may also give 
a ‘default event’ notice if the company failed to pay bills, breached the shareholders 
agreement or made a ‘misrepresentation to a lender’ (Queensland Government 2002a: 20). 
If the notice is ignored or performance does not improve, the situation can escalate to a 
failure event and lastly a termination event. The ordinary shareholders retained the right to 
terminate the board. The effect of this was: 
… that all Directors elected by the Community Shareholders cease to hold office and 
the Company must redeem all Community Shares. It is then at the absolute discretion 
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of the Ordinary Shareholders to direct the company to issue new Community Shares 
(Queensland Government 2002a: 21).  
The first affordable housing complex to be managed by the Brisbane Housing Company 
opened in mid-2002. The complex cost over seven million dollars and consisted of seventy 
units, “a mix of boarding housing, one and two bedroom units and studio apartments” 
(Queensland Government 2002a).  
The establishment of the Brisbane Housing Company was a radical departure from business 
as usual in meeting the housing needs of people on lower incomes. It was also an 
opportunity for local government involvement (Queensland Shelter circa 2000: 20). At this 
time the Queensland state government was winding up the Queensland Housing 
Commission, and the establishment of BHC provided a good departure from the ‘old ways’ 
of providing housing. As Linda Apelt explained in an interview with Queensland University 
of Technology student Helen Klaebe: 
We had a new piece of legislation that was on the drawing board, a new Housing Act. 
Which was essentially abolishing the Housing Commission and introducing a new 
piece of legislation that was very much about embedding housing affordability into a 
whole range of economic and social policy context within the community (Apelt 2005 
cited in Klaebe 2006: 322-23)  
Shelter remained cautious and conflicted about any proposed changes to the way in which 
social housing was offered. “We had a lot of arguments in the management committee about 
it” … because “of different perspectives” (Khan 2013 interview by the author). Broader 
debates were occurring at Shelter regarding the shifting government support from public to 
community housing: 
Is this the new form of governance – finding someone else to blame? Tenants in the 
private rental market blame the Real Estate Agent or their private landlord for an 
unfair outcome in their housing; perhaps this is the new risk management strategy by 
government (Queensland Shelter circa 2002: 22).  
Khan credits some of the issues to a “deep distrust” (Khan 2013 interview by the author) 
about the intentions of government, with the view by some members of the social housing 
sector that this was the beginning of the total sale of public housing. The BCC engaged with 
the sector in order to alleviate some of these concerns. Jon Eastgate, one of the founding 
members of Queensland Shelter, who was at this stage working for the BCC on the Brisbane 
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Housing Company project explains how the community sector were brought into discussions 
regarding the management committee of BHC: 
We then tried to pull in community organisations at that point to say … ‘do you want 
to be shareholders in this [community housing] company?’ They were very worried 
because they saw it as replacing public housing and being a less affordable 
alternative to public housing. (Eastgate 2013 interview by the author). 
Eastgate argues there was some justification for this concern, based on the way in which 
rents were calculated and also the fear that BHC would “take resources from public housing 
and put it into this option instead and the very poorest people, who a lot of those community 
agencies were working with daily, wouldn’t be able to get access to it because they wouldn’t 
be able to afford it. (Eastgate 2013 interview by the author). While Shelter remained critical 
of the amount of rent to be charged, they were not influential in changing the mind of 
Schwarten on this issue: 
I could understand what they [Shelter] were saying but at the same time I wanted a 
market driven place where people out of public housing could go to, the next stage 
... I didn’t want public housing to only be for the last resort ... To put it frankly I believe 
that 25% of people’s income is too lenient for housing and I think that what we were 
offering was excellent conditions, well suited …” (Schwarten 2013 interview by the 
author). 
Executive Officer replaces Shelter Coordinator 
In 2002 Roksana Khan resigned from the Coordinator’s role at Shelter to take up a position 
with Brisbane City Council. After a short period of Christine Grose serving as the locum 
director of Shelter the management committee appointed Adrian Pisarski as the Executive 
Director. At the time of his appointment, Pisarski had twenty-two years of community sector 
experience, across four Australian states. Pisarski brought his own understanding regarding 
the role of peak advocacy groups in the development of public policy. One of the first 
challenges Pisarski faced was a review of peak bodies. Schwarten was keen to reduce the 
numbers of funded state housing peaks, although he was unsuccessful at this time. 
The first issue I faced was a review of peak bodies … I was pleased when the Minister 
told us in December he was keeping the status quo among peaks. I have been 
through three peak reviews in NSW, one in Victoria and two at a national level. They 
always focus from the Minister’s or D.G.’s perspective and are always looking for a 
 160 
 
more efficient and streamlined way of engaging the sector. If completed they 
invariably disenfranchise some aspect of the sector and give more responsibility and 
work (but never more money) to those remaining (Pisarski 2003: 5).  
It was not until after the 2004 state election that the relationship between Schwarten and 
Pisarski was cemented through a series of events. Frustrated by the lack of discussion 
regarding affordable housing during the election period and disappointed that Schwarten 
had declined an invitation to the 2004 Shelter state housing conference due to a clash with 
the Rockhampton show, Pisarski sent a forthright letter to Schwarten’s office.  
In this same letter, that I was suggesting that it was important for him to attend our 
conference, not this show, I also questioned if anybody was looking after housing 
policy because everyone seemed to be talking about racing as far as I could tell 
(Pisarski 2011 interview by the author). 
Upon receiving the letter Schwarten asked that Pisarski and the Chairperson of Shelter’s 
management committee attend a meeting in his office. Schwarten was not happy with the 
content of the letter and Pisarski recalls that the meeting began with Schwarten 
demonstrating his displeasure. 
… and gave me a fifteen minute tirade full of swearing and he didn’t hold any 
language back at all. I was sitting there fuming and getting angrier and angrier ... [he] 
told me that ‘it was the worst letter he had every received as Minister’, I didn’t think it 
was a bad letter, and ‘he wasn’t coming to the conference’ ... (Pisarski 2011 interview 
by the author). 
Pisarski recalls recognising that a direct approach was needed in order to explain why he 
wrote the letter and what Shelter hoped to achieve. 
Anyway I said to Schwarten, ‘Have you finished because I want to tell you why we 
wrote that letter’ and he was taken a bit aback by that ... And said, you know, quite 
calmly …‘The reason we wrote that letter is because we had twelve months where 
housing is an important issue. You’re telling us to be solutions focussed, you want us 
to discuss what’s wrong, give you ideas etc., and there wasn’t one word about 
housing in the whole election campaign. Your government didn’t talk about it, there 
wasn’t a policy, not an announcement, nothing and you expect us as a peak body to 
sit back and just be happy about that?’ (Pisarski 2011 interview by the author). 
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Pisarski identified this as a defining moment in the relationship between the Schwarten 
Ministry and Shelter. Within the pressure group literature on social advocacy peaks, little is 
written on the role of personalities and interpersonal skills in developing close working 
relationships. Perhaps good personal relationships are regarded as less important than 
political expertise or representational capacity or maybe good interpersonal skills are 
accepted as a given. Within the business management literature these types of skills and 
attributes are sometimes referred to as emotional intelligence, “how to handle yourself, get 
along with people, work in teams, leadership” (Goleman 1999). Without the development of 
some sort of workable personal relationship it is difficult to partake in a close working 
relationship on policy issues. Strong interpersonal skills and the ability to work with a variety 
of policy actors are essential because these skills enable productive working relationships.  
Pisarski attributes the development of a close working relationship to the way in which he 
had communicated with Schwarten and the capacity of Shelter to provide constructive, 
solution focussed policy advice.  
... After that he was still quite miffed with me but just before the conference two things 
happened. One was he rang our office and … said that he had a change of plans and 
could now attend and ... could we make room on the program ... And the second thing 
that happened around that time was my mother died and he sent me a really nice 
personal note about my mother. So when he arrived [at the conference] … I went to 
the car and greeted him and I said to him ... ‘Apart from anything else I just want to 
say thanks for the note about my Mum I appreciate it.’ Ever since then we got on 
really well and we had his respect and we could do no wrong after that and because 
he then understood that I was solutions focussed and that I was trying to provide 
them, and so was the organisation of course, with solutions to our housing problems. 
That we weren’t just … another whinging peak. So I think that was really the turning 
point in our relationship with government (Pisarski 2011 interview by the author). 
Schwarten grew to greatly value the policy advice provided by Shelter and spoke highly of 
Pisarski’s knowledge and contribution:  
So I always leaned heavily on Shelter and particularly Adrian, after Roksana had 
gone - he was there for the majority of my time and I found him to be a very good 
soul. Someone who was well read, someone who understood the board base 
philosophy ... and someone who brought a practical head on his shoulders … 
(Schwarten 2013 interview by the author). 
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One of the largest reforms undertaken during this period was a review of the waitlist system. 
In October 2005 an information paper was circulated to the housing sector, ‘Paving the Way: 
Housing People in Need in the Smart State’ (Queensland Government 2005). The paper 
explained the need for radical change, proposing a centralised social housing waitlist. The 
purpose of the paper was to advise the sector that the allocation of social housing would be 
centralised.66 Schwarten credits the One Social Housing policy as the “most controversial” 
of reforms during his time as Minister (Schwarten 2013 interview by the author). One Social 
Housing policy came into effect on 1 January 2006. The aims of this policy were clear:  
 Simple entry points for clients to all social housing assistance 
 One register of need to replace existing lists 
 A commonly used process to match clients with the housing assistance that best 
meets their needs 
 Long term social housing for clients with the highest need 
 Consistent eligibility criteria for long term social housing programs 
 Long term social housing provided for the duration of need 
 Housing assistance that changes as client’s need changes 
 Connecting client to support services 
 Improved pathways between the One Social Housing System and the private market 
 (Queensland Government 2005: 11). 
 
Initially the Queensland Government undertook various consultations with the social sector, 
the process drew some criticism from Shelter: 
Despite the difficulties caused by the period allowed for the consultation to take place, 
we have been able to bring together feedback on this paper from a wide cross-section 
of Shelter members, community housing organizations (sic) and related service 
providers” (Queensland Shelter 2008).  
In the following years Shelter actively participated in both evaluation and continuous 
improvement processes of the One Social Housing Policy. In the 2008-09 annual report, 
Chairperson Wynn Hopkins noted that “Qld Shelter has continued to engage heavily in the 
                                            
66 Social housing included “public rental housing, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rental housing, long 
term community housing, boarding house accommodation, medium term community housing and crisis 
accommodation and housing provided in discrete Indigenous Communities (Deed of Grant in Trust 
Communities)” (Department of Housing 2005: 5) 
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‘new world order’ of social housing policy in Queensland - the One Social Housing System 
(OSHS)” (Hopkins 2009: 2). Hopkins described this project as that which involved “extensive 
consultation” and resulted in focussed work by Shelter to improve OSHA processes. 
(Hopkins 2009: 2). Schwarten recalled how Shelter ran several seminars on One Social 
Housing, as they were able to reach stakeholders from right around Queensland (Schwarten 
2013 interview by the author). 
During this period the participation of Shelter in the development of policy was expanding, 
with involvement in a number of departmental committees including the Joint Homelessness 
Reform Working Group, Strengthening Social Housing Reference Group, Review of One 
Social Housing System and the TAAS [Tenants Advisory and Advocacy Service] with the 
Tenants’ Union of Queensland (Pisarski 2009: 6).  
Shelter: the sole social housing peak 
In July of 2007 Minister Schwarten announced that there would be new funding 
arrangements for the state based housing policy peaks. The outcome of this process: 
… was that was that the peak funding formerly provided to the Queensland Youth 
Housing Coalition, Queensland Disability Housing Coalition and Queensland 
Community Housing Coalition was transferred to Queensland Shelter, while the 
funding formerly provided to the Queensland Public Tenants Association was 
transferred to the Tenants Union (99 Consulting 2008).  
Shelter however received extra funding, were given more tasks and responsibilities and later 
were moved to larger premises in Spring Hill. In my interview with Schwarten he explained 
the reason behind his preference for one policy peak and why he chose Shelter to be that 
organisation: 
I wanted one organisation that could professionally take on government ... I believe 
that the way to do it was to properly house and fund Shelter so that all of these groups 
could be under that umbrella and that a coherent policy structure and advocacy could 
come out of this group (Schwarten 2013 interview by the author). 
Senior public servant Natalie McDonald concurs that “the minister had been concerned for 
a period of time that there was a significant amount of money going to the peaks collectively 
and that he wasn’t getting a consolidated view …” (McDonald 2013 interview by the author). 
McDonald argues that Shelter was well placed to offer a broad view of housing, “... Shelter 
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was the peak that did tend to, and had tended to over a long period of time, try to bring the 
voices to the table and put a kind of umbrella over it …” (McDonald 2013 interview by the 
author). In 2007 Shelter had 11 branches, eight which were geographically based and three 
which had formed around special interests.67  
Linda Apelt, who was the Director-General of Housing at the time, argues that the positive 
relationship between the Executive Officer and the Minister had bearing on the development 
of a positive relationship at the organisational level:  
I think it is because the CEO at the time was strong. He was prepared to strike up a 
good working relationship with the minister of the day and I think the minister thought 
‘Well here is a credible capable person’ (Apelt 2012 interview by the author). 
The ability of Shelter to act as the umbrella peak and provide wide coverage and 
representation of social housing issues in conjunction with the organisation’s capacity to 
provide policy advice on problems and solutions contributed to Schwarten’s decision.  
Linda Apelt argues that Schwarten respected members of Shelter more than some of the 
other peaks, “He wasn’t going to give it to the community housing sector because he didn’t 
have the same level of respect there” (Apelt 2012 interview by the author). Others I 
interviewed described an uneven history between the some members of the community 
housing sector and the Queensland Housing Ministry. Former public servant Gillespie 
explains: 
They [the minister’s office] all moaned about the co-operatives because they thought 
they were a bunch of ratbags. There wouldn’t be a minister who thought the co-ops 
were any good, they all thought they were terrible because even if they started off 
thinking they were alright, they actually didn’t like the behaviour that they saw and 
their ministerial staff saw. (Gillespie 2013 interview by the author). 
Former housing minister Robert Schwarten himself noted that Shelter was more constructive 
than other housing interest groups during the implementation of the One Social Housing 
Policy, “Community housing resented greatly my interference and this is where Shelter was 
excellent because what I actually did … was to say ‘Look I’ve had a gut full of community 
                                            
67 Far North Queensland, North Queensland Branch, Mackay Branch, Central Queensland Branch, Sunshine 
Coast Branch, Toowoomba Branch, Bayside, Brisbane North, Gold Coast, Inner City, Logan, North Moreton, 
South West Brisbane, Indigenous Housing Branch, ASHRAM (Agencies Supporting Housing for Refugees, 
Asylum Seekers and Migrants) and Woman’s Housing Network (Queensland Shelter 2007). 
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housing advisors. All these little groups that ran their own race.” (Schwarten 2013 interview 
by the author).  
The continuation (and increase) of funding to Shelter in the context of other peaks being 
defunded caused considerable unrest within the social housing sector. In order to work 
effectively as an umbrella group Shelter needed to unite disparate groups within the housing 
sector.  
In 2008 Shelter commissioned 99 Consulting (a private consultancy business established in 
2006 by founding Shelter members Jon Eastgate and Helen Wallace) to conduct a 
stakeholder consultation with the sector. The terms of reference were clear: Shelter wanted 
feedback from its stakeholders, including the defunded peaks, Shelter branch delegates and 
service providers on the strengths of the organisation, policy direction and the development 
of positive relationships. This was also an opportunity for Shelter to provide an overview of 
its new funding arrangement and how these resources would be used to advocate for social 
housing on behalf of the sector.  
.. And we thought that we could be, Queensland Shelter could be, the broad based 
peak providing him advice on consumers wherever they were. That annoyed all of 
our colleagues because we were clearly indicating that we felt that we could be a 
single peak when there had been four organisations representing consumers 
previously (Pisarski 2011 interview by the author). 
Former Shelter staff member Kate Cowmeadow was of the belief that there was a “fairly 
irrational” view across the Queensland housing peaks that if the organisations stood 
together funding agreements for each would stay in place (Cowmeadow 2011 interview by 
the author). Pisarski considered this an incorrect assumption: 
But because I had been through the same scenario in different states with different 
bodies I knew that ministers eventually come to the view of ‘I’m only writing one 
check, you work out who it’s going to or I’ll work out who it’s going to”. So we put our 
hand up and it annoyed everyone else but it was a strategic decision that we had to 
make and our Board supported it. I told all of the other bodies that, that was our 
position … I am still removing the knives from my back as a result. But I think it was 
the right thing to do … (Pisarski 2011 interview by the author). 
Shelter continued to expand its avenues for influence and representational capacity. An 
enhanced branch grant program was established in order to foster work programs within 
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Shelter branches. Shelter was also actively trying to develop relationships with other 
Queensland governmental agencies including the Residential Tenancy Authority, 
Department of Communities and the Urban Land Development Authority – which was 
highlighted as an area of priority for Shelter staff and Board (99 Consulting and Queensland 
Shelter 2008: 7-8).  
Constructively engaged but not captured68 
Following the decision made by Schwarten, Shelter continued to engage constructively with 
the minister’s office and department staff. Schwarten did not necessarily agree with the 
advice provided, but insider status ensured that Shelter had ongoing involvement in policy 
discussion. As Schwarten explained: 
More than often, I’d say mostly, they [departmental staff] had a good relationship with 
Shelter and they’d run it by them before it even got to me. They would say, ‘This is 
what Shelter’s going to do and this is what Shelter thinks’ and I’d get Adrian in and 
we’d argue about it or whatever or agree to it … (Schwarten 2013 interview by the 
author). 
As discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis, Grant (1989) identified the possibility of 
interest group capture, arguing that insider groups may become prisoner groups when the 
pressure group is no longer a critical participant. Captured groups no longer offer alternate 
advice; they cannot be considered influential because they do not voice opinions that are 
not shared or openly espoused by decision makers. Thus the value that the pressure group 
can add to the policy process is minimal because they do not differ in opinion from the 
government on issues. It was clear from my time working within the offices of Shelter, 
observing staff and attending policy meetings, that the organisation was aware of the need 
to remain constructive. As Pisarski wrote in 2003 “Peaks are not arms of government and 
are most effective working in partnerships but with freedom to comment as properly 
recognised independent entities” (Pisarski 2003: 5).  
As discussed in the methodology section of this thesis, I analysed Shelter media releases 
between 2004 and 2009 to determine whether the content was supportive or critical of the 
actions of the Beattie Labor government.  
                                            
68 Handwritten Post-It note on a Queensland’s Shelter staff member’s desk, 31 August 2011 
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Figure 4: Content analysis: Shelter media releases 2004-09 
The results of the content analysis are illustrated in figure 4. After Shelter became the solely 
funded housing policy peak in July 2007, the organisation had the resources to hire a 
Communications Officer and this combined with the extra responsibilities of an umbrella 
peak accounts for the increased number of media releases during this period. Shelter rarely 
criticised the Beattie Government in the media. There were no dramatic changes to their 
modus operandi following the 2007 funding decision by Schwarten. And while there was 
some increase in media releases which offered both praise and critical comment, the low 
level of criticism could be used to suggest that Shelter was captured during this period.  
The interview material collated for this thesis points to a greater complexity, providing a more 
nuanced understanding of the different methods that insider and outsider groups use to 
engage constructively in policy development. As an insider group it is possible to criticise 
the government, but it is more productive to do this using insider tactics. Interview testimony 
supports the argument that Shelter retained its capacity to advocate, avoiding capture. 
Former Director-General of Housing, Natalie McDonald (2004-2009) recalls that while 
decision making power remains with the government, peaks have an important role to play 
in representing the views of their members: 
I certainly never felt at all that, you know, we had Shelter or anyone else in our 
pockets, doing our bidding. I don’t ever recall a time when we ever thought going into 
a meeting with the peaks would be a piece of cake and that we would just steam roller 
over the top of them. I mean we might steamroller over the top of them anyway but it 
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wasn’t for lack of [them] not putting their views forward (McDonald 2013 interview by 
the author). 
While Shelter continued to engage in advocacy, constructively criticising the government 
they did rely heavily on state government funding, bringing into question whether they were 
captured by resources. The charts below provide a snapshot of the financial contributions 
received by Shelter in 1996 and 2006. The proportion of income received by the state 
government was consistent across each of these time periods, as illustrated in figure 5 and 
6.  
 
Figure 5: Annual income received by Queensland Shelter in 199669 
                                            
69 Total income $318,095.77 (June 1996), Source Queensland Shelter annual report 1996. 
Qld Shelter Income Sources 1996
Department of Housing, Local
Government & Planning
BCC
Membership
Rent Received
Conference Fees
Interest
Sundry Income
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Figure 6: Annual income received by Queensland Shelter in 200670 
While interview testimony supports the argument that Shelter retained the capacity to 
advocate on behalf of the sector during this period, the level of income received from the 
government indicates that the organisations depended on government funding.  
During many of the interviews I asked former politicians, senior bureaucrats and other policy 
actors whether the risk of defunding was or should be a consideration by policy advocacy 
peaks when giving advice. None of the interviewees I spoke with thought that the 
relationship between funding and criticism was so direct, although some advocated that 
criticism needed to be framed in a way in which it would be constructive, “You still need to 
criticise but I think in policy terms it is always best to be constructive ... It’s not about 
necessarily keeping your funding safe but it’s about how you responsibly intervene in policy” 
(Morgan-Thomas 2013 interview by the author). Governments will continue funding peak 
policy groups if they are providing useful and productive policy advice. Schwarten was also 
clearly aware of state power with regards to funding and resourcing but also conscious of 
Shelter’s credibility within the community. “That was always in the back of my mind that 
governments can pull the rug from under them. But if it is a fairly well established 
organisation with some credibility in the community, that is hard to do” (Schwarten 2013 
interview by the author). 
A favourable political environment and the development of a productive relationship between 
the Housing Minister and the Executive Officer of Shelter, Adrian Pisarski, contributed to the 
success of the organisation in participating in many aspects of policy development. Shelter 
                                            
70 Total income $457,467.61 (July 2006), Source Queensland Shelter annual report 2006.  
Qld Shelter Income Sources 2006
Department of Housing
Housing Taskforce
Membership
Rent
Conference
Interest
Merchandise
Sundry Income
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was not captured during this period; rather the insider relationship enabled them to engage 
in meaningful and at times critical dialogue with the Minister’s office. While the Minister 
remained in a position of authority, he regularly consulted with Shelter on a range of issues, 
as did bureaucrats within the Housing department. In the same year that Shelter became 
the solely funding social housing umbrella peak, Peter Beattie retired and Anna Bligh 
became the first female Premier of Queensland.  
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Chapter Nine:  
The voice of reason: from inside to outside (2007-12) 
Shelter continued to operate as an insider group during the Bligh era but the extent of its 
participation was impacted by several challenges – access to data, the establishment of a 
super department and the organisation’s expansion into federal politics. The newly elected 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd showed great interest and commitment to housing affordability. 
This led to renewed intent in housing reform, with the implementation of the National Rental 
Affordability Scheme (NRAS). Shelter were involved in this reform as the Executive Officer 
of Queensland Shelter Adrian Pisarski, was also the volunteer Chairperson of National 
Shelter. The lines been Queensland Shelter and National Shelter blurred. The second half 
of this chapter analyses Shelter’s role following the election of the Newman LNP 
Government in 2012. Shelter operated as an outsider group throughout the turmoil and 
uncertainty, which beleaguered many policy advocates after the 2012 election. Senior 
Shelter staff, though not a majority of the Board, remained optimistic about its ability to 
develop a productive relationship with the Newman Government, with repeated affirmation 
within organisational walls that they could provide a ‘voice of reason’ and much needed 
policy advice on social housing issues. As the Newman Government delivered on its 
promise to reduce government spending, both the community sector and the state 
bureaucracy faced upheaval. 
Shelter Vice-Chairperson Peter Spearritt recalled several attempts at accessing 
governmental data and/or employing a statistician. The Housing Department rejected a 
request, by Shelter to develop its own database of housing statistics including measures of 
housing stress stating that the Department would supply such data, as needed. They never 
did (Spearritt 2012 interview by the author). There is some evidence that other areas of the 
Queensland government were aware of the problems and the difficulties experienced by 
non-state actors in accessing data. In 2010 the Queensland Governance Committee, 
established under the goals of the Queensland Compact initiated a project entitled Good 
Practice Guide for Data and Information Sharing (Queensland Government 2010). The aims 
of this guide were to “support improved data and information sharing between the 
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Queensland Government and the Non-profit Community Services Sector” (ProBono News 
2010). This issue remains unresolved for non-state actors, although at the time of writing 
this frustration was overshadowed by the threat of defunding for community and not-for-
profit advocacy organisations.  
Lack of relevant statistics is an issue, not only for developing evidence based policy advice 
but also essential in influencing governments by providing policy advice that is economically 
viable. Despite difficulties in accessing departmental data, Shelter developed and 
maintained constructive relationships with a number of bureaucratic and political actors 
within the Bligh Government: 
We have good access to the Minister’s office ... I talk to the Ministerial advisors on a 
pretty regular basis, whenever there is an issue, you know they will answer the phone, 
or get back to me very quickly ... We now have regular meeting with Treasury officials 
and we have even, about once or twice a year we meet with officials in the Premier’s 
Department as well and a couple of times a year we will meet with people in the 
planning department. So we have a much broader set of relationships now than just 
through a single government department (Pisarski 2011 interview by the author).  
National Shelter 
Pisarski was both the paid Executive Officer of Queensland Shelter and the Chairperson of 
the Executive Committee of National Shelter. For most of this time National Shelter operated 
without any funding from the Commonwealth government, in effect cross subsidised by 
Queensland Shelter. Adrian Pisarski was not the first Queensland Shelter employee to 
simultaneously hold the Chairperson’s role of National Shelter; Eleri Morgan-Thomas also 
held both positions during the 1990s.  
Morgan-Thomas recalls advantages to performing both roles, not least of which the 
opportunity to make some comments through National Shelter that may not have been 
accepted if made by Queensland Shelter: “…as chair of National Shelter … you have the 
capacity to use National Shelter to talk about other things that all the states are doing in a 
way that … took some of the pressure off Queensland Shelter” (Morgan-Thomas 2013 
interview by the author). As National Shelter chairperson, Pisarski successfully developed 
relationships with several federal Labor ministers. This also enabled Pisarski to be a conduit 
of information from the federal to the state arena. Success at this time was not only due to 
Pisarski’s ability to develop relationships but also to the resources afforded to Shelter staff 
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and board members which enabled the capacity to develop policy advice based on 
evidence.  
The federal political environment was also extremely favourable at this time: the newly 
elected Labor Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd (2007-10) was committed to ensuring affordable 
housing. The Rudd government introduced a number of major reforms to housing policy; the 
National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA) replaced the Commonwealth and State 
Housing Agreement (CSHA) and the Supported Accommodation and Assistance Program 
(SAAP). The National Rental Affordability Scheme was implemented in 2008 to address “the 
shortage of affordable rental housing by offering financial incentives to persons or entities 
such as the business sector and community organisations to build and rent dwellings to low 
and moderate income households at a rate that is at least 20 per cent below the market 
value rent” (Australian Government 2014). The aim of the NRAS was to increase the 
numbers of private rental stock by encouraging private investment. Pisarski argues that 
National Shelter was instrumental in policy development during this period:  
The impact of federal policy has been alluded to within many of the policy reforms discussed; 
the imbalance of power between the Australian states and territories continues to grow. The 
power of state based groups to challenge and frame federal policy issues is limited and 
continues to experience constraints as the Commonwealth expands its power over the 
States. In the later period covered by this research, Shelter staff shifted some of the focus 
to policy at the national level. As Linda Apelt explained:  
As a routine matter we would consult with Queensland Shelter on most things ... but 
I wouldn’t say it was, you know, ground shaping or anything because the agenda is 
pretty well set and agreed federally … all states and territories are basically driving it 
at their own pace ... So probably the most influence Adrian [Pisarski] would have 
would be as chair of National Shelter (Apelt 2012 interview by the author). 
A similar sentiment was echoed by Penny Gillespie, who also spoke about the decision 
making authority and power of the Commonwealth and the limitations of a state based peak 
to advocate successfully in this arena (Gillespie 2013 interview by the author). Another 
former Director-General I spoke with, Natalie McDonald, argued that Pisarski was “much 
more interested in high order policy, much more interested in the national scene …” 
(McDonald 2013 interview by the author). Certainly Shelter was aware of the role of the 
Commonwealth and the need to develop relationships within this level of government with 
input into several major Rudd policy initiatives: 
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We have been a part of that equation, because we have helped create the National 
Affordable Housing Agreement, the National Rental Affordability Scheme and the 
stimulus boost from the federal government and that benefits Queensland … 
(Pisarski 2011 interview by the author). 
As described in the opening chapters of this thesis there are inherent difficulties in measuring 
influence. Outsider groups that are using media tactics to pressure the government can offer 
observable conflict in which a clearly stated view is articulated and can be traced forward to 
a decision - although this account of outsider group activity is not without its limitations, 
making the assumption that the pressure group and decision maker are operating within a 
bubble and are not subject to external influences. As groups become closer to decision 
makers, influence in the form of advice or criticism becomes even less visible as ‘pressure’ 
is muted to persuasion. Insider groups are engaged by decision makers in formal and 
informal policy discussion in which they attempt to persuade governments of a course of 
action – often over very long periods of time, as relationships and trust develop. Ministers 
have a number of sources, advisors, senior bureaucrats, universities and peaks that offer 
advice and posit a view. Ministers are constrained by the political view of their party, the 
government of the day at a state and federal level and have a duty to represent their 
electorate. Without a close relationship to government, an advocacy group will have much 
less opportunity to participate in policy discussion, but influence within these discussions is 
difficult to measure given the multiple sources of advice received – some of which is likely 
to be the same or very similar.   
Super department  
Premier Anna Bligh appointed Karen Struthers as Minister for Community Services and 
Housing and Minister for Women following the retirement of Robert Schwarten, who did not 
contest the seat of Rockhampton in the 2009 election. Peter Spearritt observed that while 
Struthers had a clear understanding of community sector issues, she did not have the same 
political clout as former Housing and Public Works Minister Robert Schwarten:  
Struthers we found in one sense easier to relate to but it was also quite obvious that 
she didn’t have anywhere near the authority that Schwarten had [within her 
department] and political manoeuvre. Schwarten has a personality and was a bit 
more of a force to be reckoned with ... (Spearritt 2012 interview by the author).  
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According to Spearritt placement and seniority of the housing portfolio impacts on the 
framing of policy solutions and problems and the power of the minister: 
Schwarten also had a lot of power because he was also Minister for Public Works 
and really had a close interest in big budget projects and knew about big budget 
projects and what sites the government owned and what they didn’t (Spearritt 2012 
interview by the author).  
Following the 2009 election Bligh restructured the former 23 state departments into 13 
departments. The [Super] Department of Communities now included Community Services, 
Housing, Local Government, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Partnerships, Disability 
Services and Multicultural Affairs and Child Safety and Sport. It was the aim of the Bligh 
Government to improve efficiencies and break down the silos that existed in government in 
order to promote coordination across portfolios. The new structure, however, created 
challenges for Shelter in terms of communication and ensuring housing issues remained on 
the political agenda of the government of the day.  
Communicating with decision makers was complicated, as explained by former Queensland 
Shelter senior policy officer Noelle Hudson: 
One of the things we found with the mega department was that everything took two 
to five times as long ... Previously we would have gone to Penny Gillespie [senior 
public servant] who then would have spoken to the DG and then it would have gone 
to the ears of the Minister and there was not a lot of interference in between. When it 
became the mega department there was a layer on top of that, there was a layer in 
between ... the Executive Officer, to the Deputy Director-General, to the Director-
General, then to the Minister, but at that point in time the Director-General actually 
had three to four Ministers so that made it even more complex and we were shunted 
to the side (Hudson 2013 interview by the author). 
There was also the problem of ensuring the prioritisation of housing affordability, which was 
lost among competing issues and demands made to the Department of Communities: 
Housing was not a squeaky wheel. Extreme need in disability and child safety 
completely monopolised the Minister’s time and homelessness was in there as well. 
Housing was a quite a well-run outfit, it had all of its ducks in a row, I mean with its 
flaws but still when it came to it ... I had a Regional Director say to me at the time I 
would love to be able to spend more time with housing but my day is taken up from 
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7.00 in the morning to 7.00 at night with disability and with child safety ... (Hudson 
2013 interview by the author). 
In 2010 the Communities Department’s Policy and Performance unit asked Shelter to 
consult with the sector with the aim of creating “a vision of what the housing assistance 
sector should look like in Queensland to achieve the best housing outcomes for people who 
need assistance and the policy development and changes that would be necessary to 
achieve that ...” (Queensland Shelter circa 2010). Members of the Shelter policy team 
conducted a literature review and established a research plan. Shelter Delegates were 
consulted on the scope of the project, the membership for the reference group and the 
overall project plan (Queensland Shelter circa 2010). To ensure regional representation 
Shelter organised a series of forums in Townsville, Gladstone, Toowoomba, Roma and 
Brisbane.  
One of the key benefits of enabling a peak advocacy group to consult the sector is that 
Shelter members are often delivering services and see first-hand the issues that are 
currently facing social housing providers. Former Director-General of Housing Natalie 
McDonald explains how the peaks were also vital in gaining a different perceptive to that of 
the department: 
Not everybody will tell the department because the department is ultimately the 
decision maker in things so if someone’s got a dissenting view or an alternate view 
then they may or may not want to air that with the person that is their landlord … and 
might choose not to engage or raise issues or explore issues in a way that they might 
feel could threaten them. And I don’t think there was ever any evidence, that I saw in 
the time that I was there, that the Department would take action in that regard, but 
it’s a perception issue … (McDonald 2013 interview by the author). 
Shelter presented the Department with the Shape of Housing Assistance in Queensland 
(SHAQ) report. The SHAQ report made a number of recommendations to the Bligh 
Government, based on Shelter’s research and engagement with the social housing sector, 
but in this chapter I focus on recommendations made regarding growth and supply of social 
housing stock. In this regard the report recommended that the Department of Communities 
(Housing & Homelessness): 
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Transfer 25% of stock with title to community housing providers. This should be 
required to be leveraged up to 20% to allow the recipient organisation’s to grow their 
portfolio tied to the provision of affordable housing. 
Facilitate and provide access to equity, land and capital funding. Potential ideas for 
this may include a central fund that people could access, being offered no or low 
interest loans and /or state owned land. 
Broaden the range of housing products on offer this may include investigating home 
ownership pathways and shared equity schemes; additional subsidies being paid to 
housing providers to allow people to rent at 50% of market rent, and investigate other 
housing models that would suit other demographic groups who do not participate in 
the system fully, for example, young people (Queensland Shelter 2011b: 15). 
Hudson states that the issue of stock transfer (recommended within the report) had the most 
impact on decision makers: “I think definitely the appetite for stock transfer has changed” 
(Hudson 2013 interview by the author). As Shelter was not the only voice contemplating the 
pros and cons of stock transfer, it is difficult to determine whether the favourable shift 
towards stock transfer was solely due to policy advice from Shelter. The United Kingdom 
had begun its stock transfer program twenty years prior, reflecting a rapid growth in housing 
co-operatives in the UK, and the Australian federal government had long been making noise 
about this direction. As Hudson iterated:  
We have seen within certain approaches … bits happen and you think that looks very 
familiar or at least it’s in line – it’s not so far out of line of what we’ve asked ... Whether 
or not it’s from us … because at the same time that we’ve been pushing for this [stock 
transfer] the COAG has been pushing for it as well ... (Hudson 2013 interview by the 
author). 
While it is impossible to assign influence to one particular policy actor at the exclusion of 
others, Shelter was engaged by the key department officials and participated in policy 
discussion and development during this period. Shelter Operations Manager Kate 
Cowmeadow explained that while earlier meetings with the department “were very much 
about ... fulfilling our agreed work plan ... it’s much more now about them assisting us ...” 
(Cowmeadow 2011 interview by the author) Pisarski follows on by summing up the evolution 
of the relationship between Shelter and housing policy decision makers: 
… I think we have gone from a place where we might have made suggestions to 
government or demands on government about what they do, which they didn’t 
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respond to or responded to generally negatively and thanked us politely for our advice 
but they weren’t going to accept it … To the point now where it’s actually a genuine 
conversation about where are we going and how is the best way to get there (Pisarski 
2011 interview by the author). 
Linda Apelt took a less sanguine view of the role of Shelter during this period, arguing that 
the super departmental structure made it much more difficult for Shelter to access decision 
makers: 
In recent times I haven’t noticed Shelter as being anyway near as active as it was in 
the days of Roksana Khan. I think it has become a bit more of a comfortable 
bureaucracy, if you like and I don’t know what its role is these days … Part of my 
perspective is probably coloured by the fact that in the early days when I had a smaller 
realm of responsibility I was much closer and more actively engaged with bodies like 
Shelter. As time has gone by and bureaucracies have got bigger and housing has 
been part of a bigger amalgam of arrangements, it has probably become harder for 
these bodies to really influence right at the top (Apelt 2012 interview with the author). 
In addition to the issues associated with the super department, Apelt also suggested 
Shelter’s mandate became less clear following the decision to elevate Shelter to the policy 
peak. The emergence of large social housing companies following the success of the 
Brisbane Housing Company impacted on Apelt’s view of Shelter. As Apelt argues: 
And also when you get organisations like Brisbane Housing Company and all these 
housing companies around the place - Why do they need a Shelter? … Because 
they’ve got expert boards of lawyers, accountants … you name it, sitting on their 
boards … So does Shelter represent the interests of the tenants? Or does it represent 
the interests of the providers? And I think that got a bit lost with that amalgamation 
process, their mandate has become a bit confusing (Apelt 2012 interview with the 
author). 
Changing of the guard: the Newman Government 
By mid-2011 the public was losing confidence in the Bligh Labor government; popular 
perception was that Bligh had back flipped on the previous election promise regarding asset 
sales and this continued to damage the government’s standing (Wardill 2011). A massive 
health payroll computer glitch also undermined its credibility (Bligh 2015). Although Bligh 
had performed well in the crisis of the January 2011 Queensland floods, the Brisbane Lord 
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Mayor Campbell Newman was also highly regarded by the public for the way in which he 
and the Brisbane City Council handled the crisis.  
In an unusual political move Newman resigned as Lord Mayor in April 2011, signalling his 
intention to run for the seat of Ashgrove in the 2012 state election. Even before the state 
election, Newman was installed as the leader of the impressively united LNP team. Newman 
won his seat and the LNP were elected by an unprecedented majority on 24 March 2012, 
crucially leaving only a handful of Labor members with which to form the Opposition.71 The 
issue of state debt and controversial asset sales had crippled the Bligh Government in the 
election lead up. The Newman Government sent a clear message that they would be 
significantly reducing state expenditure, in the campaign period and after they were elected.  
Some measures saved little but spoke volumes about the newly elected government’s 
priorities, such as the abolishment of the Queensland Literary awards. This saved the 
Newman Government only $244,475 (Hurst 2012a) but conveyed the message that funding 
for the Arts was not a priority. Campbell Newman cleverly responded to the criticism by 
banning state departments and statutory bodies from buying corporate boxes at sporting 
venues (Wardill 2012). The saving from this directive was not made public. These early 
austerity measures signified the Newman Government’s commitment to the reduction of 
state debt and contributed to an environment of insecurity regarding the continuity of current 
government programs. The need for fiscal cutbacks was legitimised by the Queensland 
Commission of Audit interim report which forecasted a state deficit of almost five billion 
dollars by 2013 (Queensland Government 2012).  
In June 2012 Campbell Newman announced that Queensland had twenty thousand more 
public servants than it could afford. The state budget, handed down in September directed 
that around fourteen thousand public service jobs were to be cut. Public criticism of these 
job cuts played out in social media with several Facebook groups devoted to criticising the 
Newman Government including: Campbell Newman Shame Files72, Keep Campbell to 
Account73, Keep Queensland Public Service Jobs74, Campbell Newman Support Rural, 
Campbell We Do Care75 (regarding same sex marriage) and Friends Don’t Let Friends Vote 
                                            
71 LNP - 78 seats, Labor - 7 seats, Katter’s Australia Party - 2 seats, Independents - 2 seats 
72 3584 likes (as at 19 November 2013) 
73 6626 likes(as at 19 November 2013) 
74 1745 likes (as at 19 November 2013) 
75 401 likes (as at 19 November 2013) 
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for Campbell Newman.76 Keep Campbell to Account was by far the most popular, but 
numbers were still low, with a little over six and half thousand ‘likes.’ Membership of these 
Facebook sites was smaller than the turn out for street marching, which has the benefit of 
providing an emotional and political outlet. At one of the largest events held on 12 September 
2012 an estimated eight thousand people protested outside the Queensland parliament 
house against the job cuts (Guest 2012). 
Gag orders: funding outcomes not advocacy 
The Newman Government defunded some community organisations involved in advocacy 
almost immediately. In May of 2012, the Queensland Association for Healthy Communities 
(QAHC) lost just over two and a half million dollars in state funding, which amounted to three 
quarters of their total budget (Hurst 2012b). The focus of QAHC was to prevent HIV/AIDS 
through education and provide support for members of the gay and lesbian community. 
Health Minister Lawrence Springborg defended this decision by stating, “the organisation 
had lost its way” (Springborg cited by Hurst 2012b). Springborg disapproved of the advocacy 
work undertaken by QAHC and according to journalist Sharona Coutts: 
… slammed the group for engaging in advocacy, citing lobbying they'd done relating 
to the age of consent for homosexual intercourse. The group had advocated for the 
legal age to be brought down from 18 to 16, in line with the law governing 
heterosexual sex in that state (Coutts 2012). 
This example generated commentary and fear from the broader social services sector on 
the perceived value that the Newman Government placed on policy participation from 
advocacy groups. In August 2012 alarm in the social sector increased when the Newman 
Government released a new template for agreements between the Department of Health 
and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). The new agreement featured several clauses 
which prevented government funded NGOs in the health sector from engaging in advocacy, 
let alone explicit criticism. Clause 4.3 of the agreement stated that: 
Where the organisation receives 50% or more of its total funding from Queensland 
Health and other Queensland Government agencies, the organisation must not 
advocate for State or Federal legislative change. The organisation must also not 
                                            
76 1182 likes (at as 19 November 2013) 
 181 
 
include links on their website to other organisation’s websites that advocate for State 
or Federal legislative change. (Queensland Government circa 2013: 8)  
A spokesperson for the Department of Health was reported by the Queensland media as 
saying, “We want to fund outcomes. The dollars that are going into health are there to 
provide health outcomes. If we were there to fund political campaigning we wouldn’t be the 
health department” (Health spokesperson cited in Hurst 2012b). Shortly after the 
introduction of ‘gag orders’ in the health sector, the Newman Government also scrapped the 
Tenant Advice and Advocacy Service provided through the Tenants’ Union of Queensland. 
Twenty three offices of this service, positioned around the state, had received notice that 
the program had only three months of funding left and after this time would be abolished. 
Around eighty-thousand tenants had accessed the service in the previous year, at a cost of 
six million dollars. Funding for the program was provided by the interest collected by the 
Rental Tenancies Authority,77 a statutory authority which until the election of Newman had 
displayed considerable autonomy (Carr cited in Coutts 2012). The service was temporarily 
rescued by the federal Gillard government which provided funding for the state service until 
the 31 December 2013.  
Flegg Ministry 
In the early months of the Newman Government, the issue of public housing was high on 
the government’s agenda. Campbell Newman appointed Dr Bruce Flegg78 as Minister for 
Housing who promptly began announcing some overarching austerity measures: 
Under-utilisation of current property, waiting lists, amenity, deficits of income over 
cost, sharing, rent policy, fixed term tenancies, maintenance cost, leveraging assets, 
using the not for profit sector and caravan park ownership were all in the news 
(Pisarski 2012).  
Underutilisation of public housing gained traction in the media, as the Newman Government 
announced several measures to deal with this issue. Population shifts and generational 
change meant that a number of public dwellings housed one or two people. These people 
were living in homes which could accommodate much larger families. The government 
estimated that there were thirty thousand Queenslanders on the waiting list for public 
                                            
77 Previously known as the Rental Bond Authority, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
78 Minister for Housing and Public Works from 3 April 2012 to 14 November 2012. 
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housing and eighty per cent of these were single people with children (Flegg 2012). The 
problem was framed by the government as an issue of inequality: “We estimate there are 
more than 8,700 public housing properties that have two or more additional bedrooms than 
needed by the occupants” (Flegg 2012).  
On the 13th June 2012, Queensland Minister for Housing and Public Works, Bruce Flegg 
announced major reforms to the social housing sector to circumvent the projected one 
hundred and forty million dollar deficit by 2015-16 (Flegg 2012). The reforms included: 
 addressing under-occupancy of current housing stock  
 changing and simplifying rent policy  
 reducing administrative and maintenance costs  
 introducing fixed-term tenancies  
 leveraging the asset base  
 creating a stronger role for non-government housing providers.  
(Flegg 2012) 
For the most part these were not radical reforms, most were a continuation of processes or 
ideas from previous Queensland governments. Although the ‘introduction’ of fixed termed 
tenancies caused some unrest among social housing residents and advocates, this idea 
had been touted by the previous Labor government.  
Some proposals to deal with under-occupancy did have the makings of more radical change, 
for example encouraging public housing tenants from different households to share houses 
or apartments, but these were soon watered down. While there was some media backlash 
and advocacy campaigning the real nail in the coffin of these plans was administrative 
incapacity in the face of the difficulties of regulating the proposed change. While the Flegg 
Housing Ministry maintained that “It makes no sense for a single person to live in a two or 
three bedroom house that would be more suitable for a single parent with a child or a family 
of four” (Flegg 2012), another issue caused by spare bedrooms in public dwellings was that 
of the undeclared sub tenant in social housing. Social housing rents are charged per person, 
at a rate of twenty-five per cent of each person’s income; therefore undeclared tenants do 
not pay rent to the government, in effect giving the sitting tenant a source of extra income. 
The Housing Department announced an amnesty period for public housing tenants to 
declare any persons currently living with them. At the end of the amnesty period the 
government declared it would be reviewing all tenancies with the overall goal to “better 
match people with properties suited to their needs, and redeveloping ageing multi-bedroom 
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stock to provide higher density, mixed-tenant solutions” (Flegg 2012). Those who had failed 
to declare additional people living in the household risked “not being considered when the 
department reviews under-occupancy, or any transfer to a smaller property” or having to 
“pay back rent at 25 per cent of their household income”. It remained unclear as to how the 
government proposed calculating the amount of back rent to pay. 
 
Illustration 12: Excerpt: letter to Queensland public housing tenants 
Source: Flegg 2012 (underline added by anonymous letter recipient). 
The letter and the proposed reforms generated much media attention. While the government 
made efforts to reassure public housing tenants that their tenure with the department was 
secure the issue of under occupancy was a ‘sensitive’ one. The media began reporting that 
the government was considering forcing people to share housing:  
The Durack tenant, who did not wish to be named, said she feared the consequences 
of allowing a "total stranger" into her three-bedroom home, where she had lived for 
almost 40 years and raised four sons as a single mother (Helbig 2012b). 
The Tenants’ Union of Queensland was restrained in criticising the proposals but used the 
media to illustrate to the government some of the issues of the proposed reforms: 
They are saying things like they don't understand why the government is treating 
them like this when they've been good tenants, looked after their properties and often 
upgraded them, Ms Carr said. There are people who think they're imminently going 
to be moved. (Penny Carr [TUQ State Wide Coordinator] cited by Fleet 2012).  
Shelter was deliberately restrained in its criticisms, issuing a media response which 
supported aspects of the reform, “State housing peak, Shelter, welcomes the move by the 
State Government to address the social housing crisis” (Queensland Shelter 2012), while 
also hinting at the impact of these proposals, “Addressing under occupancy is not as simple 
as moving under occupiers out of existing properties - part of the solution is growing the 
amount of social housing.” And “We have a historic mismatch of dwellings compared with 
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current applicants, so we need a strategy to develop more appropriately sized stock”. Shelter 
made it clear that they were available to provide advice: “We are pleased that the state 
government is looking for ways to better match people with properties suited to their needs, 
and look forward to providing advice on the range of options” (Queensland Shelter 2012).  
The media comments made by Shelter on the Flegg housing department’s proposals, 
generated criticism from members of the social housing sector. As Eastgate explained not 
all members of the social housing sector agreed with the strategies of Shelter:  
You read his [Pisarski’s] press releases in early days of the Newman Government 
and the way he would say ‘You know we welcome this, we are concerned about this 
but we are really glad that they are trying to solve the problem.’ And you could see 
that he was walking the tightrope between not wanting to put them right off side and 
not wanting to just say, ‘everything you do is wonderful.’ But a lot of people in the 
sector I think, just read the praise and didn’t even notice the criticism (Eastgate 
2013 interview by the author). 
Shelter acknowledged the achievements of both the government and not-for-profit sector in 
developing mixed tenure solutions. During this period Shelter capitalised on the media 
interest in housing issues, regularly providing comment to newspapers, and on radio and 
television concerning the dire situation of housing affordability, both nationally and in 
Queensland. At one point Pisarski claimed that one couple he knew of were forced to rent 
a chook house, stating: “It was in a mining region where there was really nothing to rent and 
they were low income folks and that was about the only thing they could find ... '' (Pisarski 
cited in Conyers 2012). While Shelter argued that supply was the root of the problem of the 
lack of affordable housing, the Tenants’ Union of Queensland warned that the market did 
nothing to protect low income earners, many of whom were “too scared to ‘rock the boat’ for 
fear of retribution from landlords” (Conyers 2012).  
Not all commentary supported the plight of housing tenants. One media outlet reported on 
the instances of public housing tenants leaving their homes vacant while they went on 
overseas holidays (Gills 2012) with the inference that this was somehow an abuse of the 
public housing system. Minister Flegg also made clear of his awareness that there were 
occurrences where public housing tenants were renting out rooms to mining workers (Hurst 
2012) - with the implication that these mining workers could well afford to rent privately in 
addition to the issues associated with undeclared tenants, as described in the above 
paragraphs.  
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Despite all the talk in the media about the lack of affordable housing and the problems faced 
by citizens in finding a home, the Newman Government chose to announce a crackdown on 
‘bad tenants’ always an easy target for a government that wanted to reassure its supporters 
that their taxes are not being wasted. On 30 May 2012 the Newman Government released 
data claiming that the government was losing one million dollars a fortnight on the state’s 
social housing system. Minister Bruce Flegg began tightening the tenancy agreements. “The 
leases are likely to be one, three or five years in duration, depending on people's 
circumstances would also be tied to good behaviour and on-time rent payments, giving the 
Government more power to act against bad tenants” (Helbig 2012a).  
After media speculation and several weeks of general unease within the public housing 
community Flegg consulted directly with public housing tenants regarding the issue of 
underutilisation. On Flegg’s behalf department staff surveyed tenants. Tenants were asked 
to preference several options: move to a smaller dwelling, pay more rent or share their 
dwelling with another public housing tenant. Around twenty per cent of the 54 263 public 
tenants surveyed responded to the survey (Hurst 2012). Results of this consultation 
demonstrate that the first preference by tenants was to move to a smaller dwelling “(62 per 
cent)” and the second preference was to pay more rent “(30 per cent)” (Hurst 2012c). Flegg 
acknowledged that the third option of sharing “was not popular with respondents and will be 
considered only if directly requested by tenants” (Flegg 2012a). Over 60 per cent of 
respondents stated that sharing was their least favourite option (Hurst 2012c). In September 
2012 Flegg reported on the results of the amnesty period for public housing tenants: 2 300 
households had taken advantage of the amnesty (Flegg 2012a) ensuring that “The 
appropriate rent can now be collected” (Flegg 2012b). 
This proved a short-lived ‘success’ for Flegg: on 14 November 2012 he resigned as Minister 
for Housing, stepping down to the backbench following weeks of media speculation 
regarding allegations of misconduct. Flegg’s media advisor Graeme Hallett had made 
several allegations to the press regarding contact between Flegg and his son, Jonathon 
Flegg, who worked for professional lobbying company, Rowland Pty Ltd. State legislation 
requires Ministers to record all meetings and dealings with lobbyists and Hallett alleged that 
Flegg’s records were incomplete. 
The actual lobbyist register document that was tabled when asked for by members 
of the opposition is in fact grossly inaccurate, misleading and fails to indicate a 
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number of events, if you like, or contacts, or indeed, as the Premier says, recording 
all encounters (Hallett cited in Hurst 2012d) 
Queensland Shelter had little time to develop a relationship with Flegg before his resignation 
and the appointment of Tim Mander as Public Works and Housing Minister in November 
2012. Mander came to politics with a diverse career background. Prior to his political career 
he was the CEO of the Queensland Scripture Union, a National Rugby League referee and 
Australian Postal worker. Shelter staff remained optimistic in their capacity to provide advice 
and represent the social housing sector. Despite funding cuts to other community 
organisations and Shelter’s current position as an outsider group, the organisation retained 
state government funding. Pisarski was clear in his vision of Shelter’s continued role in 
working with government: 
The funded role of a peak can never be taken for granted and we work hard at 
bringing a considered picture whilst reflecting the diversity of opinion contributing to 
our views ... We try hard to balance the views of tenants, both in affordable housing 
and those who too often don’t enjoy affordability or quality, the viability of systems 
and providers, the scale of the issues, how markets and systems are or need to be 
affected, the individual outcomes for people and the general outcome of the people. 
I believe our real work is thinking, not just recording and reflecting (Pisarski 2012: 5). 
Shelter quickly found themselves on the outside after the change of government. A change 
in government is a catalyst for status change, as groups need to affirm and/or develop 
connections with incoming governments. At this time the state bureaucracy may not be as 
helpful or as willing to include a formerly accepted group, as departments are impacted by 
portfolio reshuffling and recruitment adjustments. There is an emerging pattern in relation to 
party politics and Shelter’s categorisation.  
Table 9: Shelter status in relation to political party in power 
Categorisation 
of Shelter 
Outsider 
(1987-1989) 
Insider 
(1989-1996) 
Peripheral insider 
(1996-1998) 
Insider 
(1998- 2012) 
Outsider 
(2012) 
Party in Power National 
Party 
Australian 
Labor Party 
 
National Party 
 
Australian 
Labor Party 
 
Liberal National Party 
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Eastgate puts this down to ideological considerations: 
It is very easy in those early days to kind of misstep ... A conservative government 
will look at a social organisation like Shelter and will automatically assume, probably 
correctly, that it is more inclined to the Labor side of politics even through it is not 
politically aligned and so they will be distrustful. Shelter had a very close relationship 
with the Labor government which they worked hard to build up and that had the 
potential to back fire. It didn’t as it turned out, because they were able to get in very 
early and demonstrate to the new guys [Newman Government] that they weren’t 
going to be partisan (Eastgate 2013 interview by the author). 
Eastgate suggests that distrust by conservative governments can be overcome and it is 
possible that if the Borbidge government had not been so short-lived Shelter might have 
achieved an insider relationship with the Watson Ministry. It is difficult to make any concrete 
assertions based on the time period – in the 25 year period covered in this thesis the 
conservative government held power for only six of these years. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to the limited body of research into the study of Australian interest 
groups, analysing changes between Queensland Shelter and successive Queensland 
governments over a twenty-five year period (1987-2012). A theoretical contribution is made 
by revising Wyn Grant’s insider typology (1989) in light of the governance shift. In this 
concluding chapter I demonstrate the usefulness of the revised insider typology in 
understanding the changing relationship between Shelter and the housing ministry of the 
day. The research illustrates how the organisation’s participation in the development of 
policy has varied despite the continuation of funding by successive state housing ministries 
since the early 1990s. At times Shelter has worked as an insider, at others it has been shut 
out of any prospect of influencing government policy.  
Consultation by the Queensland government has become routine. Consultative processes 
are used by governments to gather information and knowledge, seek evidence for change 
or stability and/or to deflect anticipated criticism. Groups that work as insiders contribute 
across many stages of policy development, informing the reform, implementation and 
evaluation of public policy. In contrast those who work on the outside or on the periphery 
have a much more limited role in policy development. While the views of these groups may 
be used to legitimise government decision making, they are less likely to participate in all 
stages of policy development.  
Over the last four decades the identity, structure and purpose of interest groups in 
Queensland has shifted. Adversarial relationships characterised by public protest and 
pressure for change, have often been replaced by public consultation, policy networks and 
requests for comment on government- proposed policy reform. ‘Pressure group’ has largely 
faded from the vernacular, replaced with the more benign ‘interest group’ as governments 
have become more inclusive. An appetite for evidence-based policy has contributed to the 
inclusion of non-state actors in policy discussion, as has the increasing reliance on the 
community sector to deliver social goods and services, albeit often with state or federal 
government funding.  
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Shelter’s role in public policy development has fluctuated over its history. This research has 
demonstrated that this role can be better understood by examining the relationship between 
Shelter and the housing ministry of the day. These historical changes are summarised in the 
table below:  
Table 10: Queensland Shelter activity in Queensland (1980s-2000s) 
Queensland 
Era  
Engagement Strategy 
(encouraged by 
Queensland state 
government) 
Government support for 
Queensland Shelter 
Characteristic of Shelter 
activity within this period 
1980s Lobbying, with increasing 
sophistication, some 
advocacy 
Ad hoc – limited grant 
funding, if any. Often funds 
primarily sourced from group 
membership. 
Grass roots: 
local/community based 
 
1990s Advocacy Contract funding Expansion, sector 
representation 
strengthened 
2000s Working in partnership; the 
Board becomes more 
conventionally stakeholder 
driven 
Development of Shelter as a 
peak, increased government 
funding 
Peak organisations, with 
gradually weakened links to 
membership base 
 
In Grant’s typology an insider group is one which has access to government. The typology 
is inadequate in light of the governance shift because interest groups can readily involve 
themselves in public consultation: access to government is now more open than during the 
era in which the typology was developed. In the revised typology put forth in this thesis, 
insider (or outsider) status is derived from examining participation across the stages of policy 
development – rather than simply a reflection of access to decision makers. An organisation 
that participates in most stages of policy development is an insider, while those that are 
involved in routine consultations are peripheral insiders. Outsiders are those groups that 
work from outside of the process, relying on outsider strategies, including media campaigns 
and public protests. Table 11 illustrates the synthesis of the key literature reviewed for this 
research: Grant’s typology (1989), stages of policy development (Althaus, Bridgman and 
Davis 2007) and levels of engagement (Queensland Government 2011a). The revised 
typology provides a framework for analysing participation in the stages of policy 
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development and therefore categorising the relationship between the Housing Ministry and 
Shelter.  
Table 11: Revised interest group typology 
Stages of policy 
development79 
Revised interest group typology80 
Protest level 
(outsider) 
Consultation level 
(peripheral insider) 
Relational level 
(insider or ‘prisoner’) 
Decision making level 
Identifying issues     
Consultation     
Policy 
instruments     
Policy analysis     
Implementation     
Evaluation     
Decision     
Coordination     
M
o
d
e
 o
f 
E
n
g
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
Informed 
 Consulted 
  Participate 
Mode of engagement81 
 
There is an assumption that groups at the relational level (insiders) have increased capacity 
to influence policy direction. This is because they are involved in policy discussion 
throughout many of the stages of policy development. These groups may also be asked to 
perform evaluations, assist in implementation and consult with stakeholders. ‘Prisoner’ 
groups may also be engaged to work across many stages of the policy development 
process, but their capacity to influence is curtailed because they are captured. ‘Captured’ 
groups are rarely able to provide critical advice, unless a government is under siege and 
feels obliged to respond to an issue or placate an angry public. Captured groups are 
constrained by resource dependency in combination with political will, and in addition 
because their ideas and the government of the day become too akin. I now outline how the 
revised typology was used to further an understanding of the role of Shelter in the 
development of housing policy in Queensland.  
Outsider 
Having established that Grant’s original typology is inadequate to describe interest group 
activity, following the governance shift, I note here that Queensland Shelter was established 
                                            
79 (Original source: Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2007).   
80 (Original source: Grant 1989)  
81 (Original source: Queensland Government 2011a) 
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during a time in which access to the Queensland government was highly restricted. Grant’s 
typology is adequate for categorising Shelter as an outsider group in the early years of its 
establishment (1987-1989). My revised typology, however, also works to categorise Shelter 
as an outsider.  
Without access or acceptance by decision makers, Shelter was shut out of political 
discussion and resorted to using outsider strategies – contacting the media and publicly 
campaigning for change. A campaign led by the Tenants’ Union of Queensland with support 
from Shelter placed pressure on the Queensland government to establish the Rental Bond 
Authority, which eventually opened its doors in 1989. It is not clear from the research 
whether the Government choose to establish such an authority because of the pressure 
from the campaign or whether this was a belated catch up due to the establishment of bond 
authorities in other states. More important, in terms of the impact of outsider strategies 
employed by Shelter during this period, is the successful campaign which demanded the 
inclusion of a tenants’ spokesperson on the inaugural board of the Rental Bond Authority. 
Interview testimony, however, collated as part of this research indicates that the capacity to 
influence on the board was limited. Had Shelter been an insider group at this time, it is 
hypothesised that the impact on the Board would have been greater, owing to a legitimate 
working relationship with the government of the day.  
Peripheral insider  
Following the election of the Goss Labor Government, policy making in Queensland became 
much more open to non-state actors. The Goss government had a willingness to include 
community organisations – both an ideological preference and because of a genuine need 
for policy advice. Shelter became an insider group. Pre-existing connections between 
Shelter and members of the Labor Party while they were in Opposition contributed to the 
inclusion of Shelter in policy discussion, as did the view that Shelter was a legitimate source 
of policy advice. In 1991, the capacity of Shelter to provide advice was strengthened by the 
Goss Government which provided funding to Shelter for two full-time workers as well as 
money to run the first state-wide Shelter conference.  
While Shelter is categorised as an insider group during the Goss era (1989-96), a number 
of factors impacted on the opportunity for Shelter to work across the stages of policy 
development. Shelter energies were stretched between establishing an organisation which 
would enable representation of regional Queensland, creating a policy platform and 
responding to the demands of the Goss Government, which initially pursued policy advice 
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on a range of issues. During this period, Minister for Housing, Tom Burns, sought out 
Shelter, either visiting Shelter meetings himself or instructing senior public servants to attend 
meetings to gain insight into social housing issues. Despite receiving funding from the 
government, Shelter was under-resourced and the increased demand for policy advice from 
elected housing officials placed pressure on the organisation as it continued to develop. 
While Minister Burns was open to working with Shelter there was an uneasy relationship 
between Shelter and the bureaucracy during the Goss era. A limitation of the revised 
typology and its use in this thesis research is that it does not take into account relationships 
with other stakeholders. The use of the revised typology to understand the relationship 
between the Ministry and Shelter, enables an examination of the role that Burns (and his 
Labor Party successor Terry Mackenroth) expected Shelter to play in the development of 
public policy. This study concentrated on this relationship, however the broader political 
context such as the tension between Shelter and the housing bureaucracy, which was noted 
at this time, is an important factor in Shelter’s capacity to participate in the development of 
policy. The narrative method of inquiry used within this research was useful in exploring the 
wider context.    
In 1996 there was an unexpected return to conservative government in Queensland. Shelter 
shifted to a peripheral insider, consulted and informed but no longer actively participating in 
policy. The Borbidge government (1996-98) remained prepared to listen to non-state 
organisations. An example of this commitment was the Priority Housing Committee, 
appointed by the housing minister, David Watson as an attempt to gain a broader 
understanding into the issues of homelessness by including non-state policy practitioners 
on the committee. Shelter was not a member of this committee, perhaps because it was 
thought to be too closely aligned to the Labor Party.  
Although Shelter is categorised as a peripheral insider during this period, it continued to 
receive funding, at a slight increase compared with the former government. Both 
Queensland Housing Ministers of this era, Ray Connor and later David Watson, were open 
to hearing Shelter’s views on issues but beyond these somewhat routine and tokenistic 
meetings, Shelter participation was minimal. This is not to suggest that Shelter was inactive 
during this period, as former Shelter Coordinator, Roksana Khan explained during her 
interview for this research, this period was used to develop Shelter’s policy platform (Khan 
2013 interview by author). 
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Insider group 
The Australian Labor Party returned to power in Queensland in 1998, led by Peter Beattie 
and after he retired from politics, Anna Bligh. Shelter operated as an insider during both the 
Beattie and Bligh eras – engaged by both political and bureaucratic actors within the state 
housing ministry to provide advice on most stages of social housing policy development. As 
former housing minister, Robert Schwarten, stated in his interview for this research, “I sort 
of wouldn’t get down a path to make up my mind mostly without talking to Shelter first” 
(Shelter 2013 interview by the author).  
While the revised typology proposed in this thesis provides a framework for examining the 
relationship between Shelter and the housing ministry, it does not offer any explanation as 
to why Shelter was able to operate as an insider. Three themes emerged during this 
research in relation to government acceptance: willingness of the state housing ministry to 
engage with Shelter, organisational capacity of the organisation to offer advice and the 
broader political context. 
Non-state actors are able to participate in policy networks when they have the necessary 
resources. It is therefore argued that governments are willing to work with non-state actors 
on policy when those actors have the capacity to bring something to the table, as Rhodes 
(1997) writes, “Each deploys its resources, whether constitutional-legal, organizational (sic), 
financial, political or informational, to maximize influence over outcomes, while trying to 
avoid becoming dependent on the other ‘players’” (Rhodes 1997: 37). 
There are challenges in applying this line of thinking to the community sector (Rhodes 1997). 
While big business and other professional groups may have the means to develop the 
capacity to participate in decision making independent of government, many organisations 
in the community sector depend on government for their core funding. Without some 
acceptance by government, funding is unlikely, yet funding enables groups to develop many 
of the resources required for acceptance (and increases their chances of additional funding). 
This creates a circle of dependence, testing the ability of such organisations to openly 
disagree with government policy.  
Government rhetoric suggests that modern governments are willing to consult widely, yet 
some groups are privileged over others, provided funding to consult, advocate and engage 
in research. Traditionally, Australian governments funded social peaks to represent the 
views of minorities but representation alone is no longer enough to justify state funding; 
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modern peaks must also provide policy solutions which are based on a sophisticated 
understanding of the issues. In order to receive funding and acceptance by the government 
an interest group must be able to demonstrate its worth, by offering well considered policy 
advice. Developing sophisticated policy solutions requires monetary resources, which 
Shelter invariably sourced from government. Social advocacy groups face an issue when it 
comes to resourcing. While they are advocating on behalf of social housing tenants and 
social housing providers, there are issues associated with getting the governing party of the 
day to continue funding. 
From around the mid-1990s onwards Shelter was required to be both reactive and proactive. 
On one hand they were approached to provide advice by acting as a sounding board for 
policy ideas while also required to develop sophisticated analysis of policy issues and 
solutions. Several people I interviewed for this project stated that governments do not 
provide funding for groups so that they can provide ‘policy demands’ but instead wanted 
solution- focussed policy advice. As former Executive Officer Adrian Pisarski told me: 
“Because what they [government] wanted was an organisation that was capable of giving 
them nuanced, sophisticated, reasoned, evidenced- based advice” (Pisarski 2011 interview 
by the author). Underpinning this way of thinking is the assumption that governments do not 
need to be told of the problems as they are fully informed on the policy issues. But policy 
issues and problems, like all aspects of policy development, are in a constant state of flux. 
An organisation, such as Shelter, is well placed to develop a nuanced understanding of 
policy problems as they emerge. There are several examples provided within this thesis 
where the Ministry and/or the bureaucracy used non-state actors as a sounding board during 
the development of policy, indicating that Shelter was in a good position to appreciate the 
impacts and implications of emerging policy. In another telling response, former Director-
General Natalie McDonald described the usefulness of Shelter: 
And I think it certainly made my job - I was going to say - easier is not the right word 
because it sometimes made it a lot harder.  As someone committed to good public 
policy which I am … I felt much more comforted by having a group like Shelter, there 
to talk to, to consult, to be very confident that they would raise issues with me when 
they felt that something wasn’t going right … And I felt that public policy was really 
well served by having that group (McDonald 2013 interview by the author).  
Shelter demonstrated the willingness and capability to represent the concerns of current and 
prospective social housing tenants, during a time when the waiting lists were getting longer 
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and longer. The branch structure implemented in the early 1990s was an important 
characterisation of the organisation which enabled Shelter to claim broad representation of 
the state, not just the south-east pocket. The ability of a peak to represent the interest of its 
sector is highly valued by governments.  
Another issue closely associated with both acceptance by governments and a peak’s 
capacity to represent a sector is the organisation’s relationships with other political players. 
These broader political contexts are important considerations; in order to participate in and 
influence public decision making, successful advocacy groups will influence across a range 
of political actors, both government and non-government. Following the funding of Shelter 
as the sole peak, with the addition of paid staff and new premises the capacity of Shelter 
grew, enabling Shelter to develop relationships with other state and federal departments. An 
opportunity arose following the 2007 election of the Labor federal government led by Kevin 
Rudd, who ensured that affordable housing was high on the political agenda during his first 
spell as Prime Minister of Australia.  
The issue of capture 
While Grant (1989) argued that insider groups run the risk of becoming captured due to a 
shared ideology, Maloney et al (1994) posited that this was more likely a result of capture 
through resources. During the Bligh and Beattie eras Shelter relied on government funding 
and resources, but as these governments were committed to receiving advice Shelter 
remained in a position to engage constructively. The Newman Government, elected in 2012, 
took a very different view of the role of funded advocacy groups, treating almost all of those 
in the welfare sector with suspicion.  
The impact of a favourable political environment on the ability (and opportunity) for Shelter 
to work as an insider group cannot be overemphasised. The capacity of Shelter to provide 
policy advice did not immediately cease when the Newman Government was elected, yet 
the organisation was immediately shut out from policy discussion. During this period Shelter 
experienced great difficulty in engaging the housing ministry. Despite the capacity of Shelter 
to provide advice and policy solutions to the newly elected government, the Newman 
Government was not open to or seeking advice at this stage. 
Capture was demonstrated when the Newman Government decided it no longer wanted to 
fund Shelter for advocacy and policy work but instead funded the organisation to provide 
training and capacity development to the community housing sector – briefly discussed in 
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the following postscript. To remain autonomous interest groups need to generate funding 
from a variety of sources to ensure sustainability. This is a difficult proposition. Individual 
staff members are dependent on government funding for their own livelihood. Further 
research is needed to develop and evaluate sustainable funding models for non-profit 
advocacy organisations. Do they always have to remain ‘lean and mean’ to survive for 
instance, largely relying on volunteers and in some areas on private philanthropy?  
With the benefit of hindsight it is possible that Shelter could have avoided capture by 
developing other sources of funding. But would Shelter have been brought into the fold if it 
had said ‘no’ to government funding? Would it have been allowed to participate in policy 
discussion across many of the stages of policy development if, as an organisation, it had 
avoided becoming a state sanctioned peak advocacy group? Further research into the 
experiences and histories of other Queensland based peaks is required in order to better 
understand the role of non-profit organisations in the development of public policy.   
At the end of 2013 the Queensland Government announced a new purpose for Shelter.  Will 
new grassroots social housing organisations emerge in Queensland to replace Queensland 
Shelter? It is possible that one or more of the housing peaks defunded during the Beattie 
era will take up some of the work, previously undertaken by Shelter.  
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Postscript: Capture 
Shelter’s direction shifted dramatically as I was finalising the writing of this thesis. In October 
of 2013 Housing Minister Tim Mander attended Shelter’s Annual General meeting and 
announced that Shelter had signed a three year funding agreement to “move into its new 
and exciting role of supporting the community housing sector in readiness for the National 
Regulatory System (NRS)82 at the end of 2014 and the Queensland Government’s 2020 
Housing Strategy” (Mander cited in Shelter 201483). Shelter would no longer receive funding 
for advocacy work, but from this point on was funded to develop the capacity of the 
community housing sector. A key goal during this initial three year funding period was to 
ensure that community housing organisations were able to work within the guidelines of new 
national regulations. In the vernacular of the pressure group typology, Shelter was captured 
by the state government: funded to provide training and capacity development not advocacy.  
Prior to the announcement of the change of direction and rationale Shelter was experiencing 
a great deal of structural change. The majority of the Board members, several of them 
serving for some years had indicated that they would not be nominating for re-election. 
Executive Officer, Adrian Pisarski had taken six months long service leave and until his 
expected return, former senior housing public servant Penny Gillespie was acting in his 
place. Shelter was in the process of developing a relationship with Tim Mander as the 
Newman Government continued to announce program cuts and redundancies within the 
public service.  
With around 98% of Shelter’s income sourced from the state government (Spearritt 2012 
interview by the author) the Board could either choose to accept the new funding agreement 
or close down the organisation. Closing down the organisation would have avoided capture, 
and at the same time sent a political message, a somewhat risky proposition within the 
political context with similar organisations closing and messages falling on deaf ears.  
                                            
82 Formally known as the National Regulatory System for Community Housing Providers (NRSCH). 
83 Since removed from Shelter’s website. 
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Shelter communicated its new purpose to its membership: 
We were delighted when our guest speaker at the AGM, Minister Tim Mander, 
announced three year funding for Q Shelter in the new and exciting role of supporting 
the community housing sector to build capacity.  
We believe this new funded role will contribute significantly to the cause of safe, 
secure affordable and accessible housing in Queensland. We are mindful of the 
importance of staying closely in touch with our membership while we navigate the 
changes involved in moving into our new activities ... (Queensland Shelter 2013a). 
At the time of writing, the role for Shelter members is unclear. Previously members and 
delegates were an important avenue for developing Shelter’s policies and work plan 
agreements. The scope of Shelter’s role has narrowed considerably and within the newly 
imposed responsibilities the role for members with a democratically elected board, is 
uncertain.  
From the government’s point of view, Shelter was well structured (and connected) to provide 
training and capacity development throughout the state, albeit with the requirement of new 
staff. Policy, research and advocacy skills were no longer needed. Skills in property and 
asset management, education and sector development were required in order to develop 
the capacity of the community housing sector. Towards the end of 2013 policy and research 
staff were offered redundancies and the Board undertook a recruitment process in order to 
appoint staff with skills in training and business development.  
In December of 2013 Shelter held the first training session: 
The session we are offering will provide you with essential information about 
registration and is targeted to boards, committees of management and senior staff. 
The session will include presentations from Q Shelter and the Office of the Registrar. 
Resources will be available to assist your organisation with decision making about 
registration and critical steps in this process. 
The session will be an opportunity to ask questions and for Q Shelter to better 
understand your learning and development needs as an organisation so that we can 
target our services to meet your needs and those of the sector more broadly.  
The NRSCH involves many responsibilities in the processes of application and 
ongoing compliance. Q Shelter is committed to assisting the sector in this process 
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and to working with you to support the best standards of community housing 
provision. 
(Queensland Shelter 2013b). 
Following this decision by the Newman Government little was left of the existing Queensland 
Shelter, other than its name. Shelter was completely captured, no longer able to advocate 
on behalf of the social housing sector. With the majority of its funding sourced through the 
state government, decision makers were able to dictate a new role for Shelter: a role that no 
longer involved participating in the development of social housing policy, or interrogating 
government policies and the fate of the most vulnerable people in the housing market. By 
September of 2014, Shelter was rebranded with a new logo and tagline. The former logo 
which included the statement, “Housing is a Human Right” was replaced with the somewhat 
lacklustre “Housing Matters".  
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Appendix B: Queensland housing portfolios since 1968-201084 
1st Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 8 August 1968 to 29 May 1969  
Minister for Works and Housing 
Allen Hodges 
 
2nd Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 29 May 1969 to 20 June 1972 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Allen Hodges 
 
3rd Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 20 June 1972 to 23 December 1974 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Allen Hodges 
 
4th Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 23 December 1974 to 16 December 1977 
 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Allen Hodges (until 25 March 1975)  
 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Norman Lee (from 25 March 1975) 
 
5th Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 16 December 1977 to 23 December 1980 
 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Claude Wharton 
  
6th Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 23 December 1980 to 18 August 1983 
 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Claude Wharton 
  
7th Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 18 August 1983 to 7 November 1983 
 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Claude Wharton 
 
8th Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 7 November 1983 to 1 December 1986 
 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Claude Wharton 
 
9th Bjelke-Petersen Ministry, 1 December 1986 to 1 December 1987 
Minister for Works and Housing 
Ivan Gibbs (to 25 November 1987) 
 
Minster for Works, Housing and Industry 
Ivan Gibbs (to 25 November 1987) 
 
Interim Ahern/Gunn Ministry 1 December 1987 to 9 December 1987 
Minister for Works, Housing and Industry 
William Gunn 
                                            
84 The style of this list is based on the list of Federal Housing Ministers Troy (2012) included in his book 
Accommodating Australians. The content used in this list is provided by the Queensland Parliamentary library.  
 248 
 
 
1st Ahern Ministry 9 December 1987 to 19 January 1989  
Minister for Family Services and Welfare Housing 
Peter McKechnie 
 
2nd Ahern Ministry 19 January 1989 to 25 September 1989 
Minister for Public Works, Housing and Main Roads. 
William Gunn (also Deputy Premier) 
 
Cooper Ministry 25 September 1989 to 7 December 1989 
Minister for Works and Housing 
James Randell 
 
1st Goss Ministry 7 December 1989 to 24 September 1992 
 
Minister for Housing and Local Government  
Tom Burns (also Deputy Premier) 
 
2nd Goss Ministry 24 September 1992 to 31 July 1995 
 
Minister for Housing, Local Government and Planning 
Terence Mackenroth (to 16 December 1994) 
 
Minister for Housing, Local Government and Planning and Rural Communities 
Terence Mackenroth (from 16 December 1994) 
 
3rd Goss Ministry, 31 July 1995 to 19 February 1996 
Minister for Housing, Local Government and Planning and Rural Communities 
Terence Mackenroth  
 
Interim Borbidge/ Sheldon, Ministry 19 February to 26 February 1996 
 
Minister for Housing, Local Government and Planning 
Joan Sheldon 
 
1st Borbidge Ministry, 26 February 1996 to 26 June 1998 
Minister for Public Works and Housing 
Raymond Connor (to 28 April 1997) 
 
Minister for Public Works and Housing 
David Watson (from 28 April 1997) 
 
Interim Beattie Ministry, 26 to 29 June 1998 
 
Minister for Public Works and Housing  
Peter Beattie  
 
1st Beattie Ministry, 29 June 1998 to 16 December 1999 
 
Minister for Public Works and Housing 
Robert Schwarten  
 
2nd Beattie Ministry, 16 December 1999 to 30 November 2000 
 
Minister for Public Works and  
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Minister for Housing 
Robert Schwarten  
 
3rd Beattie Ministry, 30 November 2000 to 22 February 2001 
 
Minister for Public Works and  
Minister for Housing 
Robert Schwarten  
 
4th Beattie Ministry, 22 February 2001 to 12 February 2004 
 
Minister for Public Works and  
Minister for Housing 
Robert Schwarten  
 
5th Beattie Ministry, 12 February 2004 to 28 July 2005 
 
Minister for Public Works, Housing and Racing 
Robert Schwarten  
 
6th Beattie Ministry, 28 July 2005 to 2 February 2006 
 
Minister for Public Works, Housing and Racing 
Robert Schwarten  
 
7th Beattie Ministry, 2 February 2006 to 13 September 2006 
 
Minister for Public Works, Housing and Racing 
Robert Schwarten  
 
8th Beattie Ministry, 13 September 2006 - 13 September 2007 
Minister for Public Works and Housing  
Robert Schwarten (until 12 October 2006) 
Minister for Public Works and Housing and Information and Communication Technology  
Robert Schwarten (from 12 October 2006) 
 
1st Bligh Ministry, 13 September 2007 - 26 March 2009 
Minister for Public Works and Housing and 
Information and Communication Technology  
Robert Schwarten 
 
2nd Bligh Ministry, 26 March 2009 – 21 February 2011 
Minister for Community Services and Housing and 
Minister for Women  
Karen Struthers 
 
3rd Bligh Ministry, 21 February 2011 – 26 March 2012 
Minister for Community Services 
Karen Struthers 
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Newman Government85  
 
Minister for Housing and Public Works 
Bruce Flegg  
(3 April 2012 – 14 Nov 2012) 
 
Timothy (Tim) Mander 
Minister for Housing and Public Works: 
(19 Nov 2012 – 14 February 2015) 
                                            
85 The Parliamentary Library will compile information for inclusion in the Queensland Parliamentary Record for 
the 54th Parliament later in the year and is unfortunately not yet available (Queensland Parliamentary Library 
2015). 
 
